Clay v. Weber, No. 24247.

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: Zinter
• Citation: 733 N.W.2d 278,2007 SD 45
• Decision Date: 02 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 24247.
• Parties: Leander CLAY and James Smith, Plaintiffs and Appellants, and Kenneth Muetze, Plaintiff, v. Douglas WEBER, Individually, Tim Reisch, Individually, and Jeff Bloomberg, Individually, Defendants and Appellees.

733 N.W.2d 278 2007 SD 45 Leander CLAY and James Smith, Plaintiffs and Appellants, and
Kenneth Muetze, Plaintiff,
v.
Douglas WEBER, Individually, Tim Reisch, Individually, and Jeff Bloomberg, Individually, Defendants and Appellees. No. 24247. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs on February 13, 2007. Decided May 2, 2007.

[733 N.W.2d 280]

Leander Clay, James Smith, South Dakota State Penitentiary, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Pro se appellants.

James E. Moore, Sander J. Morehead of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellees.

ZINTER, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Leander Clay, Kenneth Muetze, and James Smith (collectively referred to as Inmates) reside in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP). They brought this suit for declaratory judgment against prison administrators Douglas Weber, Tim Reisch, and Jeff Bloomberg (collectively referred to as Administrators). The suit arose as a result of the Inmates' alleged: loss of personal property; diversion of money from their inmate accounts; removal of computers and word processors; and closing the law library. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Administrators based on statutory immunity, and the Inmates appeal. We affirm, but for different reasons.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶ 2.] According to the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts submitted by Administrators,¹ Weber is the Warden of the SDSP. Reisch is the Secretary of the

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South Dakota Department of Corrections, and Bloomberg is the former Secretary.

[¶ 3.] While incarcerated, Smith and Clay were both found guilty of "major infractions" of prison rules. As a result of those infractions, both complain that they were impermissibly disciplined by being deprived of certain personal property in their cells for a period of one year. All three Inmates also alleged that money was improperly taken from their inmate accounts. This money was either earned while working in the SDSP or it was sent to the Inmates by others. Smith further complains about a change in prison policy, prohibiting inmates from owning word processors or computer systems. Smith finally complains that Weber closed the prison legal library.

[¶ 4.] The legal theory underlying all these complaints is the argument that the Administrators were acting without authority because the "policies" at issue were invalid as they had not been formally adopted as an administrative rule. Inmates phrase the legal issue as whether: "Bloomberg and Weber . . . in effect repealed Article XIV section 2 of the [South Dakota Constitution] and SDCL 1-26A-2 . . . [because they] established rule of the DOC by Policy.[²] Repealing 307 [sic] of the [Administrative Rules of South Dakota] without authority of law." The complaint specifically disclaims any violation of federal constitutional or statutory law.

[¶ 5.] Following the submission of briefs and an opportunity to submit supporting and opposing materials, the circuit court granted summary judgment without a hearing. The circuit court dismissed Inmates' claims concluding that the Administrators were entitled to statutory immunity under SDCL §§ 3-21-8 and 3-21-9.³ Inmates appeal raising two⁴ issues:

1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that the Inmates' claims were barred by statutory immunity.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment without a hearing.

Standard of Review

[¶ 6.] Our standard of review is well-settled:

"Summary judgment is authorized `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Krier v. Dell Rapids Twp., 2006 SD 10, ¶ 12, 709 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (citing SDCL 15-6-56(c)). "Once we determine that the material facts are undisputed, our review is limited to whether the law was correctly applied." Id. (citation omitted). "We review questions of law de novo with no discretion given to the circuit court." Wagner v. Brownlee, 2006 SD 38, ¶ 24, 713 N.W.2d 592, 600 (citing Blenner v. City of Rapid City, 2003 SD 121, ¶ 41, 670 N.W.2d 508, 514).

Pauley v. Simonson, 2006 SD 73, ¶ 7, 720 N.W.2d 665, 667. "We will [also] affirm the circuit court on summary judgment if it is correct for any reason." A-G-E Corp. v. State, 2006 SD 66, ¶ 13, 719 N.W.2d 780, 785 (citations omitted).

