Cle-Ware Industries, Inc. v. Sokolsky

Citation493 F.2d 863
Decision Date26 February 1974
Docket NumberNo. 73-1063.,73-1063.
PartiesIn the Matter of Cle-Ware Industries, Inc., et al., Debtor. CLE-WARE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Howard SOKOLSKY et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

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Mark S. Lieberman, Chicago, Ill., for appellants; Jack B. Schmetterer, Gottlieb & Schwartz, Chicago, Ill., on brief.

Ned L. Mann and Cheryl S. Karner, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellees; Nadler, Sokolsky & Bahas, Benesch, Friedlander, Mendelson & Coplan, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief for Sokolsky, Friedlander and Phillips; Frank Whalen, Wells, Marks & Whalen, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief for Frank Whalen; Robert H. Jackson, Kohrman & Jackson, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief for Kohrman & Jackson.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge, and ALLEN, District Judge.*

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal of an order of the District Court which affirmed an allowance of attorneys' fees entered by a Bankruptcy Judge in a Chapter XI proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. Jurisdiction is based on 11 U.S.C. § 47.

Few issues in bankruptcy administration are litigated so frequently as the question of attorneys' fees.1 Yet few areas of bankruptcy law are as clouded by uncertainty about the meaning of statutes, rules and judicial opinions as the area of attorneys' fees. There is, however, agreement that the allowance of fees to an attorney depends largely upon the facts of each individual case.2 The facts in the present case are set out at length because of the large number of bankruptcy law issues which they raise.

I. THE FACTS

This proceeding was commenced on February 18, 1971, by the filing of a petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act by Cle-Ware Industries, Inc. (Cle-Ware). Approximately one week later similar petitions were filed by nine subsidiary corporations of Cle-Ware. All of the corporations were encountering financial difficulties and sought court-assisted rehabilitation. For purposes of more efficient administration, the cases of the ten corporations were consolidated by the Bankruptcy Court on March 3, 1971.

The debtor corporations were involved in the nationwide distribution and warehousing of automotive parts and accessories and hardware and plumbing parts and supplies. Corporate facilities were operated in Cleveland, New York, Atlanta, California and Puerto Rico, while the Cle-Ware Rayco, Inc. subsidiary maintained 159 retail outlets throughout the entire United States, in addition to a Rhode Island manufacturing plant. The total enterprise employed hundreds of people in various parts of the country and produced an annual sales volume of about $44 million.

At the time of the arrangement, unsecured creditor claims totaled over $15 million and secured creditor claims aggregated over $4 million. The plan of arrangement provided that secured creditors would be paid off completely and general creditors would receive five cents on the dollar with a stock option or the possibility of fifteen to twenty cents on the dollar for those who elected to take deferred payments. The Cle-Ware enterprise was revived by the plan of arrangement and is in full operation today.

When the arrangement proceedings began, the Bankruptcy Judge authorized the debtor-in-possession to continue to operate the corporate business. Attorneys Howard L. Sokolsky and Jerome Friedlander were appointed by the Bankruptcy Judge as counsel for the debtor-in-possession under a general retainer pursuant to General Order 44 of the General Orders in Bankruptcy.3 These appointments were made even though the debtor already had retained other counsel, namely Frank C. Whalen and the law firm of Kohrman and Jackson, who never applied to the Bankruptcy Judge for appointment pursuant to General Order 44. The debtor-in-possession and the debtor were one and the same parties, to wit, Cle-Ware and its nine subsidiaries.

The Bankruptcy Judge attempted "to establish rigid boundaries in which the debtor-in-possession was to operate the Cle-Ware empire." Believing that creditors had little faith in the debtor's ability to operate the corporate business successfully, the Bankruptcy Judge required counsel for the debtor-in-possession to devote their legal skills "to overseeing the entire management of the business in order to protect the assets and prevent losses." To attain this result, the Bankruptcy Judge required that all Cle-Ware expenditures "be made only upon application and order of the Court." Over an eight month period from February 1971 to October 1971, there were 2,487 of these applications submitted to and approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

After a plan of arrangement for all debtors was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Judge on October 13, 1971, the applications for attorneys' fees, which are the subject of this appeal, were filed. Sokolsky and Friedlander, counsel appointed by the court to represent the debtor-in-possession filed a joint application seeking $200,000 compensation. Whalen and the firm of Kohrman and Jackson at the same time filed an application for $180,000 in compensation as attorneys for the debtor.

