Clement v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.
| Decision Date | 25 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | 14–AA–801.,Nos. 14–AA–343,s. 14–AA–343 |
| Citation | 126 A.3d 1137 |
| Parties | Royston CLEMENT and Marie Eason, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent. and Center Radiology, et al., Intervenors. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Matthew Peffer, Greenbelt, MD, and David M. Snyder, were on the brief for petitioners.
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, with whom Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. Alikhan, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief for respondent.
Joseph C. Veith, was on the brief for Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox, et al.
Theresa M. Colwell, Baltimore, MD, entered an appearance for Center Radiology, et al.
Mary G. Weidner, Baltimore, MD, was on the brief for intervenors.
Before GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and NEWMAN, Senior Judge.
This consolidated appeal concerns the interpretation of D.C.Code § 32–1505(b) (2012 Repl.), specifically whether the phrase "temporary or permanent partial disability" refers to "temporary total" or "temporary partial" disability. Petitioners Royston Clement and Marie Eason requested that the Department of Employment Services ("DOES") enforce their Workers' Compensation orders after their employers stopped paying their temporary total disability benefits after 500 weeks. In both cases, the Compensation Review Board ("CRB") construed § 32–1505(b) to include a 500–week limit on the payment of temporary total disability benefits and denied petitioners' request. We affirm the CRB's interpretation of the statute and deny Mr. Clement's and Ms. Eason's petitions for review.
Mr. Clement injured his left leg while working as a copy clerk in April 2000 and was awarded temporary total disability benefits. In November 2009, his employer issued a notice stating that it would soon stop paying because Mr. Clement's temporary total disability benefits payment was subject to a 500–week cap. Mr. Clement filed a motion seeking a declaration that his employer was in default. A DOES Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that his employer's obligation to pay temporary total disability benefits was not subject to the 500–week cap and granted his motion.
Nevertheless, the CRB reversed the ALJ's order on appeal, finding that "[w]hile the actual language of [§ 32–1505(b) ] is susceptible to alternative constructions, the rationale accompanying [the] amending language makes it clear that the Council intended to limit the payment of temporary total benefits to 500 weeks." On remand, another ALJ, bound by the CRB's interpretation of the statute, concluded that the employer's obligation to pay temporary total disability benefits had lawfully ceased in November 2009 and denied Mr. Clement's request. The CRB affirmed this subsequent order.
Ms. Eason was awarded temporary total disability benefits as of May 2003. In May 2013, her employer issued a Notice of Final Payment. On March 10, 2014, the ALJ held, consistent with her recent decision in Clement, that the employer's obligation to pay benefits had ceased after 500 weeks and denied Ms. Eason's request to hold her employer in default. The CRB affirmed this order.
The Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA"), D.C.Code § 32–1501 et seq., provides compensation to private-sector workers who suffer disabilities as a result of workplace injuries. The WCA classifies a disability as either permanent or temporary, and also as either total or partial. Section 32–1508 provides that in the cases of permanent total disability and temporary total disability, "66 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance thereof. " D.C.Code § 32–1508(1), (2) (emphasis added). In addition, "[i]n the case of temporary partial disability, the compensation shall be 66 2/3% of the injured employee's wage loss to be paid during the continuance of such disability, but shall not be paid for a period exceeding 5 years. " D.C.Code § 32–1508(5) (emphasis added).
In 1999, a statute amending the WCA was enacted. It states in relevant part: "[f]or any one injury causing temporary or permanent partial disability, the payment for disability benefits shall not continue for more than a total of 500 weeks. " D.C.Code § 32–1505(b) (emphasis added). The issue on appeal is whether the CRB erred in construing § 32–1505(b) to set a 500–week limit on the payment of temporary total disability benefits.
