Cleaveland v. Malden Sav. Bank
Decision Date | 27 June 1935 |
Citation | 197 N.E. 14,291 Mass. 295 |
Parties | CLEAVELAND v. MALDEN SAV. BANK. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Report from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Walsh, Judge.
Suit by Cora J. Cleaveland against Malden Savings Bank, wherein defendant's plea was overruled by an interlocutory decree and a ruling was made as to inadmissibility of report of master in an earlier suit. On report.
Interlocutory decree overruling plea, affirmed, and ruling as to inadmissibility of report of master in earlier suit affirmed.
P. M Foss, of Boston, for plaintiff.
G. M Poland, of Boston, for defendant.
The defendant filed a plea to this suit in equity. It was overruled by an interlocutory decree. The trial judge, being of opinion that that decree so affected the merits of the controversy that it ought to be determined by the full court before further proceedings, reported its correctness. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, § 30.
The allegations of the bill are in substance these: The plaintiff, on July 27, 1922, being the owner in fee simple of real estate in Malden and being also non compos mentis, without any consideration, signed a deed purporting to convey it to her son, who in 1923 gave a mortgage on that real estate to the defendant to secure his note to it for $3,000. In 1924, the plaintiff brought a suit in equity against her son, praying that her deed to him be declared void, and that he be required to reconvey to her the real estate. The case was tried before a master, who found and reported the facts as alleged. In April, 1926, a decree was entered in that suit ordering reconveyance to the plaintiff of the real estate. Pursuant to that decree the son by deed, in May, 1926, conveyed the real estate to the plaintiff. The mortgage to the defendant is alleged to constitute a cloud upon the plaintiff's title. The prayers are for a decree declaring the mortgage void and ordering the defendant to discharge it.
The plea of the defendant set up the fact (Reilly v. Blackstone, 266 Mass. 503, 507, 165 N.E. 660) that the deed of the real estate in question from her son to the plaintiff, in May, 1926, contained a recital that the premises were conveyed subject to the mortgage to the defendant, which the plaintiff seeks by the present suit to have avoided, and that that deed was recorded and was accepted by the plaintiff. The contention of law founded on the plea is that the plaintiff is estopped by the recital in the deed and her acceptance of it to deny the validity of the defendant's mortgage.
The principle is established that in general a grantee is estopped to deny the validity of a mortgage to which the real estate described in the conveyance to him is declared by the deed to be subject. Johnson v. Thompson, 129 Mass. 398; Cheffee v. Geageah, 253 Mass. 586, 589, 149 N.E. 620; Pearson v. Mulloney (Mass.) 194 N.E. 458. The decisions supporting that proposition have arisen mainly, if not wholly, in instances where the grantee was acquiring a new or different title. Another principle is involved in the case at bar. The deed of the plaintiff to her son was voidable because she was non compos mentis at the time of the execution and delivery. Such a deed is ineffectual to convey a title to land good against the grantor unless ratified and confirmed by the grantor when restored to soundness of mind. Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14-16, 126 N.E. 271; Hermanson v. Seppala, 272 Mass. 197, 201, 172 N.E. 87. The plaintiff did not ratify and confirm the deed to her son, but on the contrary, on recovering her sanity, successfully proceeded in equity against him to set aside the deed on the ground that it was a void instrument because of her mental incapacity at the time it was executed. It is not necessary to inquire whether the deed given by her son to the plaintiff was in conformity to the decree in her suit against him. On the allegations of this bill, the effect of that decree was to declare on the record of the court that the deed was void from its inception. If the mental incompetency of the plaintiff is established in a proceeding by which the defendant is bound, the defendant as an innocent purchaser for value from the son to the extent of its mortgage stands no better than the son and acquired no title to the land. Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 17, 126 N.E. 271. Since the deed of the plaintiff to the son has been declared void, she has been in truth the owner of the land at all times here material. The real question raised by the plea is whether she has ratified or confirmed the mortgage to the defendant. The acceptance of the deed from the son after the decree in the circumstances set forth in the bill and plea cannot with any propriety be treated as an affirmation by the plaintiff of the mortgage given by the son to the defendant. She was not acquiring title by that deed but merely removing an unwarranted cloud on her title.
The acceptance of the deed cannot rightly be treated as an estoppel against the plaintiff.‘ In order to work an estoppel it must appear that one has been induced by the conduct of another to do something different from what otherwise would have been done and which has resulted to his harm and that the other knew or had reasonable cause to know that such consequence might follow. But the doctrine of estoppel is not applied except when to refuse it would be inequitable.’ Boston & Albany Railroad Co. v Reardon, 226 Mass. 286, 291, 115 N.E. 408, 411. This language occurs in Town of Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U.S. 121, 135, 7 S.Ct. 865, 872, 30 L.Ed. 923:‘ No estoppel...
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