Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc.

Decision Date11 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-11924.,03-11924.
Citation369 F.3d 1189
PartiesAlice T. CLEVELAND, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. HOME SHOPPING NETWORK, INC., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Craig L. Berman, Berman Law Firm, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, for Cleveland.

Thomas M. Gonzalez, Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Home Shopping Network, Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and SILER*, Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge:

In this Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., termination case, plaintiff Alice Cleveland appeals the district court's judgment as a matter of law to the Home Shopping Network ("HSN"), after the jury returned a verdict finding HSN had impermissibly fired Cleveland from her television show-hosting job because of her disability. Particularly, Cleveland argues that the district court made credibility findings and viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to HSN when it found Cleveland had failed to rebut HSN's stated non-discriminatory reason of firing her because she participated in an unauthorized infomercial. We agree and REVERSE the lower court's judgment as a matter of law for HSN.

HSN cross-appeals, in the event we reverse the judgment as a matter of law, claiming the district court should have granted it a judgment as a matter of law at the close of Cleveland's case because she failed to put forth evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination. HSN also appeals the denial of its motion for a new trial based on the improper conduct of Cleveland's counsel, excessive damages, and the jury instruction regarding pretext. We are unpersuaded and deny HSN's claims of error.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

HSN operates television channels devoted to selling products over the air. In 1985, HSN hired Cleveland as a show host to sell dolls. In 1997, Elena Panos became a supervisor of the show hosts. While giving her satisfactory performance reviews, Panos did not like Cleveland's hosting style, asking Cleveland to be less "homey" and more distinguished.

In 1998, Cleveland went on medical leave after she was diagnosed with myasthenia gravis, a neuromuscular disease. Cleveland eventually returned to HSN two months later on medical restriction. Her doctor cleared her for show hosting, but restricted her to a four-day work week, with limited overnight shows. Cleveland was cut from the broadcasting budget prepared in the fall of 1998 for 1999. In late 1998, Panos met with HSN's in-house counsel regarding terminating Cleveland. The in-house counsel advised against it, concerned about a possible ADA suit.

About the same time, Cleveland took another medical leave to have her thymus gland removed. When Cleveland had not contacted HSN many weeks after HSN's twenty-six week standard disability term elapsed, HSN informed her that she would be fired unless she provided medical documentation that she was covered under the ADA. She produced a letter from her doctor that cleared her to host shows under some medical restrictions. In August 1999, HSN assigned her to an off-the-air support position. When she was not reinstated as a show host, Cleveland produced a letter from her doctor explicitly clearing her to host shows under the same four-day restrictions as before her second medical leave. Still, Cleveland was kept off the air in the support position.

A month after the doctor's letter clearing her, Cleveland was put back on the air, but mostly on HSN's less-esteemed sister network, "America's Store." Despite requests from vendors to have her back, HSN rarely put Cleveland back on the regular Home Shopping Channel.

Approximately eighteen months later, in April 2001, Cleveland was fired for doing an unauthorized infomercial on another station. Executive Vice President of Broadcasting Bill Concello made the decision.

At trial, Concello gave inconsistent reasons for the discharge: that Cleveland's contract forbid infomercials; that she had signed a "non-compete agreement"; that HSN had an "unwritten policy" prohibiting infomercials; then finally that it was "standard industry practice" that show hosts should not do infomercials. Cleveland produced evidence that these reasons were bogus: she was not under contract; the non-compete agreement was no longer valid; and no other employee had ever been made aware of an unwritten policy or industry practice prohibiting infomercials. Furthermore, she produced evidence of two other show hosts who had been given permission to do infomercials.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The jury found for Cleveland, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. HSN then moved for a renewed judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court granted HSN a judgment as a matter of law, finding that Cleveland had failed to rebut HSN's explanation that it had fired her because she had done an unauthorized infomercial. The district court found Cleveland had produced evidence that she was a popular and effective show host, that Panos wanted to fire her from the beginning, that she was treated differently when she returned from medical leave, and that Concello gave inconsistent reasons for her termination.

Nevertheless, the district court held that Cleveland had failed to show different treatment of a similarly situated show host; it found HSN had explained why it had given permission to do infomercials to the two other show hosts. It found no evidence of disability animus. The court wrote that Cleveland's disability actually delayed her termination, because Panos, after talking with in-house counsel, had put off firing Cleveland out of fear of an ADA lawsuit.

Most importantly, the court found Concello's inconsistent reasons for firing Cleveland immaterial. Whether based on a non-compete agreement, contract, or unwritten policy, the court opined that the motivating factor was still Cleveland's unauthorized participation in the infomercial. While Cleveland produced compelling evidence that she had not violated any agreement or policy in doing the infomercial, this was immaterial to the district court; if HSN's true reason was still her participation in the infomercial rather than her disability, then Cleveland had not established pretext. Cleveland had produced no evidence that Concello did not honestly believe doing an infomercial was prohibited. At most, the court found, HSN was simply guilty of poor business judgment in firing an effective show host.

Cleveland appeals, claiming that the district court viewed the evidence in favor of HSN rather than her. HSN cross-appeals that, if this court should overturn the judgment as a matter of law, the district court erred in its denial of HSN's original motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Cleveland's evidence and in its denial of a new trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo a district court's grant of a renewed judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, applying the same standard as the district court. Thosteson v. United States, 331 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir.2003). Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. We should review all of the evidence in the record and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 148-151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097. "[A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097.

In discrimination cases, the factors we should consider include the "strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 149-50, 120 S.Ct. 2097.

ADA claim

Cleveland originally sought to prove discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence framework. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this burden-shifting analysis, Cleveland had the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir.2001). To establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, Cleveland had to show (1) a disability, (2) that she was otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was discriminated against based upon the disability. Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir.2002); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir.1996). Once Cleveland put forth a prima facie case, which establishes a presumption of discrimination, the burden then shifted to HSN to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination. Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1242. HSN simply had the burden of production, and did not need to persuade the court that it was motivated by the reason. Id. After the articulated reason was given, the inferential presumption of discrimination was eliminated, the McDonnell Douglas framework disappeared, and Cleveland was left with the ultimate burden of proving that HSN intentionally discriminated against her because of her disability. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097. In order to prove this intentional discrimination, Cleveland was allowed to show HSN's reason was "unworthy of credence" and a pretext for discrimination. Id.

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