Decision

[¶ 7.] We initially note that although we affirm the circuit court, we do not rely upon the circuit court's rationale that statutory immunity barred this action.⁵ A substantial portion of this action was a request for declaratory judgment, and we have not been presented with argument or authority that statutory immunity from liability applies to declaratory actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Generally, immunity does not bar such relief. See Dakota Systems, Inc. v. Viken, 2005 SD 27, ¶¶ 8-9, 694 N.W.2d 23, 27-28 (discussing declaratory relief and sovereign immunity). Furthermore, the statutes at issue only provide immunity from liability for damages. See SDCL 3-21-8 and SDCL 3-21-9 (stating: "No person, political subdivision, or the state is liable. . . ."). For both reasons, the immunity statutes were not a basis for summary judgment on the Inmates' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.⁶

[¶ 8.] Consequently, we decline to address the statutory immunity claim. Instead, we address Inmates' underlying legal theory that the Administrators were acting without authority of law because they were acting pursuant to policies rather than lawfully adopted administrative rules. Inmates claim that the Administrators acted without authority in four areas: taking of money, taking of personal property, taking of computers, and closing the law library.

Taking of Money

[¶ 9.] The only record evidence indicating why Inmates' money was taken is a letter from Weber to Muetze in answer to Muetze's request for an administrative remedy on this issue. The letter indicated that the SDSP took the money for the Inmates' cost of incarceration. The pleadings suggest it was taken while the Inmates were working at Private Sector Prison Industries. The Inmates' briefs and the circuit court's opinion do not provide further clarification.

[¶ 10.] SDCL 24-2-28 provides that: "Each inmate under the jurisdiction of the

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Department of Corrections is liable for the cost of the inmate's confinement. . . ." Furthermore, the Department is authorized by statute to take these costs from inmate accounts:

"Each inmate is liable for court-ordered fines, costs, fees, sanctions, and restitution and any obligation incurred while under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. . . . Disbursement shall be made from an inmate's institutional account to defray the inmate's obligation, regardless of the source of the inmate's funds, including moneys in the inmate's institutional account . . . and wages earned by the inmate. . . ."⁷

SDCL 24-2-29. Therefore, even if there were no administrative rules formally adopted under SDCL ch 1-26, the Administrators had statutory authorization for the diversion of the Inmates' money. Consequently, we conclude that the Administrators' diversion of money from the Inmates' accounts was not unlawful, and the circuit court properly dismissed.⁸

Personal Property

[¶ 11.] Smith and Clay claim that their alleged loss of personal property as a disciplinary punishment was unlawful. The property was removed under Department of Corrections Policy 3C.4. Policy 3C.4 provides: "Inmates will be subject to the forfeiture of personal property items as sanction for Category 5 and Category 4 Prohibited Acts." Smith and Clay allege that Policy 3C.4 impermissibly expanded by "policy" the statutory disciplinary sanctions authorized in SDCL 24-2-9 and SDCL 24-15A-4.⁹

[¶ 12.] However, the Department of Corrections was specifically authorized by statute to "prescribe departmental policies and procedures for the management of its

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institutions and agencies, including inmate disciplinary matters." SDCL 1-15-20 (emphasis added). Therefore, Policy 3C.4 was authorized by statute. Consequently, even if there were no validly enacted administrative rule governing the loss of personal property privileges for Inmates' rule infractions, the Administrators were authorized to act by policy rather than rule in this area.

Computers and Word Processors

[¶ 13.] We do not reach the merits of Smith's claim concerning the loss of computers and word processors because his claim is barred by res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata serves as claim preclusion to prevent relitigation of an issue actually litigated or which could have been properly raised and determined in a prior action. Matter of Estate of Nelson, 330 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1983); Schmidt v. Zellmer, 298 N.W.2d 178 (S.D.1980); Gottschalk v. South Dakota State Real Estate Comm'n, 264 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1978). . . .

For the purposes of res judicata, a cause of action is comprised of the facts which give rise to, or establish, the right a party seeks to enforce. Carr v. Preslar, 73 S.D. 610, 47 N.W.2d 497 (1951); Jerome v. Rust, 23 S.D. 409, 122 N.W. 344 (1909). In Golden v. Oahe Enterprises, Inc., 90 S.D. 263, 240 N.W.2d 102 (1976), we approved of the test adopted in Hanson v. Hunt Oil Co., 505 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir.1974), for determining if both causes of action are the same. This test is a query into whether the wrong sought to be redressed is the same in both actions.

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