Clem v. Case Pork Roll Co.
| Decision Date | 18 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-6809 (FLW)(LHG) |
| Parties | LOUANN CLEM, Plaintiff, v. CASE PORK ROLL COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
**NOT FOR PUBLICATION **
:
This matter comes before the Court on a motion filed by Defendant Case Pork Roll Company ("Case" or "Defendant"), the former employer of Plaintiff Louann Clem ("Clem" or "Plaintiff""), seeking dismissal of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Amended Complaint asserts two claims of associational discrimination by way of hostile work environment and constructive discharge pursuant to: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"); and (2) the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. Plaintiff alleges that Case discriminated against her based on two of its executives making "numerous comments" to her regarding unusual and unpleasant symptoms arising from a gastric bypass surgery performed on her husband, who was also Plaintiff's co-worker. Plaintiff alleges that these comments resulted in the creation of a hostile work environment and her constructive termination. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Specifically, Count I of the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to plead facts that would show the alleged conduct resulted in an alteration of the terms and conditions of her employment, as is required to show the existence of a hostile work environment or constructive discharge and, therefore, has failed to allege an adverse employment action by Defendant. In the event that Plaintiff is unable to cure the deficiencies in her pleading within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Opinion, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II of the Amended Complaint, and that claim will be dismissed without prejudice so that Plaintiff may file that claim in the Superior Court of New Jersey within the 30-day period provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint. Clem was hired by Case in June of 2008 as a part-time Administrative Assistant to the Comptroller, who was also her husband, Richard Clem. Am Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20. Clem alleges that "[a]t all times relevant to the Complaint, Mr. Clem was disabled and/or perceived as disabled under the meaning of the ADA and NJLAD." Id. at ¶ 21. Specifically, in 2010, Mr. Clem weighed 420 lbs. and suffered from the disabilities of morbid obesity and diabetes, which Clem alleges imposed substantial limitations on Mr. Clem's major life activities, including "eating, sleeping, breathing, exercising, and walking." Id. at ¶¶ 22-24, 26.
In October 2010, Mr. Clem underwent gastric bypass surgery and, as a result of that surgery, suffered complications, "such as extreme gas and uncontrollable diarrhea." Id. at ¶¶ 27-28, see also id. at ¶ 29. Clem alleges that Mr. Clem's symptoms "were progressive and worsened in 2013," id. at ¶ 30, and "caused Plaintiff significant disruption in the workplace." Id. at ¶ 32; see also id. at ¶¶ 33-34 ().
Clem alleges that Case's President, Thomas Dolan ("Dolan"), and Case's Owner, Thomas E. Grieb ("Grieb"), complained about the symptoms exhibited by Mr. Clem. Id. at ¶¶ 35-42. Clem alleges that Dolan "complained about Mr. Clem's impaired digestive and bowel functions," id. at ¶ 35, and told Mr. Clem that he "needed to work from home and that the office environment smelled because of Mr. Clem's symptoms." Id. at ¶ 36. Clem also alleges that Dolan told her, on "multiple occasions," that "Mr. Clem needed to work from home because of the complications associated with his surgery and disability." Id. at ¶ 37.
Clem further alleges that Dolan complained to Grieb about Mr. Clem "constantly," id. at ¶ 38, and that when Mr. Clem's symptoms worsened in 2013, id. at ¶ 30, Dolan and Grieb "harassed Plaintiff about her husband's condition." Id. at ¶ 39. Specifically, Clem alleges that Dolan and Grieb "brought the subject up frequently with Plaintiff" and "made numerous comments directly to Plaintiff because of her association with Mr. Clem," including:
Id. at ¶ 40. Clem alleges that Dolan and Grieb made "these comments and other comments like these to Plaintiff on a regular basis." Id. at ¶ 41.
Clem alleges that Dolan and Grieb continued to make these comments "until Mr. Clem was terminated on February 28, 2014." Id. at ¶ 44. On that same date, Clem "terminated her [own] employment because of the [alleged] harassment and discrimination her husband faced as a resultof his disability and the resulting symptoms as well as the [alleged] harassment and severe and pervasive environment that she was subjected to as a result of her husband's disability or perceived disability." Id. at ¶ 45.
On or about September 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at ¶ 13, Ex. A. On or about June 11, 2015, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue letter. Id. at ¶ 15, Ex. B
On September 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant. On November 23, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which was terminated as a result of Plaintiff filing an Amended Complaint on December 9, 2015. On December 28, 2015, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a claim "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must first separate the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This standard requires the plaintiff to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but does not create as high of a standard as to be a "probability requirement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Third Circuit requires a three-step analysis to meet the plausibility standard mandated by Twombly and Iqbal. First, the court should "outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to astate a claim for relief." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). Next, the court should "peel away" legal conclusions that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (). It is well-established that a proper complaint "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Finally, the court should assume the veracity of all well-pled factual allegations, and then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A claim is facially plausible when there is sufficient factual content to draw a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The third step of the analysis is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
The ADA prohibits employers from taking adverse employment action against an employee "because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4); see Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2009). To state a prima facie claim of association discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) the plaintiff was "qualified" for the job at the time of the adverse employment action; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) the plaintiff was known by his employer at the time to have a relative or associate with a disability; (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the employer's decision.
Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)), aff'd, 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2016); Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2011); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 1999); Pollere v. USIG Pa., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 680 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff's allegations satisfy the first and third elements. Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss turns on whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she was (1) subjected to an adverse employment...
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