Clemmons v. United States Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mich.

• Decision Date: 02 May 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-290
• Parties: TIRRELL L. CLEMMONS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

TIRRELL L. CLEMMONS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, Respondent.

No. 1:22-cv-290

United States District Court, D. Colorado

May 2, 2022

OPINION

GORDON J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is an action brought by a federal prisoner. Petitioner, Tirrell L. Clemmons, is presently serving a life sentence in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at USP Florence ADMAX in Florence, Colorado. Petitioner was tried and sentenced in this Court. United States v. Clemmons, 1:98-cr-00229-2 (W.D. Mich.).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently described the procedural history relating to Petitioner's conviction, his direct appeal, and his subsequent challenges to his conviction and sentence as follows:

In 2000, a jury found Clemmons guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (Count 1), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime causing death (Count 3), in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 2, 924(c), and 924(j). The district court sentenced Clemmons to life imprisonment. We affirmed the convictions and sentence on appeal. United States v Winston, 55 Fed.Appx. 289 (6th Cir. 2003).

More than fifteen years later, Clemmons filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C § 2255. The district court denied the motion as time-barred, observing that Clemmons had filed, back in 2005 a “Motion for Re-Sentencing/Sentencing Adjustment” that was also construed as an untimely § 2255 motion. Clemmons v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-636, 2019 WL 4601690 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2019); see United States v. Clemmons, No. 1:98-cr-229-02 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2005). Clemmons then filed a motion for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion that was denied. See In re Clemmons, No. 20-1368 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020).

Meanwhile, Clemmons filed his first motion to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) in 2007, based on a Sentencing Guidelines amendment applicable to certain cocaine base offenses. The district court denied that motion. Clemmons filed his second § 3582(c)(2) motion in 2012, seeking relief based on Amendment 750. The district court denied the motion for the same reasons that it denied the first motion, including an assessment that Clemmons's prison record and criminal conduct were both “horrible, ” and we affirmed the denial. United States v. Clemmons, No. 12-2381 (6th Cir. May 29, 2013). Clemmons filed his third § 3582(c)(2) motion in 2015 based on Amendment 782. The district court denied that motion as well.

In February 2021, Clemmons filed this fourth motion to reduce his sentence, with references to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (authorizing the district court to modify a sentence if “expressly permitted by statute”). He argued that he was entitled to resentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which the First Step Act had made retroactive. The district court denied the motion. Clemmons filed a notice of appeal, the timeliness of which the government does not challenge.

United States v. Clemmons, No. 21-1353, pp. 1-2 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021). The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion:

The district court, in adjudicating all of the prior motions filed by Clemmons, has consistently concluded that his criminal history and prison conduct has warranted no change to his sentence. With respect to this motion, the district court noted that, aside from the offenses that led him to prison in the first place, Clemmons “continued his violent life by assaulting prison staff and other inmates” to the point that he is incarcerated at United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Facility, near Florence, Colorado. The government notes that this is the same facility that houses some of the most notorious criminals alive, including “El Chapo, the Unabomber, the Boston marathon bomber, and an Oklahoma City bomber.” The fact that the district court has been consistent in its assessment of Clemmons does not demonstrate a failure to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Id. at pp. 3-4.

The issue Petitioner raises by way of the present action is the same issue he raised in his § 2255 motion in Clemmons v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-636 (W.D. Mich.). In that motion Petitioner argued that the undersigned had violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury, and his rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when the Court refused to remove a juror “due to the juror's clear and self-admitted distress and question of her ability to concentrate and perform.” Id., (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) This time, however, Petitioner does not raise the issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he raises it under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1651, and 2241.

I. Mandamus claims

Petitioner seeks mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1651. A petition for writ of mandamus is a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental officer or entity. See Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1996). As such, the petition is subject to all the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Therefore, with respect to Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1651, this Court must conduct a preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (“The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity ....”).

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must read Petitioner's pro se pleading indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept his allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss the mandamus petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Respondent.

Section 1361 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Petitioner does not seek relief against an individual officer or employee; instead, he sues the “United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan Southern Division.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Setting aside the oddity of this Court being asked to compel itself to act, whether this Court has jurisdiction under § 1361 depends on whether the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan Southern Division is an “agency” of the United States.

In Trackwell v. United States Government, 472 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2007), the court considered whether a federal court was an agency of the United States within the meaning of the mandamus statute:

Section 1361 grants district courts original jurisdiction over any action in the nature of mandamus brought to compel the performance of a duty owed to a plaintiff by “an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1361. Jurisdiction exists for Mr. Trackwell's claim against the Supreme Court only if the Court is an “agency.” For purposes of Title 28 of the United States Code, the term agency is defined to include “any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 451. The term department is defined as “one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government.” Id.

This definition of agency does not encompass the Supreme Court. In Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 131 L.Ed.2d 779 (1995), the Supreme Court construed the identical definitions (although appearing in 18 U.S.C. § 6, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 451) in determining whether a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which at the time prohibited such statements “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The Court began by observing:

In ordinary parlance, federal courts are not described as “departments” or “agencies” of the Government. As noted by the Sixth Circuit, it would be strange indeed to refer to a court as an “agency.” See [United States v. Hubbard, ] 16 F.3d [694], at 698, n. 4 [(6th Cir.1994)] (“The U.S. Court of Appeals is not the Appellate Adjudication Agency”). And while we have occasionally spoken of the three branches of our Government, including the Judiciary, as “departments, ” e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 500, 18 L.Ed. 437 (1867), that locution is not an ordinary one. Far more common is the use of “department” to refer to a component of the Executive Branch.

Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 699, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (brackets in original omitted).

Turning to the statutory definitions, the Court said...