Claybourne v. State
Decision Date | 28 February 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 0443,Sept. Term, 2011.,0443 |
Citation | 209 Md.App. 706,61 A.3d 841 |
Parties | William CLAYBOURNE v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Allison P. Brasseaux(Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief) Baltimore, MD., for Appellant.
Brian S. Kleinbord(Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD., for Appellee.
Panel: ZARNOCH, HOTTEN, JAMES P. SALMON(Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Appellant, William Claybourne(“Mr.Clayborne”),1 was indicted for first degree murder of Zachary Thompson(“Mr.Thompson”), and two related weapons offenses.During trial, appellant informed the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of his purported waiver of jury unanimity when the jury indicated that it failed to reach a unanimous decision.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder by an eleven-to-one vote and unanimously convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure.SeeMd.Code(1957, Repl.Vol.2012), § 2–201(a) of the Criminal Law Article(“C.L.”)(first degree murder);2C.L. § 4–101(c)(2)( ).3During the sentencing hearing, the court imposed sentences of life imprisonment, suspending all but twenty-five years for first degree murder and three concurrent years for carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure.Appellant noted an appeal, and presents three questions for our consideration:
1.Was Mr. Clayborne's waiver of his right to a unanimous verdict knowing and voluntary?
2.Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it permitted testimony that one of the State's key witnesses had expressed concerns about her safety?
3.Under the law of the case doctrine, was the evidence insufficient to sustain Mr. Clayborne's conviction for openly carrying a dangerous weapon?
For the reasons that follow, we(1) answer the first question in the affirmative; (2) answer the second question in the negative; and (3) decline to rule on the third question.We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The underlying material facts of this case are not in dispute.The State provided critical circumstantial evidence to support its theory that Mr. Clayborne committed first degree murder.Mr. Clayborne raises no challenge to the sufficiency of the murder conviction.4Although the focus of this review is the waiver of appellant's right to a unanimous verdict and an abuse of discretion issue, we present an overview of the trial's history for purposes of this appeal.
On April 3, 2009, at approximately 2:13 a.m., a police officer responded to 433 Watty Court in Baltimore, Maryland for a report of a fatal stabbing.The officer discovered Mr. Thompson lying on his back in the doorway of his home, suffering from an apparent stab wound to his back.5Following a police investigation, appellant was indicted on charges of first degree murder and two related weapons offenses.
A trial occurred between January 11 through January 19, 2011, where the State called several witnesses to establish its prima facie case.Valerie Leak(“Ms.Leak”), a resident of the McCulloh Homes neighborhood, which was approximately one block from 433 Watty Court, testified that at approximately 2:00 a.m. or 2:30 a.m. on April 3, 2009, appellant6 and Mr. Thompson were arguing on her lawn, when she told them to “get the hell away from in front of my door with all that noise.”Mr. Thompson removed a switchblade from his possession and swung it in appellant's direction.After this commotion, Mr. Thompson placed the blade into his pocket and walked towards his home.Ms. Leak further stated that appellant entered her home, grabbed a knife from her kitchen drawer, and proceeded outdoors.7
Appellant returned to Ms. Leak's home about six or seven minutes later, displayed the knife, which was covered in blood, and stated, “[t]his is what I do if somebody messes with me.”Appellant retrieved his jacket from Ms. Leak's home, and never returned her knife.The police arrived and transported her to the Baltimore City Homicide Unit, where she was interviewed and identified appellant's picture from a photo array of possible suspects.
Angela Gibbs(“Ms.Gibbs”) testified that she was good friends with Mr. Thompson, and had known him and Ms. Leak for approximately one to two years.She was also friends with appellant, but had only known him for two months.However, she noted that he occasionally visited her home.Ms. Gibbs was in the neighborhood on the night in question, seeking to partake in a drug transaction.As she neared Ms. Leak's house, she observed Ms. Leak engaged in a dispute with a man.She noticed Ella Gregg(“Ms.Gregg”), Mr. Thompson's girlfriend,
Ms. Gibbs admitted that she had previously indicated to the police that she witnessed the murder of Mr. Thompson, but stated in court that she had not “witness[ed] that exactly,” and was under the influence of drugs at the time.She explained that subsequent to Mr. Thompson's murder, she had been arrested and that the police indicated to her that if she possessed information “about a murder or anything” that she could be released from jail.She was then interviewed by Detectives Aaron Pittman(“Det.Pittman”) and Art Brummer(“Det.Brummer”) on May 14, 2009, and she stated the following:8
During trial, Ms. Gibbs noted that she falsified information regarding witnessing the murder because she believed that she would be released from jail.10She clarified that while Dets.Pittman and Brummer interviewed her, she was not promised anything in exchange for her information concerning Mr. Thompson's murder, and that she never received any personal benefit from her participation in the investigation.
In light of the inconsistencies between Ms. Gibbs' testimony and her statements to the police, the State, over objection, questioned Ms. Gibbs regarding her concern about being a witness:
The State also presented testimony of Ms. Gregg.She testified that she was Mr. Thompson's girlfriend, and that they resided in the same household.On the night in question, Ms. Gregg found Mr. Thompson lying unresponsive on the floor.She proceeded to the door and observed a man walking away from her home with a shiny object in his hand.She then scanned the neighborhood and noticed the same man standing in front of Ms. Leak's house.However, when she spotted him, he ran.Ms. Leak indicated that the man's name was “Bishop.”11
Appellant was arrested on April 17, 2009, and acknowledged that his nickname was “Bishop.”He explained to the police that he had a verbal disagreement with Mr. Thompson over a drug transaction involving the purchase of some “ready.”12Appellant told police, however, that the disagreement occurred early in the day and recited his alibi to the police.13Appellant stated that he socialized with others throughout the day, but refused to identify them.
Jocelyn Carlson, a forensic examiner, testified that in analyzing Mr. Thompson's fingernail clippings, she found that they yielded a DNA profile consistent with a mixture of Mr. Thompson's and appellant's DNA.She further indicated that the chances that an unrelated individual in the African American population could have been a contributor to that mixture was approximately one in 34.2 million.
At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant's counsel motioned for judgment of acquittal:
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: Well, I'll—as to count one I'll submit.As to counts two and three, the only direct testimony we have regarding a deadly weapon in either case is from Ms. Leak and Ms. Gregg.Actually I guess Ms. Gibbs also testifies.
I know that's an issue of credibility, which therefore is in the province of the jury but I would proffer to the Court simply that, particularly Ms. Gibbs, the credibility is so suspect that I believe it should not get to the jury and other than that, Your Honor, I'll submit.
The court denied appellant's motion regarding the counts for murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure, finding that ample evidence existed through which the jury could find the elements of those offenses.During the close of the defense's case, appellant's...
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