We review the CRB's decision that affirmed the ALJ's compensation order—we do not directly review the ALJ's determination on appeal. Jones v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 41 A.3d 1219, 1221 (D.C.2012). "We will affirm the CRB's decision unless it was ‘[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ " Id. (quoting D.C.Code § 2–510(a)(3)(A) (2001) ). Given the CRB's expertise in administering the WCA, even though we review the CRB's legal conclusions de novo, we will defer to the CRB's reasonable interpretations of WCA ambiguous provisions. Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 960 A.2d 603, 606 (D.C.2008). In fact, we have said that the CRB's "interpretation is binding unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the enabling statute." Hiligh v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 935 A.2d 1070, 1073 (D.C.2007).
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning. Mazanderan v. District of Columbia Dep't of Pub. Works, 94 A.3d 770, 774 (D.C.2014). However, "we recognize that even where statutory language has a superficial clarity, a detailed consideration of other factors, such as the specific context in which that language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole, when viewed in light of the statute's legislative history, may reveal ambiguities that this court must resolve."Id. Where a statute is ambiguous, the statute's legislative history is relevant in determining its appropriate meaning. See United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154–55, 53 S.Ct. 28, 77 L.Ed. 223 (1932) ; District of Columbia v. Acme Reporting Co., 530 A.2d 708, 713 (D.C.1987).
Here, the language of § 32–1505(b) as written is ambiguous, especially when read in conjunction with § 32–1508(5). As defined by the WCA, temporary disability benefits are categorized as either total or partial. However, § 32–1505(b) does not state as to which of these temporary disability benefits it applies; it simply states "temporary or permanent partial disability." D.C.Code § 32–1505(b) ; cf. Hiligh, supra, 935 A.2d at 1074 ().
Petitioners insist that a plain reading of § 32–1505(b) indicates that it applies only to partial disability benefits, either temporary or permanent. Petitioners, however, fail to address the statutory conflict created by their interpretation. The WCA already has a provision limiting the payment of temporary partial disability benefits to five years. D.C.Code § 32–1508(5). If § 32–1505(b) also applies to temporary partial disability benefits, we would have two conflicting statutory provisions—one of which has a five-year cap while the other one has a 500–week cap on the same type of benefits.
Petitioners attempt to resolve this statutory conflict by suggesting a "combined" interpretation of these two provisions, in which "an injured worker is entitled to receive a maximum of 500 weeks' worth of partial wage loss benefits, whether they be temporary or permanent, for which a maximum of 5 years' worth can be temporary partial disability benefits." Petitioners, however, provide no legislative support for their interpretation.
We find petitioners' "combined" interpretation unpersuasive. Basic statutory interpretation requires that statutes should be construed "so as to avoid rendering superfluous" any statutory language. Astoria Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). Here, petitioners' "combined" interpretation suggests that the 500–week cap applies to both temporary partial and permanent partial disability, but temporary partial disability benefits payment would still be subject to the five-year cap in § 32–1508(5). This interpretation renders the term "temporary" in § 32–1505(b) essentially unnecessary, or "superfluous," because the 500–week cap would have no effect on temporary partial disability benefits payment. Therefore, we reject petitioner's "combined" interpretation. Even if defensible, such a reading does not render the CRB's alternative interpretation "plainly erroneous" or inconsistent with the WCA. Hiligh, supra, 935 A.2d at 1073.
Having determined that § 32–1505(b) is in fact ambiguous, the CRB properly relied on legislative history to interpret the statute. We hold that the CRB's interpretation of § 32–1505(b) is reasonable and not otherwise ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Dist. of Columbia
...that statutes should be construed ‘so as to avoid rendering superfluous’ any statutory language," Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Empl. Services, 126 A.3d 1137, 1140 (D.C. App. 2015) (quoting Astoria Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2......
-
Vining v. Council of the D.C.
...referred to statutorily protected information, it would render Exemption 6 superfluous. See, e.g., Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 126 A.3d 1137, 1140 (D.C.2015) (“Basic statutory interpretation requires that statutes should be construed so as to avoid rendering super......
- Hickerson v. United States
-
Stevens v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Health
...by making the Act applicable to educational service RIFs as well as other government RIFs. Id.7 See Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 126 A.3d 1137, 1141 (D.C. 2015) (relying on purposes listed in bill preamble as evidence of the Council's legislative intent); Expedia, ......