Clements v. Lanley Heat Processing Equipment
Citation | 548 So.2d 1345 |
Parties | Roger Keith CLEMENTS v. LANLEY HEAT PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, et al. 87-909. |
Decision Date | 12 May 1989 |
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
W. Lee Pittman of Pittman, Hooks, Marsh, Dutton & Hollis, Birmingham, for appellant.
James L. Clark and Lynn Baxley Ault of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellees.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff awarding "court costs only" against the defendants. We reverse and remand.
The issues are whether the jury verdict, awarding "court costs" only to the plaintiff, was inconsistent with the jury's finding in favor of the defendants and whether the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.
Plaintiff, Roger Keith Clements, filed suit under Code 1975, § 25-5-11, for damages based on personal injuries sustained at work. Plaintiff named as defendants: Lanley Heat Processing Equipment, Gallagher-Bassett Services, Inc.; National Can Corporation (plaintiff's employer); Ed Hornbuckle, Frank Mummert, Louis Michael Bridges, and Marvin Walker (supervisory employees and officers of plaintiff's employer).
Plaintiff claimed at trial that defendants had negligently failed to provide a reasonably safe work environment, and he sought damages for pain and suffering and $8,682.36 in medical expenses. Defendants alleged contributory negligence, but did not dispute the amount of medical expenses.
The trial court charged the jury that if the jury found that Clements "was guilty of negligence, and his own negligence either caused or contributed to cause his injuries and damages, then that is an absolute defense to [his] claim"; that if Clements "was guilty of contributory negligence, then it is a complete defense"; and that if the jury was reasonably satisfied that "the defendants have sustained the burden of proof on contributory negligence, that is a case of mutual fault and again, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover."
The trial court further instructed the jury in regard to its verdict:
The jury returned the following verdict:
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE
After the jury verdict was returned, the trial court polled the jury and found that the jury had unanimously found in favor of Clements and against defendants Hornbuckle, Mummert, Bridges, and Walker and had assessed Clements's damages at the sum of "court costs only" and that the jury found in favor of defendants Lanley Heat Processing Equipment, Gallagher--Bassett Services, Inc., Coy Head, and David Tharpe. In the case action summary, the trial court entered the following finding and order
The plaintiff based his motion for new trial on three grounds: (1) that the verdict failed to give substantial compensation for substantial injuries suffered by the plaintiff; (2) that the damages awarded were not sufficient to compensate for proven expenses without any damages for pain and suffering; and (3) that "[t]he verdict is so opposed to the clear and convincing weight of the evidence presented as to damages that it clearly fails to do substantial justice and suggests that the verdict was the result of passion, prejudice, or improper motive." The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The trial court correctly charged that, for a plaintiff to recover under a negligence theory, there are four essential elements that must be proven to the jury's reasonable satisfaction: duty, breach (initial legal liability), causation, and damages. Jones v. Newton, 454 So.2d 1345 (Ala.1984). Therefore, for the jury to find for the plaintiff, all four elements must have been resolved in plaintiff's favor, for the absence of any one element would require a verdict for the defendants. The trial court concluded that because the jury awarded "court costs only," which are not an element of damages on which the jury received instructions, there was a failure to find each essential element of negligence and, therefore, that the verdict was a verdict for the defendants. However, the record shows that each juror found in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Hornbuckle, Mummert, Bridges, and Walker. Therefore, the plaintiff did not fail to prove all of the elements of negligence to the jury's reasonable satisfaction.
We hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, on the authority of Stinson v. Acme Propane Gas Co., 391 So.2d 659 (Ala.1980).
The jury's finding for the plaintiff necessarily embraced all of the elements of the negligence claim, including the element of injury and resultant damages. To so find, and then award "court costs only" and no compensatory damages, is inconsistent on its face, as a matter of law. The trial court should have afforded the plaintiff a new trial on the basis of the inconsistency of the award of no damages when that award is juxtaposed with the jury's finding of the defendants' liability. Its refusal to do so was reversible error. Stinson, supra; see also Ward v. Diebold, Inc., 486 So.2d 1261 (Ala.1986), and Monteleone v. Trail Pontiac, Inc., 395 So.2d 1003 (Ala.Civ.App.1980), cert. denied, 395 So.2d 1005 (Ala.1981).
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur in the judgment of reversal, but dissent from the grant of an unconditional new trial.
HORNSBY, Chief Justice .
I write to express my view that the practice of additur, rejected by the federal courts and described in the literature, but rarely if ever observed in practice in Alabama, should be an available tool in modern practice.
In calling for the recognition of additur, I must quickly point out that I strongly defend the role of the jury in our system of justice.
Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374, 1378 (Ala.1986).
In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935), the United States Supreme Court reluctantly recognized the validity of remittitur practice and rejected additur. Legal scholars have subsequently tried to articulate a reasonable explanation of why remittitur does not violate the right to trial by jury and additur does.
Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 29 (1942).
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