Clayton v. Colvin, Case No. CIV-12-511-SPS
| Decision Date | 24 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-12-511-SPS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma |
| Parties | PATIENCE L. CLAYTON, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
The claimant Patience L. Clayton requests judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for benefits under the Social Security Act. The claimant appeals the decision of the Commissioner and asserts that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in determining she was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the SocialSecurity Act "only if h[er] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]" Id. § 423 (d)(2)(A). Social security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.2
Judicial review of the Commissioner's determination is limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's review is limited to two inquiries: first, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and, second, whether the correct legal standards were applied. Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997) [citation omitted]. The term substantial evidence has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require " "Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). The Court may not reweigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the agency. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the Court must review the record as a whole, and "[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see also Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
The claimant was born on December 20, 1974, and was thirty-six years old at the time of the administrative hearing (Tr. 201). She has an eleventh grade education and past relevant work as a certified nurse's aide, child monitor, and power screwdriver operator (Tr. 27). The claimant alleges that she has been unable to work since July 29, 2009 because of neck pain, headaches, anxiety disorder, hiatal hernia, degenerative disc disease, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Tr. 246).
The claimant applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and supplemental security insurance payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85, on July 29, 2009 (Tr. 17). The Commissioner denied her applications. Following an administrative hearing, ALJ Michael A. Kirkpatrick found that the claimant was not disabled in a written opinion dated May 23, 2011. (Tr. 17-29). The claimant appealed the determination that she wasnot disabled, but the Appeals Council denied review. Thus, the ALJ's written opinion is the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of this appeal. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. He found that the claimant had the ability to perform sedentary work, i. e., that claimant could lift and carry up to 10 pounds occasionally or 5 pounds frequently, sit for up to six hours and stand or walk for up to two hours with normal breaks, but found that the claimant was limited to simple, routine, unskilled tasks requiring no interaction with the general public due to mental limitations (Tr. 22). The ALJ concluded that although claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work, there is work in the national economy that claimant is capable of performing, i. e., inspector, assembler, and hand worker (Tr. 28). Thus, the ALJ found that the claimant was not disabled (Tr. 29).
The claimant contends that the ALJ erred in the following ways: 1) failing to find additional severe impairments at step two; 2) failing to properly evaluate, consider, and weigh the medical evidence; 3) failing to present a proper hypothetical to the vocational expert at the hearing; and 4) failing to properly analyze her credibility. The Court finds that the ALJ failed to properly analyze the medical evidence of record, and as such, the Commissioner's decision is reversed and remanded.
State examining physician Dr. Patricia J. Walz, Ph.D. performed a MentalDiagnostic Evaluation of the claimant on November 10, 2009 (Tr. 610). During the interview, the claimant related that she has anxiety attacks that prevent her from being around people, feels depressed, and experiences panic attacks and paranoid thinking (Tr. 610-11). The claimant reported that she had seen a counselor on a couple of occasions but could not continue because she had no transportation (Tr. 611). The claimant told Dr. Walz that she had been molested as a child, which caused relationship problems and ongoing nightmares (Tr. 611). The claimant described her health as "not good at all" and related that she experiences weakness on her left side and aches and pains all the time (Tr. 612). After employing several diagnostic techniques, Dr. Walz concluded that the claimant's diagnoses included bipolar II disorder, mixed, chronic PTSD, and panic disorder with agoraphobia (Tr. 614). Dr. Walz also recommended an intellectual assessment and assessed her GAF to be from 45-50 (Tr. 614-50).
State reviewing physician Dr. Phillip Massad, Ph.D. completed a Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) on January 22, 2010 in which he found that the claimant's mental impairments fell under both affective disorders and anxiety-related disorders (Tr. 630). As a result, Dr. Massad found that the claimant had mild limitations in activities of daily living and moderate limitations in both social functioning and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace (Tr. 640). Dr. Massad also completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment in which he found that the claimant was markedly limited in the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, abilityto carry out detailed instructions, and the ability to interact appropriately with the general public (Tr. 645).
On December 19, 2009, state examining physician Dr. Ashley Gourd, M.D. performed a physical examination of the claimant in which she found that the claimant's range of motion in her joints, hands, wrists, and spine were all normal (Tr. 626-28). Dr. Gourd's written notes indicate that the claimant's complaints of both left-sided weakness and chronic neck pain were unsubstantiated during her physical examination, and Dr. Gourd questioned "whether secondary gain is the motivating factor in [the claimant's] multiple persistent medical complaints" (Tr. 624).
The claimant began receiving treatment from Dr. William A. Willis of the Family Medical Clinic in March 2010. In April 2010, Dr. Willis noted that the claimant had a positive ANA, and he planned to redraw an ANA diagnostic cascade in order to more accurately determine a diagnosis. Dr. Willis, however, suspected that the claimant was suffering from "a mixed connective tissue disorder such as lupus" or fibromyalgia (Tr. 668). In September 2010, Dr. Willis noted that the claimant had been suffering from numbness in her left hand along with joint swelling (Tr. 679). Dr. Willis completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Evaluation on June 20, 2011 in which he opined that the claimant could sit for four hours (45 minutes at a time) in an eight-hour workday, stand for one hour (30 minutes at a time) in an eight-hour workday, and walk for two hours (30 minutes at a time) in an eight-hour workday (Tr. 731). Dr. Willis also opined that the claimant could frequently and continuously lift up to five pounds, andoccasionally lift up to 25 pounds (Tr. 731), occasionally push, pull, and reach, rarely work in an extended position and work above shoulder level, and never work overhead (Tr. 732). Finally, Dr. Willis included the following opinions in his medical statement: i) claimant could only occasionally grasp, finger, or perform fine manipulation with her hands; ii) claimant could only occasionally bend, stoop, kneel, and climb stairs; iii) claimant could rarely squat, crawl, crouch, balance, and climb ramps; iv) claimant could never climb ladders or scaffolds; v) claimant should completely avoid unprotected heights, dangerous moving machinery, handling vibrating tools, exposure to respiratory irritants, and driving/riding in automotive equipment; and vi) claimant had marked limitations in her ability to be exposed to extremes and sudden or frequent changes in temperature and/or humidity and limitations on fine visual acuity (Tr. 733).
The claimant's contention that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate all the medical evidence is based, in part, upon evidence submitted to the Appeals Council after the hearing. The Appeals Council must consider such additional evidence if it is: (i) new, (ii) material, and (iii) "related to the period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision." Chambers v. Barnhart, 389 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004), quoting Box v. Shalala, ...
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