Clemons v. Couch

• Decision Date: 07 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-6411,19-6411
• Parties: Richard L. CLEMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John COUCH, Individually, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

3 F.4th 897

Richard L. CLEMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.John COUCH, Individually, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-6411

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 22, 2020

Decided and Filed: July 7, 2021

ARGUED: Bethany N. Baxter, JOE F. CHILDERS & ASSOCIATES, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Brenn O. Combs, KENTUCKY STATE POLICE, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Bethany N. Baxter, Joe F. Childers, JOE F. CHILDERS & ASSOCIATES, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Brenn O. Combs, Shawna Kincer, KENTUCKY STATE POLICE, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: COOK, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which COOK, J., joined. NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 906–12 – ––––), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge.

Many families live through their fair share of drama during the holidays. But on Easter Sunday, March 27, 2016, the Clemons family experienced more than they might have expected. As the result of a family feud that sparked a home visit by a state trooper, three members of the family were arrested and the litigation giving rise to this appeal ensued.

The trouble arose when Kentucky State Trooper John Couch escorted Christina Clemons so she could retrieve some personal belongings from the residence of her in-laws, Evalee and Richard Clemons, where Christina and her then-husband, Dustin Clemons, had been staying. That living arrangement changed, however, after Christina fought with her in-laws and they ordered her out. When Christina returned to gather her things, she brought along reinforcements—her mother and Trooper Couch. Upon Couch's entry into the house, he exchanged words with Christina's father-in-law, Richard, who objected to Couch's presence in his home. As the trooper was leaving, Richard told Couch that he smelled "like pig shit." The trooper responded by clobbering the father-in-law, who fought back. Evalee and Dustin soon joined in the melee. Easter evening ended with Couch's arrest of all three. Months later, a grand jury declined to indict any of the Clemons family.

On March 13, 2017, Richard Clemons filed suit against Couch and others, alleging, as relevant on appeal, that Couch entered his home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A magistrate judge, hearing the case by consent of the parties, granted Couch qualified immunity on the unlawful-entry claim. The court determined that Couch's entry was justified by the "community caretaker" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and that Couch also had Christina's consent to enter the home. Richard appeals.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

This sad story begins with a fire that damaged the home of Christina, Dustin, and their young son. As a result, in December 2015 or January 2016, they moved in with Dustin's parents, Richard and Evalee, in Hazard, Kentucky.¹ A house fire was not the only thing that troubled the Clemonses, for around the same time, Christina filed for divorce from Dustin, and the two separated. The conflict between Christina and Dustin extended to include her in-laws. On March 25, 2016, Christina and Evalee got into an argument that escalated into a physical altercation. Richard broke up the fight, and either he or his wife told Christina to leave, which she did.

Two days later, on Easter Sunday, March 27, 2016, Christina went to the local Kentucky State Police station with her mother and requested a law-enforcement escort to accompany her to the Clemonses’ house so she could retrieve some of her and her son's belongings. Christina told the police she was separated from her husband and having difficulties with her in-laws. She said that she was afraid to go back to the residence by herself, in part because her in-laws had threatened her. Trooper Couch was assigned to accompany Christina to the Clemonses’ home. Couch did not inquire further into Christina's living arrangement, her domestic situation, or her history with Dustin or her in-laws. Instead, he simply followed Christina and her mother to the Clemonses’ residence.

They arrived around 7:30 P.M. The three let themselves in so that Christina could retrieve her and her son's belongings. They came upon Richard and Evalee, who looked up from the television in shock. It was startling enough to see Christina but added to the surprise were Christina's mother and the state trooper. Richard and Evalee were particularly disturbed that law enforcement had entered their home. So was Dustin, who had been outside grilling steaks for Easter dinner. Inside, Richard became hostile as Christina went to retrieve her possessions. He shouted that he did not want Christina, Christina's mother, or the state trooper in his home. He expressed this sentiment to Couch directly: "I don't want you in my house ... I don't want these women in my house ... You can't do this ... I want you out of my house." He also told the officer, "I want you to leave my home. You have no right here." Couch, however, would have none of it. According to Richard, the trooper "just stood there" and demanded that Richard "sit down and shut up," while he waited for Christina to finish packing her things. Richard then took the matter into his own hands, first with a cellphone. Richard called the police—his son-in-law John Napier, a Perry County sheriff's deputy, who was on his regular patrol.

Soon after Officer Napier arrived at the Clemonses’ residence, Christina finished collecting her belongings. As she was exiting the house for good, Couch followed behind her. According to Richard, he walked towards the two to shut the door behind them as they were exiting and told Couch that he smelled "like pig shit." Based on Richard's account, Couch responded by "clobber[ing]" him. The two then began to fight, and Evalee and Dustin, back from the grill, soon joined in the fray. Officer Napier managed to disrupt the brawl for a moment, after which Couch deployed his taser to subdue Richard and Dustin.

The episode ended with Richard, Dustin, and Evalee being placed under arrest. Couch variously cited them for menacing, disorderly conduct, assault of a police officer, and resisting arrest. But later, a grand jury declined to issue any indictments.

II.

About a year after the incident, Richard filed a civil-rights action against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Kentucky State Police, and Trooper Couch in his official and individual capacities. Richard alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful entry, excessive force, wrongful arrest, deliberate indifference, and failure to train, and state-law claims for negligence, assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The magistrate judge dismissed with prejudice the § 1983 claims against the Commonwealth, the state police, and Couch in his official capacity. The court also dismissed the state-law claims, but without prejudice.

With the court's permission, Richard amended his original complaint. In doing so, he presented the same claims he had asserted in his original complaint, even though the court had already dismissed a number of those counts—some with prejudice, some without. Couch filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The magistrate judge granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the court denied summary judgment on the claims for wrongful arrest, excessive force, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution (Richard later dismissed the latter four claims). It also granted summary judgment to Couch on the claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and noted its prior dismissal of the claims for deliberate indifference and failure to train. But because the court planned to grant summary judgment to Couch on the unlawful-entry claim on a basis not briefed by either party—the community-caretaker exception—it postponed final judgment on that claim and gave the parties ten days to respond to its application of the exception.

After the parties submitted their supplemental briefing, the magistrate judge issued a second order granting Couch's motion for summary judgment as to the unlawful-entry claim. The court reasoned that Couch was entitled to qualified immunity because his warrantless entry was justified by the community-caretaker exception and even if it was not, Couch was still entitled to immunity given that the law was not sufficiently clear on the issue. The magistrate judge also found that Couch's warrantless entry was permissible in part because of Christina's voluntary consent.

Richard appealed the court's second order granting qualified immunity on the unlawful-entry claim, and we dismissed the interlocutory appeal for jurisdictional reasons. Couch, on the other hand, appealed the court's first order denying qualified immunity as to the wrongful-arrest and excessive-force claims. Again, we dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, the parties proceeded to trial on the wrongful-arrest and excessive-force claims. After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Couch. Richard does not appeal the jury's verdict. Instead, he appeals the magistrate judge's summary-judgment ruling that Couch was entitled to qualified immunity on his unlawful-entry claim.

III.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Jackson v. City of Cleveland , 925 F.3d 793, 806 (6th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" exists and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Peffer v. Stephens , 880 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct....