Clayton v. Hofbauer

• Decision Date: 25 August 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:09-cv-252
• Parties: DANNY CLAYTON, Petitioner, v. GERALD HOFBAUER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

DANNY CLAYTON, Petitioner,

v.GERALD HOFBAUER, Respondent.

Case No. 2:09-cv-252

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: August 25, 2011

HON. R. ALLAN EDGAR

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Danny Clayton filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his habitual offender, second offense (MCL 769.10), prison sentences of eight to thirty years for two counts of first-degree home invasion (MCL 750.110a(2)), thirty months to six years for possession of a counterfeit prescription (MCL 333.7407 (1)(f)), and twenty-four to thirty-six months for resisting or obstructing a police officer (MCL 750.81d(1)). The respondent has filed an answer and has complied with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The parties have briefed the issues and the matter is now ready for decision.

Petitioner raises the following claims:

I. The two home invasion first degree convictions should be overturned because there was insufficient credible evidence to prove the Petitioner committed them.

II. The Petitioner should not be convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer as well as count I because of double jeopardy.

III. The Petitioner's convictions for home invasion counts I and II must be reversed since the home invasion statute is not applicable to this type of situation where there is not a continuing crime before entering the house, while present inside, and after leaving it.

IV. The Petitioner's convictions for home invasion must be reversed because they are against the great weight of the evidence and involve a miscarriage of justice.

V. The prosecutor's actions denied the Petitioner a fair trial and his due process rights under the Michigan and Federal Constitutions.

VI. The Petitioner's sentence was invalid because it was based on inaccurate information.

VII. Petitioner is entitled to resentencing.

VIII. The Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

IX. There was a jurisdictional defect in the lower court proceedings denying petitioner his state and federal constitutional right to counsel of choice.

X. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial counsel where counsel without consent accepted funds from Petitioner's mother to represent Petitioner knowing a conflict of interest existed as being appointed counsel.

XI. Petitioner was denied his state and federal constitutionally protected rights to effective assistance of appellate counsel.

XII. The cumulative effect of multiple errors by preliminary judge, trial judge, prosecutor, trial attorney, and appellate counsel collectively denied Petitioner a fair trial and appeal of right.

In April of 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) became effective. Because this petition was filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, this Court must follow the standard of review established in that statute. Pursuant to the AEDPA, an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court ofthe United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This provision marks a "significant change" and prevents the district court from looking to lower federal court decisions in determining whether the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). To justify a grant of habeas corpus relief under this provision of the AEDPA, a federal court must find a violation of law "clearly established" by holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Recently, the Supreme Court held that a decision of the state court is "contrary to" such clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. A state court decision will be deemed an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be "unreasonable" "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 412. Rather, the application must also be "unreasonable." Id. Further, the habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a subjective one by inquiring whether all reasonable jurists would agree that the application by the state court was unreasonable. Id. at 410 (disavowing Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)). Rather, the issue iswhether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is "objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.

The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). The habeas corpus statute has long provided that the factual findings of the state courts, made after a hearing, are entitled to a presumption of correctness. This presumption has always been accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 961 (1990). Under the AEDPA, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct. The petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040 (1999).

Petitioner claims that the two home invasion first-degree convictions should be overturned because there was insufficient credible evidence to prove that Petitioner committed them. Petitioner argues that the prosecutor used circumstantial evidence and that inference of criminality may not be drawn because of lack of impelling certainty. Petitioner insists the prosecution offered no evidence that Petitioner entered either of the homes with the intent to commit any crimes. The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed:

Defendant also challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show that he entered either of the two dwellings with the intent to resist a police officer. An appellate court's review of the evidence to sustain a conviction should not turn on whether there was any evidence to support the conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). The evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 515.

The evidence showed that the police were pursuing defendant, had yelled for him to stop, and had informed him that he was under arrest. Immediately before defendant entered the first residence, he was involved in a physical struggle with a police officer during which defendant resisted the officer's attempts to subdue and handcuff him. The officer used pepper spray, but defendant broke free from the officer and ran. The officer chased defendant, who ran inside the residence and locked the door behind him, preventing the officer from following defendant inside. Defendant eventually left the house and the officer continued to pursue him. Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to stop some cars that were driving by. Other officers joined the pursuit, and defendant eventually ran inside an apartment. Two officers followed defendant inside and grabbed him, but defendant continued to fight and resist the officers' attempts to handcuff him. Although defendant asserts that he entered the two dwellings only to obtain relief from the effects of the pepper spray, and not to resist the police, it was up to the jury to determine defendant's intent. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered the two dwellings, which were both occupied, with the intent to resist or obstruct the police, contrary to MCL 750.81d(1), which is a felony. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's two convictions of first-degree home invasion.

Michigan Court of Appeals' decision, Docket #23, at 2-3.

A federal court sitting in habeas corpus review of a state criminal trial is to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of the essential elements of the crime to justify any rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to establish that petitioner committed the crime. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or did not result in a decision that...