Clements v. Schuyl. R. Etc. R. Co.
Decision Date | 24 February 1890 |
Docket Number | 127,128 |
Citation | 132 Pa. 445,19 A. 274 |
Parties | J. C. CLEMENTS ET AL. v. SCHUYL. R. ETC. R. CO.; W. R. THOMPSON v. SCHUYL. R. ETC. R. CO |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 23, 1890
APPEAL BY DEFENDANTS FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 4 OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY.
Nos 127, 128 July Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, Nos. 89, 88 June Term 1887, C.P. No. 4.
CLEMENTS v. RAILROAD CO.
On June 3, 1887, Joseph C. Clements and Margaret his wife, brought assumpsit against the Schuylkill River East Side Railroad Company and the Union Trust Company, to recover upon the penal bond of the defendant companies to the plaintiffs. Issue.
At the trial on May 8, 1889, the plaintiffs put in evidence a sealed contract between Joseph D. Ellis, of the one part, and Joseph C. Clements and Margaret Clements, of the other part providing as follows:
The plaintiffs then put in evidence the bond of the defendant companies to the plaintiffs, dated March 6, 1886, in the sum of $10,000, with the following recital and conditions:
It was shown that the grade of Hamilton street, as established by the ordinance of July 3, 1885, was at the rate of 5 feet to the 100, but that on November 23, 1885, the board of surveyors of the city refused to confirm the grade fixed by said ordinance, and referred the matter back to councils; that on April 5, 1886, an ordinance was passed amending the ordinance of July 3, 1885, and fixing the grade of Hamilton street at 5.28 feet to the 100; and that Ellis was given possession of the plaintiff's property on March 8, 1886, and proceeded with the work almost immediately. The testimony as to when the property was ready for occupancy, and when re-possession of it was delivered, was conflicting, the plaintiffs testifying that they did not obtain possession until December 14, 1886. The sum of $500, provided for by the contract as damages to the real estate, was paid by Ellis to the plaintiffs, who in this action claimed $200 for injuries to the furniture, etc., and $150 per week as stipulated damages for the delay in the completion of the work. It was in evidence that the real estate of the plaintiffs was worth about $3,000, with a rental value of $25 per month.
At the close of the testimony, the court, ARNOLD, J., charged the jury in part as follows:
Mr. Ellis went on with the contract and took possession. Has he complied with his contract to put the building in good condition? Has he indemnified her against damage? In other words, has he given her property back to her without damage? All these are matters for you. [I say to you that the important part of this case, to which I now come, is that which relates to the sum claimed, of $150 per week. I do not say to you for what period of time or what space of time that was to be paid. It is something which the contract itself does not mention. Counsel themselves have not alluded to it. I have read the contract with considerable care, for the purpose of seeing whether there was anything in it to fix the time when the payment of the $150 stopped. If you take the contract itself for a guide, it would never stop. He agrees to pay her the further sum of $150 per week for each and every week after the expiration of thirty days from the date of the delivery of the property to him. When did it stop? It nowhere appears upon that contract when it is to stop. This furnishes, therefore, what we call in law a latent or hidden ambiguity. It is not a matter which I can decide for you. It is a matter for you to decide. What was the intention of the parties in this respect? Was he to pay her $150 a week permanently and forever? That would not be reasonable. Then, when was it to stop? Was it to stop from the time, as the plaintiff says, when they gave possession to her? Well, that might not be reasonable either. The contract does not say that they shall give back possession.
I think a reasonable construction of the contract is, that they were to pay $150 a week after the expiration of the thirty days, up to the time that she might have got possession; or, in other words, to pay for such time as the contractor here, and the workmen, kept her out. In other words, I do not think -- though it is a question for you to say, and I will leave it to you to say -- I do not think that the company was bound to go to her at any particular time and say, "There is your house, Mrs. Clements, and that stops our $150 a week;" but I do think that the reasonable meaning of the parties was, or that the construction of this agreement is, that $150 a week was to be paid during such time, after thirty days, as Ellis kept her out. Now, how long was that? . . . I think it would be well then for you to inquire, as an important element in this case, when it was that this house was raised and finished to a proper state to permit her to resume possession of the property, and to allow her for such time as she was kept out by the act of Mr. Ellis, or his agents or workmen. . . .
That is a matter altogether for you to determine upon the evidence. I have no opinion whatever to give you, and leave it to you to inquire how long it was that Mrs. Clements was kept out of possession of the property by the occupancy of it, or by its not being completed under this contract.]
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The defendants request the court to charge you, as follows [inter alia]:
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