Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co.

Citation704 N.E.2d 403,184 Ill.2d 328,235 Ill.Dec. 54
Decision Date03 December 1998
Docket NumberNo. 84244,84244
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Parties, 235 Ill.Dec. 54, 14 IER Cases 1122 Dennis CLEMONS, Appellant, v. MECHANICAL DEVICES COMPANY, Appellee.

James P. Ginzkey, Hayes, Hammer, Miles, Cox & Ginzkey, Bloomington, for Dennis Clemons.

John Casey Costigan, Costigan & Wollrab, P.C., Bloomington, for Mechanical Devices Co.

Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Dennis Clemons, filed a complaint in the circuit court of McLean County against his former employer, Mechanical Devices Company (defendant). Plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. A jury found for plaintiff and assessed damages against defendant in the amount of $63,520.23. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 292 Ill.App.3d 242, 226 Ill.Dec. 141, 684 N.E.2d 1344. We granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 1988, plaintiff began working for defendant as a machine operator. On June 1, 1989, plaintiff injured his back while at work and informed his foreman, Clarence Hatfield, of the injury. The next day, at defendant's request, plaintiff saw Dr. Larry Nord for this injury. Dr. Nord prescribed pain medication. Plaintiff worked that day and the rest of June. The bills incurred in June as a result of this injury were processed and paid by defendant's workers' compensation carrier.

On July 1, 1989, plaintiff heard his back pop while at work. He worked the remainder of his shift, and at trial stated that, upon leaving, he told Hatfield that his back was still bothering him. Hatfield testified that he did not recall plaintiff reporting this injury. Further, Linda Fillingham, defendant's vice president and office manager, testified that there was no report of this injury.

On July 3, 1989, plaintiff's back popped again while he was at home bending over to tie his shoes. He called defendant and informed someone in the office that he was not coming to work because he had hurt his back. Because Dr. Nord was not available, plaintiff saw Dr. Neil for this injury. Dr. Neil instructed plaintiff not to return to work, and he remained off work until July 27, 1989.

Plaintiff, however, kept a previously scheduled appointment with Dr. Nord on July 10. Plaintiff testified that, while at Dr. Nord's office, someone from defendant's office called Dr. Nord's secretary and told her not to file the July injury as a workers' compensation claim. Fillingham testified that she told Dr. Nord to keep his records straight between the June and July injuries, for the July injury was to be processed under defendant's health insurance program.

Plaintiff also testified that he had a conversation with Irene Sperry, defendant's co-owner. She told him that she knew the July injury was not work related. According to plaintiff, she stated that if he filed a workers' compensation claim relative to that injury, he would be discharged. Plaintiff stated that he believed Sperry's claim. Plaintiff received a health insurance claim form for the July injury in the mail. Plaintiff completed the form with the help of his wife. He indicated on the form that the July injury was not work related.

Plaintiff returned to work on Thursday, July 27, 1989. He worked full eight-hour shifts on both July 27 and July 28. Plaintiff then took July 31 through August 4 off as previously scheduled vacation. In accordance with company policy, plaintiff received compensation in advance for his vacation on July 28, 1989. He was not paid for working July 27 and July 28 at that time.

While on vacation, plaintiff saw Kevin Miller, an attorney, to discuss a possible workers' compensation claim. Miller testified that he telephoned defendant the same day inquiring as to the identification of defendant's workers' compensation carrier. He also testified that plaintiff signed a blank workers' compensation application in his office that day.

On August 4, 1989, plaintiff went to defendant to pick up his paycheck for working July 27 and July 28. He was told that he would receive his pay for those two days in his August 11 paycheck. Fillingham testified that this method was consistent with how it paid employees during their vacation periods. Plaintiff insisted that he be paid that day.

