Clayton v. City of New York, 82 Civ. 1482 (SWK).

• Decision Date: 25 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82 Civ. 1482 (SWK).,82 Civ. 1482 (SWK).
• Citation: 596 F. Supp. 355
• Parties: Roger CLAYTON, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

596 F. Supp. 355

Roger CLAYTON, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

No. 82 Civ. 1482 (SWK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

October 25, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Conrad J. Lynn, Spring Valley, N.Y., for plaintiff.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel by James F.X. Hiler, New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KRAM, District Judge.

The above-captioned action is before this Court upon the motion by defendant for judgment in its favor either on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or as summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(b). For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Roger Clayton is a citizen of the United States and the State of New York, and is of the Black race.

The defendant, the City of New York ("the City"), is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York.

This case arises out of an incident which allegedly occurred on September 22, 1979. Plaintiff alleges that on that day, at approximately 3:15 p.m., he was lawfully in his own residence — a room located at 109 East 9th Street. "Police officers" came to his residence and asked plaintiff to let them in, which plaintiff did. Thereafter, he alleges, the police officers beat him without cause or provocation. Plaintiff alleges that he was beaten unconscious, then handcuffed and taken to the police station. Upon regaining consciousness, plaintiff was allegedly beaten again with "clubs, blackjacks and rubber hoses." Plaintiff was allegedly hospitalized the following evening.

On September 24, 1979, plaintiff was arraigned on charges of criminal trespass, criminal mischief, sexual abuse, possession of burglary tools, menacing, and resisting arrest. Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance after arraignment. The charges were dismissed in Criminal Court, New York County on January 22, 1980.

On March 10, 1982, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action, alleging that the beating was racially motivated and a deprivation of his civil rights under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ Plaintiff did not name any of the police officers as defendants herein; the City was named as the sole defendant.

On March 18, 1982, plaintiff filed an amended complaint ("the first amended complaint") which included an allegation that a Notice of Claim had been served on the City. Apart from the added reference to the Notice of Claim, the first amended complaint was identical to the original complaint.

In November, 1982, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) on the theory that the first amended complaint sought to hold the City liable on a theory of respondeat superior and was therefore legally insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that municipalities are not liable for acts of their employees solely on theory of respondeat superior).

In response to that motion, on November 29, 1982, plaintiff filed, among his opposition papers, a further amended complaint ("the second amended complaint"). As a basis for the filing of the second amended complaint, plaintiff urged that "Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the privilege to amend is freely afforded the plaintiff." Plaintiff further argued that he was "prepared to demonstrate that the actions of the law enforcement officers ... were part of a general practice of the police officers of the City of New York, when dealing with a minority persons such as black men." Specifically, plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges:

That the police officers and other law enforcement officers deprived the plaintiff of his civil rights as hereinabove stated, pursuant to a long established custom of law enforcement officers in the City of New York, to violently injure and destroy the civil rights of Black men as a policy of intimidation, and with the expectation of enforcing order and preventing protest. That the responsible officials of the City of New York, including the Mayor and Police Commissioner, did not have any program which would alter this long standing practice and custom of the law officers of the City of New York.

Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 9.

Thereafter, the City moved to dismiss the second amended complaint pursuant to Rules 7(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The City argued that plaintiff's attempt to amend the complaint (again) without either leave of the court or the consent of the defendant, and without a noticed motion, was procedurally defective. Moreover, the City argued that the "new" claim against the City was fundamentally different from that asserted in the first amended complaint. As such, the claim would not, the City argued, relate back to the filing of the original complaint, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 15(c). If the claim did not relate back, it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

This Court recognized that the manner in which plaintiff had proceeded in amending his complaint was technically defective and perhaps inartful; however, in the interests of justice the Court construed plaintiff's filing of the second amended complaint as a motion for leave to do so. The Court held further that the "same basic facts" were involved in the different complaints and that the statute of limitations had not run. The Court, therefore, granted plaintiff leave to file the second amended complaint and denied defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court, however, directed the City to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of pattern and practice. The Court further stated that "plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise genuine disputes of material fact. The bare allegations of his complaint are insufficient. If discovery is needed plaintiff must proceed forthwith to seek discovery." This motion ensued.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's claim against the City is comprised of three distinct allegations. First, plaintiff claims that he was brutally beaten by police officers. Second, plaintiff claims that this beating was part of a "long established custom ... to violently injure and destroy the civil rights of Black men." Third, plaintiff claims that the City does not have any program to "alter this long standing practice and custom." Only one of these allegations, the first, contains any assertion of facts. The City argues that these allegations, on their face, are insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983 and that it is therefore entitled to judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

The starting point for any discussion of the liability of a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F.Supp. 455, 458 (N.D.Ill.1982). In Monell, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and held that a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983, and, therefore, may be liable for constitutional deprivations. The Court held, however, that a municipality could not be found liable under traditional concepts of vicarious liability, like respondeat superior, based upon the tortious acts of others. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036; see also Means, 535 F.Supp. at 458. To state a cause of action under section 1983 against a municipality, Monell requires the plaintiff to assert that the alleged unconstitutional act "implements or executes a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers or is visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels." 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. This Circuit has held that those requirements are met where a municipality "impliedly or tacitly authorized, approved or encouraged conduct that resulted in a constitutional tort." Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 (1980) ("Turpin II").

The courts of this circuit have held that greater particularization and specificity are required in the pleadings in order to adequately assert a cause of action against a municipality under section 1983. See Finkelstein v. City of New York, 543 F.Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F.Supp. 1130, 1136-37 (D.Conn. 1978) (citing Fine v. New York, 529 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1975)). In Smith, then District Judge Newman justified the stricter pleading requirements as follows:

The standard for municipal liability predicated on inaction by senior personnel must be frankly acknowledged as difficult to meet. A claim of this sort should not be initiated unless there is a sufficient factual basis to justify the extensive litigation that such a claim entails. The typical § 1983 suit against a police officer for his allegedly unconstitutional action generally involves a single episode. Discovery and trial are entirely manageable. But a claim of municipality liability based on an alleged policy reflected by a pattern of prior episodes will inevitably risk placing an entire police department on trial. Sweeping discovery will be sought to unearth episodes in which allegedly similar unconstitutional actions have been taken, and the trial will then require litgiation of every episode occurring in the community that counsel believes can be shown to involve a similar constitutional violation. Even if a trial is warranted by a complaint that does allege overt acts with requisite particularity, (

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