Clayton v. State, F-86-165

Citation1992 OK CR 60,840 P.2d 18
Decision Date24 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. F-86-165,F-86-165
PartiesRobert William CLAYTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
OPINION

PARKS, Judge:

Robert William Clayton, appellant, was tried by jury and convicted of First Degree Murder (21 O.S.Supp.1983, § 701.7) in Tulsa County District Court Case No. CRF-85-2501. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, appellant was sentenced to death. From this Judgment and Sentence, appellant appeals. We affirm.

Shortly before noon on June 25, 1985, appellant, a grounds keeper at the South Glen Apartments in Tulsa, Oklahoma, told a co-worker that he was going to take a nap in the shop during the lunch hour. The co-worker returned from lunch to find that appellant was no longer there and that a woman, whom appellant had expressed an interest in earlier in the summer, had been murdered in her South Glen apartment.

Between 12:00 and 12:30 p.m. on that day, appellant arrived at the apartment of Helen Syphurs in another apartment complex close in proximity to the South Glen Apartments. He was breathing heavily and told Mrs. Syphurs that he had been in a fight with a couple of men who tried to rob him. He was shaking his hand and stated that he had broken it in the fight. After using the phone, appellant took a shower, wrapped himself in a towel, put his clothes in a paper bag, and called someone to tell them that due to personal problems he would not be back at work that day. Mrs. Syphurs then took appellant to the home of Don and Sharon Reinke, where appellant and his friend, Tony Hartsfield, also resided.

Appellant arrived at the Reinke's around 1:30 p.m. wearing a towel and carrying a paper sack. He changed clothes and reiterated that he had been in a fight. He told Mrs. Reinke that he needed to wash his clothes because they were bloody. Although Mrs. Syphurs testified that she had seen nothing on appellant's clothes, Mrs. Reinke stated that she noticed blood on the thighs and knees of appellant's overalls which appeared to still be wet. Appellant put his clothes into the washing machine but apparently dropped a blood-stained sock, which police officers later found, on the floor beside the machine. When Mr. Hartsfield and Mr. Reinke arrived home shortly thereafter, appellant told them that he had been in a fight. Both men noticed that appellant's hand was bothering him.

Shortly after 12:30 p.m. on the day in question, William Timmons returned home to his South Glen apartment for lunch. He had been at work since 7:30 a.m., but had spoken with his wife, Rhonda Timmons, at 10:30 a.m. when he telephoned her. Mr. Timmons testified that he received no answer when he called Rhonda at 12:25 p.m. Upon arriving, he noticed that the back door was unlocked and towels and a pillow were laying near the door where his wife evidently had been sunbathing. He entered the apartment and immediately noticed blood everywhere. Yelling for his wife and receiving no answer, Mr. Timmons followed a bloody trail through the apartment to his 18-month-old baby's bedroom where he found his wife's dead body slumped over in front of the baby crib. He called the police and took the baby outside where he waited for officials to arrive.

Officers and medical personnel arrived around 1:00 p.m. and unsuccessfully attempted to revive Mrs. Timmons. An autopsy revealed that she sustained twelve (12) stab wounds to the chest, neck, side and arms, a large bruise to the back of her head, a fracture to the front of the skull, a ligature mark on her neck possibly caused by her bikini top being pulled tightly around her neck, and numerous bruises and abrasions. The medical examiner opined that Mrs. Timmons died from multiple stab wounds and blunt head injuries and that all of the injuries were inflicted prior to death. He further testified that the victim could have lived fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minutes after having sustained the wounds, but likely would have lost consciousness after receiving the head wounds.

A forensic chemist who analyzed the crime scene concluded from blood splatter evidence that at least two, and possibly three, assaults occurred. The first assault was at the back door leading into the apartment. The second assault occurred inside the apartment. A third assault possibly occurred in the baby's bedroom.

