Clements v. Clinton Cnty.
| Decision Date | 22 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 54A05–1205–PL–272.,54A05–1205–PL–272. |
| Parties | Jacqueline R. CLEMENTS, Appellant–Counterclaim Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY, Indiana, by and Through the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF CLINTON, Ted R. Johnson, Barbara Conner, Michael W. Conner and William Clinton, Appellees–Counterclaim Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Montgomery Circuit Court; The Honorable Harry A. Siamas, Judge; Cause No. 54C01–0907–PL–240.
Edward R. Hannon, Steuerwald Hannon Zielinski & Witham, LLP, Danville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
James S. Stephenson, Ian L. Stewart, Stephenson Morow & Semler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
Jacqueline R. Clements (“Clements”) appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to correct error, which challenged the dismissal of her counterclaims against Clinton County by and through the Clinton County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”), and her complaint against Ted R. Johnson (“Johnson”), Michael W. Conner (“Michael”), and William Clinton (“Clinton”) (collectively, “the County”), and Barbara Conner (“Barbara”) (altogether, “the Defendants”).
We affirm.
Clements and the Defendants present numerous issues for our review. We restate these as one issue: whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Defendants on Clements's claims for malicious prosecution. 1
Clements was the Clinton County Auditor from August 2004 to November 2008. During her term in office, changes were made to the Indiana Administrative Code that required changes to the County's tax assessment software. Clements, in her capacity as Auditor, was involved in the process of identifying, bidding, and recommending to the Board software programs that would comport with the changes in the Indiana Administrative Code.
The County already had a software system in place, but, separate from any required changes related to the Indiana Administrative Code, the existing system lacked certain features that Clements and others deemed desirable. Clements and others with the County investigated other software programs. Among these software programs was a product from Nikish Software Corp. (“Nikish”), which Clements and others recommended that the Board select.
The Board eventually selected the software package Clements recommended, with a final price to the Board of $99,500. After delays in the development and implementation of the software and the production of apparently inaccurate results from the Nikish system, relations between the Board and Nikish soured sometime during 2008. Also around this time, the County's prior software vendor informed the County of the availability of an update for the prior software that was expected to cost significantly less than the Nikish system.
Subsequent to this, the Board sought to cancel the contract with Nikish. On May 20, 2009, the Board filed suit against Nikish and Clements. On June 26, 2009, the Board filed its first amended complaint, alleging breach of contract and fraud against Nikish; alleging negligence, fraud, and intentional interference with contractual relations against Clements; seeking declaratory judgment against Nikish concerning ownership of the software system; and seeking compensation under the Indiana Civil Action by Crime Victim Statute. Clements filed her answer and counterclaims on June 20, 2009, and alleged that the Board had initiated the litigation against her in bad faith and had engaged in abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
In March 2010, Clements filed a motion for summary judgment on the allegations the Board had brought against her, arguing that she was entitled to immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) for discretionary actions taken during her term as County Auditor. The trial court agreed, and also concluded that the evidence produced by the Board did not support a conclusion that she had engaged in fraud. Clements had also sought attorney's fees and costs, but the trial court denied her request. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Clements, but reversed the trial court's denial of Clements's request for attorney's fees and costs.
After this Court's decision, the Board filed its petition seeking transfer of jurisdiction over the appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. Our supreme court denied the petition to transfer on September 2, 2011, after which the matter returned to the trial court for consideration of Clements's counterclaims.
On October 7, 2011, Clements moved the trial court for leave to file an amended counterclaim, which would dismiss her allegation of bad-faith litigation as having been resolved upon appeal and leave standing her allegations of abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The trial court granted Clements's motion on October 12, 2011.
On November 2, 2011, the Board filed a motion to dismiss Clements's amended counterclaim for failure to state a claim under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing that the Board was immune from liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The trial court agreed and entered an order dismissing Clements's amended counterclaim.
Clements then filed her second amended counterclaim against the Board, which incorporated into it a complaint against Johnson, Clinton, and Michael Conner, and Barbara Conner, each as individuals not entitled to receive Indiana Tort Claims Act-compliant notices for varying reasons. Clements's claims against the Defendants no longer differentiated between abuse of process and malicious prosecution, and instead alleged that each of the Defendants committed the tort of malicious prosecution.
On January 9, 2012, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Clements's second amended counterclaim and complaint. The Defendants argued in the motion that Clements had failed to seek leave of the trial court to amend her counterclaim a second time, that none of the individuals against whom Clements sought relief had previously been a named party to the litigation and thus were not proper parties, that her claims for malicious prosecution were barred by immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act as to the Board and all individual defendants, and that Clements's claims failed for failure to file a tort notice as required under the Tort Claims Act. Clements responded on January 24, 2012.
On January 27, 2012, the Defendants filed a reply brief. In support of their arguments, the Defendants designated evidentiary material in the form of a transcript of deposition testimony offered by Barbara Conner. Clements filed her surreply on February 17, 2012, and designated additional evidentiary material, including portions of depositions from Clinton, Johnson, and Michael Conner.
On March 23, 2012, the trial court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss Clements's second amended counterclaim and complaint. On April 19, 2012, the trial court designated its order as a final judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 54(B). On April 23, 2012, Clements filed her motion to correct error; on April 25, 2012, the Defendants filed their response.
On April 27, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying Clements's motion to correct error. This appeal followed.
Clements appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to correct error. We generally review an order on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Singh v. Lyday, 889 N.E.2d 342, 348 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
Clements's motion to correct error challenged the trial court's entry of an order dismissing her second amended complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Ordinarily, we review such orders de novo and without deference to the trial court's decision. Shi v. Yi, 921 N.E.2d 31, 36 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Here, however, both the Defendants and Clement designated various evidentiary materials to their briefing on the Rule 12(B)(6) motion. “If, on a motion, asserting the defense ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim ... matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” Ind. Trial Rule 12(B). We therefore review the trial court's order dismissing Clements's second amended complaint pursuant to our standard of review for orders granting summary judgment.
Our standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is well settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(c); Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Id. Our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. Id.
Crosson v. Berry, 829 N.E.2d 184, 192 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.
Upon appellate review of a trial court's entry of summary judgment, we presume the validity of a trial court's entry of summary judgment. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ind.2009). A party challenging summary judgment on appeal must therefore bear the burden of proving that the movant was not entitled to the entry of summary judgment. Id.
We will affirm a trial court's entry of summary judgment if the judgment can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record. Town of Plainfield [ v. Paden Eng'g Co.], 943 N.E.2d [904,] 908 [ (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied ]. We review a decision on summary judgment carefully, however, to ensure that a party was not properly denied his day in court. Haire v. Parker, 957...
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