Clemons v. Dart

• Citation: 168 F.Supp.3d 1060
• Decision Date: 09 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 13 C 02356,13 C 02356
• Parties: Thomas Clemons, Plaintiff, v. Thomas J. Dart, et al., Defendant(s).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

168 F.Supp.3d 1060

Thomas Clemons, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas J. Dart, et al., Defendant(s).

No. 13 C 02356

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 9, 2016

Thomas Gerard Morrissey, Patrick William Morrissey, Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd., Joel A. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

David Richard Condron, Helen Catherine Gibbons, James Emory Nichols, Michael L. Gallagher, Thomas E. Cargie, Chicago, IL, Kevin Jon Mueller, Woodbury, MN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John J. Tharp, Jr.

, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Thomas Clemons, a double amputee confined to a wheelchair, filed this suit alleging that defendants Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff, Thomas Dart,¹ violated both the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132

, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), when he was housed in two separate jail cells that did not comply with ADA and Rehabilitation Act structural requirements. The County is sued only on an indemnification theory and the Sheriff in his official capacity only, so this opinion refers to the defendants collectively as “the Sheriff.” Clemons also brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending that his cell assignment deprived him of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Pending is Clemons' motion for summary judgment on both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, and the Sheriff's cross-motion on all counts. For reasons discussed below, Clemons' motion is granted in full; accordingly the Sheriff's cross-motion with respect to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims is denied. The Sheriff's motion on Clemons' 1983 claim, however, is granted.

BACKGROUND²

Thomas Clemons was incarcerated at the Cook County Jail from September 23, 2012 to March 9, 2013. Complicating his detention, however, was the fact that Clemons has been wheelchair bound since 2003 when a gunshot wound

paralyzed him from the waist down. Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts ¶ 23, ECF No. 76 (“PSOF”). In connection with these injuries, Clemons' legs were amputated in 2009. Id. at ¶ 26. Because of Clemons disabilities and accompanying medical requirements, he was assigned to the Cook County Sheriff Department of Corrections Cermak Hospital, division 8 (“Cermak”), which was built in 1998. Id. at ¶ 8.

Cermark is staffed with both correctional officers and county medical personnel twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Although county medical staff provide medical care to the inmates housed at Cermak, ultimately Cermak is a correctional facility that falls under the control and supervision of defendant Sheriff Thomas Dart, as he administers the Cook County Department of Corrections at large. Defs.' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts ¶ 2, ECF No. 84 (“DSOF”). Cermak comprises eight tiers, each of which has thirty to forty inmates at any given time. Doctors check each tier twice daily to address medical issues as needed. Id. at ¶ 13. Each tier also has one registered nurse on call twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Id. The nursing staff checks on each detainee once per shift, for a total of three checks in a twenty-four hour period. During these checks, the nurse assists detainees with bathing, feeding, and administering medication. The detainees can also request assistance throughout the day via the nurse call button, which is located in each room.

Although there were multiple ADA compliant cells at the Cermak facility, and notwithstanding his obvious disability, Clemons was not assigned to one. Instead, when Clemons arrived at Cermak he was processed and initially assigned to room 3115, which is an isolation room that houses a single inmate, id. at ¶ 46, and was then later transferred to room 3225. Id. at ¶ 57. Neither room complied with ADA structural requirements. Who assigned Clemons to these cells is subject to dispute between the parties. Clemons insists that correctional officers made the assignments, while the Sheriff claims that correctional officers played no role in determining Clemons' housing assignments at Cermak and that it was Cook County medical personnel that determined where Clemons would go based on his medical needs. Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 15–16, ECF No. 89; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 14–16, ECF No. 82. But even when analyzing the defendants' response to Clemons' motion and construing the facts in a light that is most favorable to them, the defendants' position lacks support in the record. The defendants point to the first sentence of the Cook County Health & Hospital System (CCHHS) infirmary operational statement which states that “[o]n the 3^rdfloor medical unit, an RN or LPN reviews the admission orders and assigns a bed.” DSOF ¶ 1. But in the next sentence the policy states that “[t]he nurse must confer with Correctional Officers to incorporate both clinical and security considerations when assigning a bed.” Id. at ¶ 11. Thus, it is apparent that even though CCHHS medical personnel had some say in where prisoners were housed, Sheriff's Department employees did too.

