Claypool v. Mohawk Motor

• Decision Date: 28 February 1951
• Docket Number: No. 32172,32172
• Citation: Claypool v. Mohawk Motor, 155 Ohio St. 8, 97 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 1951)
• Parties: , 44 O.O. 27 CLAYPOOL v. MOHAWK MOTOR, Inc.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 8

155 Ohio St. 8

97 N.E.2d 32, 44 O.O. 27

CLAYPOOL v. MOHAWK MOTOR, Inc.

No. 32172.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 28, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The specific requirement of a law or ordinance enacted in the interest of public safety prescribes the standard of care required. Failure to comply therewith is negligence.

2. The Rules and Regulations of the Public Utilities Commission of the state of Ohio do not constitute such specific requirement, but a failure to comply therewith may be properly submitted to and considered by a jury as bearing upon the question of negligence. (Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220, approved and followed.)

3. The charge of a trial court, which in effect instructs the jury that the failure of the defendant to comply with the Rules and Regulations of the Public Utilities Commission constitutes negligence instead of instructing the jury that such failure should be considered by the jury only as a factor together with other evidence adduced in determining the issue of negligence of the defendant, is an erroneous instruction and is prejudicial to the defendant.

This is an action for damages for personal injury suffered by the plaintiff, Verna K. Claypool, when the automobile in which she was a passenger collided with the rear end of defendant's trailer.

The automobile, in which the plaintiff was riding, was proceeding in a westerly direction as was also the defendant's truck unit, consisting of a tractor and two trailers, which was then being operated by the defendant's employee. The accident occurred at about 3:00 o'clock on a foggy November morning.

The trial of the case in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff upon which judgment was entered.

The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

A motion for certification of the record having been allowed the cause is now before this court on its merits.

Chas. J. McLaughlin, Toledo, for appellee.

Welles, Kelsey, Fuller, Harrington & Seney and Cobourn, Notnagel, Smith & Moran, all of Toledo, for appellant.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

One of the specific charges of negligence on the part of the defendant, which it is claimed caused plaintiff's injury, was the failure to have any lights on the rear of its trailer.

Whether there were any lights on the rear of the trailer which were burning at the time of the collision was a matter in controversy and the record discloses a sharp conflict in the evidence in respect thereto.

Charges of negligence of the defendant enumerated in the petition were, among others, failure 'to have any tail-light in operation on its tractor or trailers' and failure 'to have lights on its tractor and trailers which emitted any light which would be visible for a distance of 500 feet.'

The trial court in the course of the general charge read to the jury Section 6307-78, General Code, which, in part provides:

'(a) Every motor vehicle, * * * trailer, semi-trailer, pole trailer or any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a train of vehicles shall be equipped with at least one tail lamp mounted on the rear which, when lighted as hereinbefore required, shall emit a red light visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear, provided that in the case of a train of vehicles only the tail lamp on the rearmost vehicle need to be visible from the distance specified.'

The court likewise read to the jury extracts from the Rules and Regulations of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, as follows:

"(c) On every tractor there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors:

"(B) On the rear, one red tail lamp; one red or amber stop light.

"(d) On every semitrailer or full trailer having a gross weight in excess of 3,000 pounds--there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors: * * *

"(C) On the rear, one red tail lamp; one red or amber stop light; two red clearance lamps, one at each side; two red reflectors, one at each side.

"(K) Clearance * * * and tail lamps shall, when lighted, be capable of being seen at a distance of 500 feet, under normal atmospheric conditions, during the time when lights are required.

"The light from * * * rear clearance and tail lamps (shall be visible) to the rear of the vehicle.".

Thereafter the court instructed the jury as follows:

'If the defendant failed to have the required lights lighted on the tractor and trailers, at the time of the collision, such failure would constitute negligence on its part.

'It is a question for the jury to determine, therefore, whether or not the lights required by the statutes and Rules and Regulations of the Public Utilities Commission were lighted and burning at the time of the collision.'

It is to be noted that in addition to the tail-light specifically required by Section 6307-78 General Code, the Rules and Regulations of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, which were read to the jury, require certain other lighting devices and reflectors hereinbefore enumerated.

It is well settled that the violation of a specific requirement of law or ordinance is in itself negligence and if there be such violation there is left for the determination of the jury, under proper instructions, only the question of the commission or omission of the specific act inhibited or required and whether such commission or omission, as the case may be, was the proximate cause of the injury complained of. Variety Iron & Steel Works Co. v. Poak, 89 Ohio St. 297, 106 N.E. 24; Schell v. DuBois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, L.R.A.1917A, 710.

It has been just as clearly settled that failure to comply with the Rules and Regulations of the Public Utilities Commission does not in itself constitute negligence. Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220. It is stated in the syllabus in that case as follows:

'A violation of a safety regulation adopted by the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to authority conferred by section 614-86, General Code, does not constitute negligence per se; but such a regulation is admissible in evidence as bearing on the question of the want of ordinary care.'

In support of the proposition stated in the syllabus, it is announced in the opinion by Williams, J., as follows:

'Assuredly, a violation after the regulation...