Clema v. Colombe, 11-CV-0807-MV-WPL
| Decision Date | 03 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-CV-0807-MV-WPL,11-CV-0807-MV-WPL |
| Parties | JOHN CLEMA, Plaintiff, v. PAUL COLOMBE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff John Clema's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Orders Documents##58 [sic] & 108 and to Reinstate Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff John Clema [Doc. 118], Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Damon Fay [Doc. 120], Defendant Colombe's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts II and II of the First Amended Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief [Doc. 121], and Defendant Colombe's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Qualified Immunity Grounds as to Count I of the First Amended Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief [Doc. 125]. The Court, having considered the Motions, briefs, relevant law, attached exhibits, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that Defendant Colombe's Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. 121, 125] are well-taken and therefore will be GRANTED and that all other pending motions are not-well taken and will be DENIED.
In light of the complicated procedural history and cross-motions before the Court, the Court will cabin its factual analysis to those portions of the narrative that the Court believes are dispositive in this case. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on July 10, 2009, Officer Colombe initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Plaintiff Clema was a passenger. Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("DSUMF") ¶ 1. See also Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("PSUMF") ¶ 1. After detecting the "odor of alcoholic [sic] beverage" emanating from the driver, the officer ordered the driver to exit the vehicle and submit to a field sobriety test. PSUMF ¶ 2; DSUMF ¶ 2. At the conclusion- of this field sobriety test, Defendant "arrested the driver for Driving Under the Influence ('DUI') of alcohol." DSUMF ¶ 2. After arresting the driver, Officer Colombe returned to the vehicle and "informed the passengers that he had arrested the driver and asked if they could call someone to pick them up from the scene." Id. ¶ 4.
At this point, Plaintiff asked Officer Colombe if the officer could "check [Clema] to see whether he (Clema) was sober." Id. ¶ 5. Defendant attempted to respond that he could tell "by [Clema's] slurred speech right now," that Clema was intoxicated, "but Clema interjected" that "If you don't—if you don't, then I think--." Id. ¶ 6. Apparently, Plaintiff then tried to exit the car because "Officer Colombe can be heard on videotape cautioning Clema to stay in the vehicle." Id. ¶ 7. Clema then "asked Officer Colombe a second time whether Officer Colombe could check to see if he (Clema) was sober." Id. ¶ 8. After this second request, "Officer Colombe toldClema that he could administer a preliminary field test to him right then if that is what Clema would like." Id. ¶ 9. In response, "Clema began to advise Officer Colombe what would happen in a court of law if Officer Colombe refused to give him a breathalyzer test." Id. ¶ 10.
During this conversation, Plaintiff had, evidently, attempted to touch the flashlight in Officer Colombe's hand, which caused Officer Colombe to react by raising "his right hand up from the position where he had been holding it near his lower chin and extended it in one swift motion so that his hand was over his head." Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Clema protested "well, don't put it in my lights-- in my--," but Officer Colombe explained that "he was shining a flashlight into the vehicle for his own safety and asked Clema to cooperate." Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Clema retorted "are you cooperating with a citizen?" Id. ¶ 18. Defendant Colombe "attempted to respond," but Plaintiff interjected that he "was happy to drive home." Id. ¶ 19. Officer Colombe then explained that he would not permit Clema to drive the vehicle home, presumably because the officer believed Clema to be intoxicated. Id. ¶ 20.
Clema's behavior then became increasingly belligerent and erratic. He "began to ask the other passenger whether he was following the conversation" and shouted over Officer Colombe to say that Id. ¶ 21. At this point, Officer Colombe opened the vehicle door, "interrupted Clema and asked him to step outside the vehicle and advised that he would be placed under arrest for parties to a crime." Id. ¶ 22.
The following day, on July 11, 2009, "Officer Colombe filled out a criminal complaint form (the 'Complaint') against Clema for filing with the Magistrate Court for the County and stated in the Complaint that he had arrested Clema for parties to a crime." Id. ¶ 23. In this Complaint, Colombe noted "that he would be closing the case and sending the Complaint, Supplemental Report and the Santa Fe Detention Arrest/Booking Sheet to the County District Attorney's Office for review." Id. ¶ 24. Evidently, the case against Clema was not prosecuted. The facts before the Court do not make entirely clear what happened. At his deposition, Officer Colombe explained that "Clema's criminal case would have gone to the Magistrate Court as a misdemeanor offense, but that [Colombe] never received a subpoena to appear before the Court and did not prosecute the case or attend a hearing on it, and would typically assume when that happened that the defendant had reached a plea bargain" with the District Attorney. Id. ¶ 25.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a "motion to reconsider," it is well-established in this circuit that such motions are interpreted as requests for an amendment to or relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b), respectively, or as an invocation of the district court's inherent "discretion to revise interlocutory orders before the entry of a final judgment." Wagner Equip. Co. v. Wood, 289 F.R.D. 347, 349 (D.N.M. 2013). Consequently, a "district court has considerable discretion in rulingon a motion to reconsider." Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 308 F.R.D. 410, 427 (D.N.M. 2015) (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir.1997)).
It is firmly-established that the "[g]rounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). See also Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1212 (10th Cir. 2012) (). "'Thus,'" as courts in this circuit have emphasized repeatedly, "'a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law.'" Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1218 (D.N.M. 2014) (quoting Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012). It is therefore inappropriate for a litigant to seek to "reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion." Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012. Plaintiff fails to meet this burden here.
Stated succinctly, Plaintiff Clema asks that this Court reconsider two of its prior decisions and "reinstate Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action" in light of a recent opinion issued by the New Mexico Supreme Court. See Doc. 115 at 1. As listed in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, his Seventh Cause of Action was a"Claim against Sheriff Robert A. Garcia for Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Doc. 51 at 10. This was the sole claim for supervisory liability in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and the only cause of action at issue in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Sheriff Garcia's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 108]. While Plaintiff also requests reconsideration of a prior Memorandum Opinion and Order [Doc. 58], he does so only insofar as it establishes a rule of decision in this case that Clema argues has subsequently been altered by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
In deciding that Sheriff Garcia was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this Court explained that to "establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) an officer committed an underlying constitutional violation, (2) a municipal policy or custom exists, and (3) there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged." Doc. 108 at 10. The Court continued that Plaintiff's official capacity claim could not survive summary judgment because he "identifie[d] no official policy" that caused his alleged injuries and, further, had not offered sufficient evidence to establish that the County of Santa Fe acted with deliberate indifference, as would "sustain an official capacity Section 1983 claim." Id. at 6, 10-13. Now, on reconsideration, Plaintiff insists that he "has obtained additional evidence of the County's deliberate indifference in failing to supervise and train Defendant Colombe and other Tribal Officers from the deposition of Defendant Colombe." Doc. 115 at 6. Plaintiff's proffer is unavailing. First, nowhere in his brief does Plaintiff argue that this "additional evidence" is "new evidencepreviously unavailable" to him, nor does he explain why the testimony of Defendant Colombe would have been "unavailable" to him when he responded to Defendant Garcia's Motion for Summary Judgment. Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
Indeed, as was amply explained by Magistrate Judge Scott in his Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Stay of Discovery [Doc. 45], Clema had an opportunity to obtain...
To continue reading
Request your trial