After obtaining appellant's name from the apartment manager, as well as other information, police officers went to the Reinke's home to question appellant. Upon arriving around 3:30 p.m., the officers asked Mr. Reinke if "Randy Clayton" (one of appellant's aliases) was there. Mr. Reinke initially denied knowing him but subsequently went into the house to get appellant when the officers urged the importance of talking to him. Mrs. Reinke testified that appellant said he was going to run because the police were there. Mr. Reinke stated that he found appellant sitting on a back bedroom window and persuaded him not to run, but rather to talk to the police.

Mr. Hartsfield testified that as appellant went outside he told Hartsfield not to let the police find out about the folding knife which appellant usually carried. Mr. Hartsfield subsequently found the knife in the backyard about twenty-five (25) feet from the window on which appellant had been sitting, but did not inform the officers of its existence. Pursuant to a consent search, police officers discovered the knife the next day. Expert testimony established that the knife could have caused Mrs. Timmons' stab wounds. However, the expert could not determine whether the minute amount of blood found on the knife was of human or animal origin. During the search, the officers also found appellant's clothes in the washing machine, including the overalls on which Mrs. Reinke had earlier seen blood stains. No trace of blood could be found on the clothes which had recently been washed. However, the officers also found the aforementioned bloody sock which experts determined was stained with Type AB blood. Appellant has Type O blood, while the victim's blood was Type AB.

Appellant agreed to go to police headquarters for questioning. After being advised of his Miranda rights, appellant admitted stabbing the victim but only because she made sexual advances toward him. This statement was held inadmissible because the trial court found that appellant did not fully understand his rights. A subsequent confession containing similar information was admitted over appellant's objection. (See Part III(A) of this Opinion).

During the second stage of trial, the State presented evidence that appellant had used a folding knife to threaten and intimidate a rape victim and her boyfriend in Alabama. Further testimony by Mr. Hartsfield implicated appellant in a beating and robbery of a man in Pasadena, Texas. However, other testimony indicated that Hartsfield, rather than appellant, assaulted the Texas man.

In mitigation, appellant called a psychologist who testified that her examination and testing of appellant revealed that he had a full scale I.Q. of 68, placing him in the lower one to two percentile of the population. The doctor further testified that appellant exhibited passive, aggressive and paranoid traits in his personality, as well as a tendency to be dependent and submissive. She stated that he was emotionally immature and self-centered and unable to empathize with others. Finally, the doctor stated that appellant had disclosed that he had only finished the seventh grade and was mistreated by his alcoholic father.

I.

PRE-TRIAL ISSUES

A.

In his eighth assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to declare unconstitutional the statutes under which he was prosecuted. Specifically, he argues that when the Oklahoma Legislature amended 21 O.S.Supp.1985, § 701.13, they failed to limit the resentencing function for a first degree murder conviction to the same jury that convicted the defendant. He claims that this failure denies such defendants and himself a substantial right.

Title 21 O.S.1981, § 701.13(E)(2), granted this Court the authority to "[s]et [a death] sentence aside and remand the case for modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life." The 1985 amended statute instructs this Court to "[s]et the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by the trial court." In Cartwright v. State, 778 P.2d 479, 482 (Okl.Cr.1989), a majority of this Court held that a defendant sentenced to death "can be resentenced under [Section 701.13(E)(2) ] without violating due process or the ex post facto prohibition of either the Oklahoma or Federal constitutions." This writer dissented to the majority decision on the grounds that the statute should not be applied retroactively where no express provision for retroactive application was provided by the Legislature. See Cartwright, 778 P.2d at 483 (Parks, P.J., dissenting). Although I stand on this interpretation of the statute, I yield to the doctrine of stare decisis in holding that Section 701.13(E)(2) does not violate either the Federal or Oklahoma constitutions. Since resentencing under the statute is not an issue properly before this Court, we need not address either the retroactivity aspect of Section 701.13 or appellant's nineteenth assignment of error, which also...

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