Clewis v. Worley

Decision Date08 March 2023
Docket Number5:22-CT-03009-M
PartiesJAMES LEVIE CLEWIS, Plaintiff, v. Lt. ANDREW WORLEY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
ORDER

RICHARD E. MYERS, II Chief United States District Judge.

This cause is before the court on plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, Mot. [D.E. 36], and defendants' motion for summary judgment, Mot. [D.E. 22], These motions are ripe for review.

Procedural History:

On January 6, 2022, James Levie Clewis (plaintiff') a state inmate proceeding without prepayment of fees, filed pro se a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [D.E. 1, 2, 7].

Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Andrew Worley (Worley), Capt Dawn Battle (“Battle”), and Sgt. Lee (“Lee”) (collectively, defendants) violated his constitutional rights at the Columbus County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) sometime between July and December 2,2020, when, after deliberately flooding a cell, plaintiff and his cellmate were cuffed and shackled to a bench in the intake area and denied water and toileting for 72 hours. Compl. [D.E. 1] at 1, 3-6.

On February 17, 2022, plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel. Mot. [D.E. 8].

On July 11, 2022, the court conducted its initial review, denied plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel, allowed plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim to proceed, but directed defendants to address exhaustion of available administrative remedies. See Order [D.E. 11]. Also on that date, summonses were issued as to Worley, Battle, and Lee. See [D.E. 12], On July 28, 2022, plaintiff was notified that North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. (“NCPLS”), was available to assist him with discovery in this action. See [D.E. 13, 14], On August 2, 2022, summonses were returned executed as to Worley, Battle, and Lee. See [D.E. 15, 16, 17]; but see [D.E. 28] (indicating that a summons was returned unexecuted as to Lee), and Defs.' Mem. [D.E. 23] at n.l (“While Plaintiff named a ‘Sgt. Lee' in the Complaint and a summons was issued regarding a ‘Sgt. Lee,' counsel for Defendants has been unable to identify that any such person exists at the Columbus County Detention Center or otherwise.”).

On August 3,2022, plaintiff filed a motion indicating an intent to amend the complaint and seeking legal advice about obtaining witness statements, together with an attached correspondence from NCPLS and what appears to be North Carolina Department of Public Safety policies as to prisoner restraint for behavioral management. See Mot. [D.E. 18]; Mot. Attach. [D.E. 18-1].

On August 5, 2022, plaintiff accepted NCPLS assistance with discovery. [D.E. 19].

On August 12, 2022, defendants Worley and Battle moved to dismiss, Mot. [D.E. 22] (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)), and filed a memorandum in support, Defs.' Mem. [D.E. 23].

On August 15, 2022, the court issued a Rule 12 Letter,” notifying plaintiff about the motion to dismiss, the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline. [D.E. 24], On August 22, 2022, plaintiff filed both a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Pl.'s Resp. [D.E. 25], and a motion seeking appointment of counsel, Mot. [D.E. 26].

On September 1, 2022, plaintiff filed a supporting memorandum. Pl.'s Mem. [D.E. 27].

On September 27, 2022, summons was returned unexecuted as to Sgt. Lee. [D.E. 28].

On October 5,2022, the court: denied plaintiffs motions seeking legal advice, appointment of counsel, and to amend the complaint; converted defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment premised on plaintiffs purported failure to exhaust available administrative remedies; directed defendants to supplement their motion with documentation as to the Detention Center's grievance procedure and plaintiffs attempted use of this procedure; and allowed plaintiff until November 17, 2022, to file any response. See Order [D.E. 29].

On October 19, 2022, plaintiff filed a response in opposition, Pl.'s Resp. [D.E. 30], and defendants moved for an extension of time, Mot. [D.E. 31].

On October 26,2022, defendants filed a statement of material facts [D.E. 32], an appendix [D.E. 33], and a memorandum in support [D.E. 34]. Also on that date, the court granted defendants an extension of time until November 9, 2023, to comply with the court's October 5, 2022, order and allowed plaintiff until December 1,2023, to file any response. Order [D.E. 35].

