Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-2215,20-2215 |
| Citation | 2 F.4th 112 |
| Parties | CLEAN AIR COUNCIL, Appellant v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Lisa W. Hallowell, Eric V. Schaeffer [ARGUED], Environmental Integrity Project, 1000 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20005, Counsel for Appellant
Mark K. Dausch, James D. Mazzocco, Babst Calland, 603 Stanwix Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, James C. Martin [ARGUED], Colin E. Wrabley, Reed Smith, 225 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Counsel for Appellee
Jason A. Levine, Alston & Bird, 950 F Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20004, Counsel for Amici Appellees Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Chemistry Council, National Mining Association, American Coke & Coal Chemicals Institute, and Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
When Congress writes, context matters. Shorn of their surroundings, some words can mean many things. But context clarifies, and neighboring language often shows what each word must mean.
Following two fires at its steel plant, U.S. Steel polluted the air. Because that pollution violated its Clean Air Act permits and regulations, it reported the incidents to the local officials who enforce that Act. Even so, the Clean Air Council, an environmental watchdog, sued. It argues that under CERCLA, U.S. Steel should have reported the pollution to the federal government too.
All the arguments hinge on the meaning of two words: "subject to." CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) exempts from reporting any "federally permitted" emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 9603. That includes emissions "subject to " certain Clean Air Act permits and regulations. § 9601(10)(H) (emphasis added). The Council says that "subject to" means "obedient to." Under its definition, an emission cannot be "subject to" a permit or regulation that it violates. But that is just one meaning of those words, and not the one that fits here. Rather, in context, "subject to" means "governed or affected by." Since U.S. Steel's emissions were governed by a Clean Air Act permit, that means they were "federally permitted" under CERCLA and thus exempt from federal reporting. Because the District Court got that right, we will affirm its dismissal.
U.S. Steel runs the Mon Valley Works, a major steel facility near Pittsburgh. The Works comprises three plants: The Clairton Plant processes raw coal into coke, creating a byproduct called coke-oven gas. The Edgar Thomson Plant uses coke to make steel. And the Irvin Plant processes and finishes the steel. All three use coke-oven gas as fuel. And all three have Clean Air Act permits.
Burning raw coke-oven gas belches benzene, hydrogen sulfide, and other pollutants into the air. So before the plants use it, the Clairton Plant cleans up the raw gas in several control rooms. But in December 2018 and again in June 2019, fires shut down two of these control rooms, taking them offline for months. During those months, U.S. Steel could not fully process the raw gas, but kept burning it as fuel. That emitted pollutants into the air.
U.S. Steel reported the fires and those emissions to the Allegheny County Health Department. It made these reports to comply with its Clean Air Act permits and regulations.
Rather than creating a federally run regime, the Clean Air Act relies on "cooperative federalism." Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station , 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Act, the federal government sets broad, national standards for air quality. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) ). But it lets states themselves implement and refine the emissions limits needed to meet those standards. Id. (citing § 7410(a)(1)). The collection of a state's regulations is called a State Implementation Plan, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency must approve each Plan. Id.
A key part of the Act is its Title V permit scheme. Title V requires an operating permit for every "major source." § 7661a(a). These Title V permits are comprehensive: they "consolidat[e] into a single document all of a facility's obligations under the Act ... includ[ing] all ‘emissions limitations and standards’ that apply to the source, as well as associated inspection, monitoring, and reporting requirements."
Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA , 573 U.S. 302, 309–10, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) (quoting § 7661c(a)). Each Title V permit incorporates all the requirements of the state's Plan. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.7(a)(1)(iv), 70.2 ; Sierra Club v. EPA , 964 F.3d 882, 891–92 (10th Cir. 2020).
States must submit proposed permits to the EPA, which can issue, reject, modify, or revoke them. § 7661d. The EPA, local agencies, and private citizens may police and enforce violations of these permits. § 7604(a)(1), (f)(4).
Pennsylvania implements the Act. It has an approved Plan and leaves local enforcement to local agencies—here, the Allegheny County Health Department. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2020(c)(2). In turn, the County has adopted its own emissions standards, monitoring standards, permitting programs, and reporting requirements. Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc. , 810 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2016) ; 40 C.F.R. § 52.2020(c)(2). Collectively, these are known as Article XXI. See id. (both sources). Article XXI is incorporated into Pennsylvania's Plan, making its rules "binding federal law under the Clean Air Act." Grp. Against Smog & Pollution , 810 F.3d at 120.
Article XXI requires various reports. If pollution-control equipment breaks down and a source is "substantial[ly] likel[y]" to emit "air contaminants in violation of this Article ... [or] potentially toxic or hazardous materials," the source's operator must immediately notify the Department. Art. XXI, § 2108.01(c)(1). The operator must also detail the breakdown, the types and estimated amounts of pollutants, and the measures being taken to curtail them. § 2108.01(c)(2).
Other federal laws also require reporting emissions of pollutants. One of them is CERCLA. When a facility releases more than a set amount of certain pollutants, CERCLA requires the operator to "immediately notify the National Response Center," a division of the Coast Guard. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). Those who do not face large penalties. See § 9609(b)(1).
But not all emissions have to be reported under CERCLA. Congress exempted "federally permitted release[s]." § 9603(a). That exemption covers eleven types of releases, including:
Only one of the eleven paragraphs exempts air pollution:
• "any emission into the air subject to a permit or control regulation under" the Clean Air Act or state Plans implementing it. § 9601(10)(H) (emphasis added).
This last paragraph is the CERCLA reporting exemption at issue.
By burning raw coke-oven gas, the Clean Air Council claims, U.S. Steel released reportable amounts of coke-oven emissions, benzene, and hydrogen sulfide. The Council sent U.S. Steel a demand letter and then sued it, claiming that these emissions were not "federally permitted releases" under CERCLA. The emissions were not "subject to" the relevant permits, it reasoned, because they violated each plant's Title V permit. § 9601(10)(H). Thus, U.S. Steel had to report the emissions not only to the Allegheny County Health Department, but also to the Coast Guard's National Response Center.
The District Court disagreed. It held that the emissions were "federally permitted releases" because they were governed by —and thus "subject to"—the permits. Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 2020 WL 2490023, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2020). So it was enough to report them to the Department under the Clean Air Act; U.S. Steel did not also have to report them to the Center under CERCLA. The court dismissed, and the Council now appeals. We review de novo. Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh , 989 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2021).
This case turns on what "subject to" means in CERCLA's definition of "federally permitted release," § 9601(10)(H). We start with the phrase's plain meaning when Congress enacted it in 1980. Dueling dictionary definitions support either side. In isolation, "subject to" could have meant either "governed or affected by," as U.S. Steel argues, or "obedient to," as the Council urges. Subject to , Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Those are the only two definitions that could fit. But any ambiguity melts away in context: Congress meant the former, not the latter.
"Obedient to" means "in compliance with." See Obedience , in id. And when defining "federally permitted release[s]" in § 9601(10), Congress most often required "compliance with a ... permit." § 9601(10)(A), (D), (E), (F), (K) ; see also id. (J) ("in compliance with applicable pretreatment standards"), (G) ("authorized under ... injection control programs").
But not in paragraph (H)—the only paragraph addressing how CERCLA works with the Clean Air Act and the only one relevant here. When Congress uses a particular phrase in one section of a law but not in another section of the same law, we presume that it...
To continue reading
Request your trial