Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of Am.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1905
• Citation: 103 N.W. 402,14 N.D. 116
• Parties: CLEMENS et al. v. ROYAL NEIGHBORS OF AMERICA.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

14 N.D. 116

103 N.W. 402

CLEMENS et al.

v.ROYAL NEIGHBORS OF AMERICA.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Feb. 28, 1905.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Under the language of a benefit certificate of insurance in a fraternal society, stating that said certificate shall be void “if the member holding this certificate * * * shall die * * * by any means or act which if used or done by such member while in the possession of all natural faculties unimpaired * * * would be self-destruction,” a death by suicide avoids the policy; and such language is equivalent to providing that death by self-destruction, whether sane or insane, avoids the policy.

2. In case of death under circumstances not explained, the legal presumption is that such death was not by suicide, and that presumption will remain until overcome by evidence establishing a death by suicide.

3. Where the circumstances surrounding the death of a person all point to death by suicide, and there are no facts from which a different conclusion might be reasonably reached or inferred, a directed verdict will be sustained-that death was caused by suicide.

4. Where a note is found in a room where a person is found dead, caused by violence, and such note is in the handwriting of the deceased, and gives directions as to burial and other matters, such note is competent evidence on the question whether the death was suicide or not.

5. Ambiguous language in a certificate of insurance will be construed in favor of the insured.

Appeal from District Court, Cass County; Charles A. Pollock, Judge.

Action by Peter Clemens and others against the Royal Neighbors of America. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

S. G. Roberts and Martin Ryan, for appellants. Morrill & Engerud, for respondent.

MORGAN, C. J.

Action upon a benefit certificate of insurance issued by the defendant, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, doing business in this state as a fraternal beneficial society. The members of the society are permitted to avail themselves of the benefit of the insurance provided for by its by-laws upon the acceptance of an application for insurance, payment of a certain fee, and the issuing of a certificate by the society. Payment of losses by the death of insured members is provided for by the collection of assessments from the members. The complaint alleges that one William Clemens received from the defendant a benefit certificate of insurance on the 9th day of May, 1899, and that the defendant thereby insured the life of said Clemens for a sum not to exceed $2,000; that said certificate provided that, in case of the death of said Clemens, said sum should become payable to his surviving children; that said Clemens died on the 3d day of November, 1900; that the defendant refuses to make an assessment from the members to pay said surviving children, although due proof of the death of said Clemens has been made as provided by the laws of said society. The answer alleges that said Clemens came to his death by suicide, and that, under the contract of insurance entered into between the defendant and Clemens, death by suicide forfeited all insurance. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiffs procured a settlement of a statement of the case, and have appealed from the judgment.

The plaintiffs contend that the judgment should be reversed upon three grounds: (1) That the defendant is estopped from claiming that death by suicide is a forfeiture of the right to the insurance provided for by the benefit certificate; (2) that the evidence bearing upon the question of the suicide of Clemens should have been submitted to the jury; (3) that errors were committed in receiving and excluding evidence at the trial.

Upon the first question, the evidence shows that the certificate of insurance contained the following provision: That “William Clemens is entitled to the privileges of this order and the beneficiary or beneficiaries * * * to participate in its benefit fund * * * which will be paid to his children * * * subject to all conditions of this certificate and the laws of this order and liable to forfeiture if said neighbor shall not comply with the said conditions, laws and such by-laws and rules as are now in force or hereafter may be adopted by the supreme camp of the order,” etc. The application for membership was made a part of the benefit certificate, by express language, and contained the following stipulation or admission: “I understand that the laws of this order now in force or hereafter enacted enter into and become a part of every contract of indemnity by and between the members and the order and govern all rights thereunder. I understand and agree that this order does not indemnify against death from suicide,” etc. Section 102a of the by-laws of the order provided as follows: “If any member of this society holding a benefit certificate heretofore or hereafter issued shall come to his or her death by his or her hands, sane or insane, said benefit certificate of said member shall thereby become absolutely null and void.” It is stipulated by the parties that this section of the by-laws was in force when the application was made, and when the certificate and all its terms and conditions were accepted in writing by Clemens, and ever since has been in force. The appellant concedes that, under the language of the application and section 102a, death by suicide would render the certificate null and void, and subject to forfeiture. But it is argued that the following clause of the certificate, stating that it will be void “if the member holding this certificate * * * shall die * * * by any means or act which if used or done by such member while in possession of all natural faculties unimpaired would be deemed self-destruction,” is so ambiguous and obscure and contradictory, and inconsistent with the provisions of the application and by-laws, that no effect can be given to it, and that the defendant should be estopped from asserting any defense based thereon. It is true, as contended, that ambiguous stipulations in a contract of insurance will be construed in favor of the beneficiary, and most strongly against the insurer. The reason why such construction is given such contracts is that the contracts are prepared by the insurer. Cook v. Benefit League (Minn.) 79 N. W. 320; Joyce on Insurance, § 65. A court will not indulge in a liberal construction of the terms of an insurance contract to uphold a forfeiture, but will construe such contracts so as to avoid a forfeiture, if the language thereof will sustain such a construction. Kerr on Insurance, p. 432; Warwick v. Supreme Council K. of D. (Ga.) 32 S. E. 951;Inghram v. National Union (Iowa) 72 N. W. 559;Wallace v. German-American Ins. Co. (C. C.) 41 Fed. 742.

The principle contended for is not, however, applicable to the conditions in the benefit certificate in this case. The language used conveys but one meaning. It is not susceptible of an ambiguous construction, nor can the language be construed to convey any meaning inconsistent with the by-laws referring to the same subject-matter. The idea conveyed is that if the assured shall die by his own act, or through means of his own selection, the certificate would be void, whatever his condition of mind at the time. It is equivalent to saying that if the assured should die by his own hand, whether sane or insane, the certificate...