The attorneys for the debtor also represented Gerald Levine, who owned 165,992 shares of the 394,000 outstanding shares of Cle-Ware stock. They represented Levine in his personal stock negotiations with various parties, including several persons known collectively as the 1300 Group, to whom Levine sold his Cle-Ware stock by an agreement also concluded on October 13, 1971.

The debtor companies, through their new management, filed written objections to the application submitted by the four sets of attorneys, raising serious factual questions about the claims. As to the attorneys for the debtor, it was charged, among other things, that (1) certain of their services were duplicated by the services rendered by attorneys for the debtor-in-possession or should have been rendered by the latter attorneys; and (2) extensive services were rendered on behalf of their personal client, Gerald Levine, the principal stockholder of Cle-Ware, which were not compensable in the bankruptcy proceedings. As to the attorneys for the debtor-in-possession, it was objected that they had failed to document their services with detailed time records. As to all attorneys, it was charged that they claimed compensation for extensive ministerial and administrative services that were not properly compensable as "professional services," and that counsel had duplicated much work of the administrative personnel of the debtor-in-possession and of each other. Without conducting any evidentiary hearing as to these issues of fact, the Bankruptcy Judge allowed a fee of $162,500 to the attorneys for the debtor and $197,500 to the attorneys for the debtor-in-possession.

The following schema outlines the requests and allowances for the respective attorneys:

                                                      Requested
                                             Court   Compensation
                Client                   Attorneys    Approved              Allowance
                Debtor                Whalen and the    No      $180,000   $162,500
                                      firm of Kohrman
                                      and Jackson
                Debtor-in-Possession  Sokolsky and      Yes     $200,000   $197,500
                                      Friedlander
                                                                           ________
                                                Total Allowance            $360,000
                

The appellant debtor companies then petitioned the District Court to review the Bankruptcy Judge's order and to suspend execution thereof, citing as errors the objections to the fee applications that had been overruled by the Bankruptcy Judge and the Bankruptcy Judge's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. The District Court on November 20, 1972, affirmed the Bankruptcy Judge's Allowance of Fees and Second Order of Distribution in a five line order. From that order, this appeal has been perfected.

II. Principles Governing Bankruptcy Fee Allowances

In determining whether the fees awarded counsel were excessive, we are guided by the economic spirit of frugality that underlies the Bankruptcy Act. In In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America, Inc., 157 F.2d 640, 644 (1946), this court, speaking through Judge Martin, said:

". . . the policy of the Bankruptcy Act, manifest in all its provisions regarding expenses and fees, is to reduce to a minimum the cost of administering estates, . . . . the courts are bound to give the statute such construction and application as will fulfill the intention of Congress. In re King, D.C.W.D.Tenn., 11 F. Supp. 351, 357. Among other authorities, reference was made to the opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Realty Associates Corporation v. O\'Connor, 295 U.S. 295, 299, 55 S.Ct. 663, 79 L. Ed. 1446, where he declared for the unanimous court that extravagant costs of administration in winding up estates in bankruptcy have been denounced as crying evils; that, in response to those complaints, Congress had attempted to fix the limit for expenses growing out of the services of referees and receivers; and that a court should not forget that Congress meant to hit the evil of extravagance, wherefore the meaning of the words of the Bankruptcy Act if doubtful, must be adapted to its aims."4

More recently, Bankruptcy Judge Asa S. Herzog has written as follows:

"There is . . . one overriding principle which governs bankruptcy fees and overshadows all other canons. This is the economy principle, often referred to as the `Economic Spirit of the Act\' . . .
* * * * * *
"Economy in administration is now axiomatic, and . . . it is sufficient to note that the Supreme Court has denounced extravagant costs of administration as a `crying evil\' and has warned against `vicarious generosity.\'
"The importance of the economy principle is that it modifies the business standards which ordinarily are the measure of fees. Bluntly, fees in bankruptcy case
...

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