Clements v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 16 December 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 25875.,25875. |
| Citation | 30 N.E.2d 643,375 Ill. 170 |
| Parties | CLEMENTS v. HUGHES, Secretary of State. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by Charles Clements against Edward J. Hughes, Secretary of State, to review the action of the Secretary of State in refusing plaintiff's application for registration of automobile and a certificate of title thereto unless plaintiff paid a fee of $25 in addition to the fee tendered by the plaintiff. From the judgment, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; Lawrence E. stone, judge.
John E. Cassidy, Atty. Gen. (John B. Harris, of Springfield, of counsel), for appellant.
Sonnenschein, Berkson, Lautmann, Levinson & Morse, of Chicago, and Charles G. Briggle, Jr., of Springfield (Henry S. Moser and Jack I. Levy, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
This cause is here to review the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon county holding invalid section 4(b) of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act as that section was amended in 1939. Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 95 1/2, par. 77(b).
Appellee, a resident of Illinois, purchased a new automobile from an Indiana corporation at Hammond, Indiana, immediately bringing it to his home in Illinois. Within twenty-four hours after the purchase he made application for registration of this automobile and a certificate of title thereto. In his applications he stated that a certificate of title to said motor car had been issued by the Treasurer of the State of Indiana to the company selling the car to the petitioner and by that company assigned to the petitioner. He also tendered the fee for certificate of registration and certificate of title.
Relying on section 4(b) here involved, the Secretary of State refused to issue to appellee a certificate of registration or of title unless he paid a fee of $25 in addition to the fee he tendered. This $25 fee is fixed by section 4(b) as a fee to pay for investigation of title by the Secretary of State. Appellee brings this action under section 9(b) of the act (section 82) to review the action of the Secretary of State. As we have seen, the circuit court held section 4(b) of the act unconstitutional and entered an order reversing the decision of the Secretary of State, who has appealed.
The grounds upon which appellee contested the validity of section 4(b) are that it has no relation to the purpose expressed in its title, prescribes unreasonable and discriminatory classifications, denies equal protection of the law, deprives plaintiff of due process of law and constitutes a burden on interstate commerce, in that it levies an impost or duty on new motor vehicles purchased in States other than Illinois by an Illinois resident. It is also complained that the actual cost of the investigation provided for does not exceed 25 cents on the average, and that the charge of $25 is so excessive as to take the act out of the realm of regulation and to make of it a revenue statute.
The act here under consideration is styled the ‘Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act.’ Its objects are stated to be, ‘an act in relation to the prevention of the theft of motor vehicles by requiring certificates of title,’ etc. After provision for the registration of motor vehicles and for application for certificate of title, the act, in paragraph (b) of section 4, after requiring a certificate of title in the case of the purchase of a new car and providing the method of applying therefor, and the proof necessary to secure such certificate, when purchased within the State or in a State having a registration law, further provides that if the applicant is a resident of this State and has not secured a certificate of title in such other State, or legally recorded the purchase of the motor vehicle or registered the same in such other State, or if he has so secured such a certificate of title or recording but has not owned the motor vehicle under such certificate, recordation or registration for at least ninety days prior to his application for a certificate of title in this State, he is required to pay the sum of $25 to the Secretary of State who, thereupon, is to cause an investigation to be made ‘to determine whether the applicant is the owner of the motor vehicle.’ This section further provides that if an Illinois resident has purchased a motor vehicle outside the State, because of a breakdown or other emergency, the repair or replacement of which would equal one-third the value of the motor vehicle so purchased in the other State, when the same is shown by affidavit accompanying the application for certificate in this State, the Secretary of State may issue the certificate without the investigation fee. The act also provides that if the applicant for certificate of title was, at the time he purchased the car in another State, a legal resident therein, but since, such purchaser has become a resident of this State, a certificate of title may be issued to him without the investigation charge.
By stipulation of the parties as to facts and evidence offered by the plaintiff, it appears that during the six months following July 1, 1939, when the act went into effect, approximately 3,300 automobiles of ‘current model’ purchased outside of Illinois were registered in the Secretary of State's office, and of these the $25 fee provided by the statute was paid on approximately 803. Three additional persons were added to the defendant's clerical staff by reason of the act, at a salary cost to the State of $375 per month. The total revenue derived in that time approximated $21,000. The cost of administering the act for that period included $7,000 for a publication and mailing of notices to local dealers familiarizing them with the provisions of the statute, and $1,000 for discarding and reprinting outmoded application forms. Above these two items the expense of the administration of the act amounted to $4,500. In seventy-five per cent of the cases where payment of $25 fee was demanded, the investigation consisted of writing a form type of letter, sometimes followed with a telegram, or, in about twenty-five per cent of those cases, a telephone call.
Plaintiff also showed that during the calendar year 1938, out of a total of 3,650 automobile thefts reported to the stolen auto detail of the Chicago police department, 362, or about ten per cent, involved automobiles of the 1938 model, and that, during the first six months of 1939, according to such reports, out of a total of 1,667 automobile thefts so reported, 180, or less than eleven per cent of the automobiles involved, were 1939 models. There is no evidence as to such percentages in other parts of the State.
We will consider first the objection that this statute places a forbidden burden on interstate commerce and discriminates against it. To justify the exaction by a State of a tax which burdens interstate commerce, it must affirmatively appear that it is demanded as a reimbursement for the expense of providing facilities or to enforce regulations which are within its constitutional powers. Clyde Mallory Lines v. State of Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 56 S.Ct. 194, 80 L.Ed. 215;Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 51 S.Ct. 380, 75 L.Ed. 953;Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 48 S.Ct. 502, 72 L.Ed. 833, 62 A.L.R. 45.
In determining whether a tax act is an unwarranted and, therefore, illegal burden upon interstate commerce, recourse is had to the taxing statute. Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 56 S.Ct. 756, 80 L.Ed....
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