Fillingham further testified that attorney Miller called defendant and requested plaintiff's check. She told Miller that plaintiff could come in and pick up his check. When plaintiff arrived he was given his check and told by Fillingham that he was being treated in a manner different from the other employees, which could not be allowed. Plaintiff testified he was told that if he took his check for July 27 and July 28 he would be quitting. Plaintiff took his check and did not work for defendant again.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a one-count complaint in the circuit court of McLean County. He alleged wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the action in January 1994. In January 1995, plaintiff again filed a one-count complaint in the circuit court of McLean County, alleging wrongful discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim.

During the trial, plaintiff presented evidence attempting to establish that defendant's method of paying him was in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Over defendant's objection, plaintiff's counsel had Fillingham read portions of the Wage Act while examining her as an adverse witness, and questioned her about the legality of defendant's method of payment in light of the Wage Act. Plaintiff focused on section 4 of the Wage Act, which provides, "All wages earned by any employee during a weekly pay period shall be paid not later than 7 days after the end of the weekly pay period in which the wages were earned." 820 ILCS 115/4 (West 1994).

At the close of evidence, the trial court allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint. In relevant part, plaintiff amended his complaint by adding paragraph 13, which stated: "On August 4, 1989, in retaliation of Plaintiff's exercise of his statutory rights, Defendant wrongfully discharged Plaintiff." In granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, the trial judge stated: "In regard to paragraph 13, the statutory rights referred to are in fact the workmen's comp[ensation] statutory rights." In the complaint, plaintiff did not allege a claim based on a violation of the Wage Act, nor did he allege that he was discharged in retaliation for pursuing rights afforded him under the Wage Act. During closing arguments, however, plaintiff's attorney stated: "If Mechanical Devices starts discharging their at-will employees because of the color of their skin, they are liable. If they start discharging employees for their gender, they are liable. If they start discharging their employees in violation of Illinois statute, they are liable. It is as simple as that. Read the statute."

At plaintiff's request, and over defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the Wage Act. The instruction informed the jury that the Wage Act provides that wages earned during a weekly pay period must be paid for those services no later than seven days after the weekly pay period ends. Further, any employer who knowingly discharges or discriminates against any employee who has sought to exercise his rights under the Act is guilty, upon conviction, of a Class C misdemeanor. In response to this instruction, defendant tendered its own instruction, which the judge refused to give, stating that the plaintiff was discharged for a wage dispute and "the determinative factor was not the intent or filing of a workman's compensation claim." The jury found for plaintiff and awarded him damages against defendant of $63,520.23.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the Wage Act and instructing the jury on portions of the Act. Defendant contended that the Wage Act was irrelevant to the issues in the case. The appellate court agreed with the defendant and reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. 292 Ill.App.3d 242, 226 Ill.Dec. 141, 684 N.E.2d 1344. The appellate court concluded that evidence relating to the Wage Act was "wholly irrelevant" to whether plaintiff was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. 292 Ill.App.3d at 251, 226 Ill.Dec. 141, 684 N.E.2d 1344. Further, the appellate court found the admission of evidence relating to the Wage Act, the instruction to the jury on the Wage Act, and plaintiff's counsel's comments during closing arguments "seriously prejudiced Mechanical in its defense so as to deprive Mechanical of a fair trial." 292 Ill.App.3d at 253, 226 Ill.Dec. 141, 684 N.E.2d 1344. We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and, for the reasons that follow, affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Relevance of the Wage Act

We note at the outset that plaintiff's amended complaint alleges only that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Nowhere does the amended complaint allege that defendant violated the Wage Act or that plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for invoking his rights under the Act. The amended complaint, which was filed after the close of evidence, alleged in paragraph 10 that "defendant * * * intentionally interfered with * * * plaintiff's rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act in violation of 820 ILCS 305/4(h)." Paragraph 13 of the amended complaint further alleged that "in retaliation of plaintiff's exercise of his statutory rights, defendant wrongfully discharged plaintiff." The trial judge, when granting plaintiff leave to file an amended...

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