On November 17, 2022, plaintiff filed what the court construes as a motion seeking reconsideration of prior court orders and a response in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Mot. [D.E. 36]; Mot. Attach. [D.E. 36-1], On November 29, 2022, defendants filed a reply. Defs.' Reply [D.E. 37].

Discussion:

1) Plaintiffs November 17, 2022, motion for reconsideration. Mot. [D.E. 36].

In his November 17, 2022, filing, plaintiff objects both to the order granting defendants' motion for an extension of time and to the undersigned judge “practicing law from the bench, denying plaintiff due process of law, by converting a North Carolina State Bar Licensed Attorney's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment [sic].” Mot. [D.E. 36] at 1-2. Plaintiff asserts that the court should review his pro se filings leniently, that the legal standard for a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment are distinct, and that the court was required to deny defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. Plaintiff further contends that any extension of time for defendants is unreasonable, especially because defendants' counsel is in a large law firm and “in Raleigh, mere blocks from the Federal Courthouse, from the Judge ... [sic].” Id. at 6.

The court construes this filing as a motion seeking reconsideration of both the court's October 5, 2022, order converting defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and the court's October 26, 2022, order granting defendants an extension of time. See United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting courts “classify pro se pleadings from prisoners according to their contents, without regard to their captions.”).

Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are not subject to the strict standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment,” but are “committed to the discretion of the district court.” Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003). Because no change of law occurred, and because plaintiff fails to show any clear error causing manifest injustice in these prior orders, the court DENIES this motion. See Carlson v. Boston Scientific Corp., 856 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017) (permitting revision of interlocutory orders under the following circumstances: (1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence; (2) a change in applicable law; or (3) clear error causing manifest injustice).

2) Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Mot. [D.E. 22].

As noted above, the court converted defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment premised on plaintiffs purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Order [D.E. 29].

a) Parties' Arguments:

Defendants argue, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies at the Detention Center before filing this action. See Defs.' Mem. [D.E. 23] at 3-7.

In response, plaintiff admits he did not exhaust the Detention Center's administrative remedy process, but asserts he received no response despite filing multiple grievances. Pl.'s Resp. [D.E. 25] at 2. Plaintiff asks, “how can I exhaust the grievance process when deliberately the appropriate officials failed to respond [sic],” and he claims he “exhausted the administrative remedy process to the best of [his] ability.” Id. Plaintiff: states that he “did file grievance after grievance,” but “did not [receive] anything in return”; asserts the grievance process was “unfairly restricted,” he “submitted on the appropriate [grievance] forms ‘over & over,”' and he exhausted the grievance process “to the best of [his] ability”; and seeks “a pardon for this exception and to move forward.” Pl.'s Mem. [D.E. 27] at 3, 6. Plaintiff contends: “I willingly admitted I did not exhaust the administrative remedy procedure. .. . Nevertheless, I exhausted what was available to me to the best of my ability [sic].” Pl.'s Resp. [D.E. 30] at 3. Plaintiff further states:

What reason would I have not to exhaust the Grievance Procedure to the max! Just so at least and willfully knowingly [sic] a paper trail so existed, even knowing it is no use. But I still kept submitting! I should not be forced to be held responsible for telling the truth “that I did not exhaust the grievance remedy procedure” (DUE TO) [sic] staff officers['] responsibility to appropriately respond to grievances and request forms. That is neglect of duty and breech of the Detention Center[']s Policy. If there is/was a policy and that gives rise to the request of Defendants Presenting the Policys [sic]. May I respectfully request a subpoena for officer[']s statements. I did to the best of my ability submit numerous of grievance [sic]. William Shawn Buffkin, Junior Thompson, Mrs. Faulk, Corporal Michael Dancil, Officer Mitchelle, Sgt. Danston, Corporal Lancaster, Sergeant Ferris, Captain Trina Worley, Nurse Justin Creech. Those are the officers. All officers above can verify & vouche [sic]. I did turn in grievances on this matter numerous of times [sic].

Id. at 3-4.

Defendants' memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment reiterates arguments that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies at the Detention Center. See Defs.' Mem. [D.E. 34]; see...

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