Both rooms 3115 and 3225 contained features that did not meet ADA and Rehabilitation Act architectural standards. PSOF ¶ 31, 40. In room 3115, Clemons' toilet seat was sixteen inches high, rather than the seventeen to nineteen inches required by the ADA. Id. at ¶ 32 (a). The distance from the centerline of the toilet to the side wall was twenty-four inches, rather than the eighteen inches required by the 1991 ADA standards. Id. at ¶ 32 (b). The cell also lacked grab bars near the toilet, as required by the ADA. Id. at ¶ 32 (c). The shower compartment in the room also had a door that was only twenty-eight inches wide, rather than the minimum thirty-two inches required by the ADA, and lacked both a mounted shower seat and grab bars. Id. at ¶ 32 (e). Additionally, the room contained a table with fixed seating, which prevented wheelchair access. Id. at ¶ 32 (h). Because of these noncompliant features, Clemons contends he was unable to use the toilet to empty his colostomy bag

on his own and was not regularly provided assistance to do so, which resulted in him suffering personal injury on several occasions when his colostomy bag burst or his catheter leaked. Id. at ¶¶ 33–35. Defendants, however, maintain that Clemons was not only provided adequate medical care, but that the care was so exceptional that it made up for the cell's structural deficiencies.

On October 2, 2012, correctional officers transferred Clemons to Room 3225, where he remained until his release on March 9, 2013. Id. at ¶ 39. Clemons shared this room with between five to eleven cellmates. Id. at ¶ 41. Room 3225 had ADA deficiencies

similar to those in Room 3115. Id. at ¶ 40. The toilet seat was fifteen and one half inches high, rather than the required seventeen to nineteen inches high. Id. at ¶ 43 (a). The distance from the centerline of the toilet seat to the side wall was twenty-three inches, instead of the eighteen inches required by the applicable 1991 ADA standards. Id. at ¶ 43 (b). The clearance width of the toilet area perpendicular to the side wall was 55 inches, rather than the sixty inches required by law. Id. at ¶ 43 (c). The toilet area also lacked ADA required grab bars. Id. at ¶ 43 (d). The sink, which was located behind the toilet, could not be reached by a person using a wheelchair, as required by the 1991 ADA standards. Id. at ¶ 43 (e). Just as in Room 3115, the group shower room, which Clemons had access to while he stayed in room 3225, lacked a mounted shower seat and grab bars. The defendants provided a portable shower chair, but it had a seat height of twenty inches, rather than a height of seventeen to nineteen inches required by the ADA. The presence of inmates in portable beds, known colloquially as “boats,” compounded the problems created by the non-ADA compliant room features, as it was more difficult for wheelchair-bound inmates, such as Clemons, to move about the room. Id. at ¶ 44. On December 3, 2012, Clemons fell in the shower while attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the portable shower chair. Id. at ¶ 51. As a result of the fall, Clemons suffered a number of personal injuries that required pain medication. Id. at ¶ 52.

DISCUSSION

To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a)

. Summary judgment is only appropriate when the record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc. , 779 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir.2015). Summary judgment is “properly entered against a party ‘who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” Hakim v. Accenture U.S. Pension Plan , 718 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir.2013) (citing Parent v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. , 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir.2012) (internal quotations omitted)). With these principles in mind, the parties' cross motions with respect to each claim are addressed in turn below.

I. Clemons' Title II ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

Both Clemons and the Sheriff seek summary judgment on Clemons' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Broadly stated, Title II of the ADA forbids discrimination in the provision of services, programs, and activities by public entities on the basis of an individual's disability.³ 42 U.S.C. § 12131

. Relatedly, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits any disabled individual from being “excluded from the participation in, be[ing] denied the benefits, of, or subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794. The relief available under both statutes is coextensive, thus as one claim rises or falls, so too does...