Cliff v. Pinto.

Decision Date05 August 1948
Docket NumberNo. 8910.,8910.
Citation60 A.2d 704
PartiesCLIFF v. PINTO.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles A. Walsh, Judge.

Action of asumpsit by Lilly Cliff against Francis A. Pinto for breach of promise to marry. A justice of the superior court, sitting without a jury, rendered a decision for plaintiff, and the defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Woolley, Blais & Quinn, Clarence N. Woolley, Corcoran, Foley & Flynn and Francis R. Foley, all of Pawtucket, for plaintiff.

Letts & Quinn and Daniel J. Murray, all of Providence, for defendant.

BAKER, Justice.

This is an action of assumpsit for breach of promise of marriage. It was heard by a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury and he rendered a decision awarding the plaintiff damages of $2,500. The defendant duly prosecuted his bill of exceptions to this court and he is now relying on his sixth and seventh exceptions only. His other exceptions not being briefed or argued are deemed to be waived.

It appears from the evidence that the parties first met on May 9, 1945 at Blackpool, Lancashire, England. The plaintiff was a member of the women's auxiliary territorial service of the British army. The defendant was a staff sergeant in the United States army air force and was stationed at Walton near Blackpool. The plaintiff invited the defendant to her home where he met her family. He subsequently visited her there almost every evening and often was an overnight guest. After a brief courtship they discussed marriage, the plaintiff apparently being the first to broach the subject. The defendant promised to marry her but not while he was in uniform.

On August 3, 1945 the defendant left England for France. Thereafter the parties corresponded regularly and frequently. The plaintiff kept a diary and also a complete record of the letters they both wrote. By arrangement between them each letter was numbered. The defendant did not return to England but arrived in this country November 8, 1945 and was soon separated from the service and returned to his home in Jamestown in this state. On November 14 he wrote the plaintiff a letter formally asking her to marry him. She accepted this offer in a letter to him dated November 19, 1945 and mailed in England, she in the meantime having also been demobilized. The parties continued to correspond frequently and the defendant asked the plaintiff to come to this country so that they could be married. In compliance with immigration regulations, under date of January 5, 1946 he signed a so-called affidavit of support stating his financial condition. In this instrument he referred to her as ‘my fiancee’ and declared that he would marry her immediately upon her arrival in this country. The plaintiff had difficulty in obtaining passage but eventually she succeeded in doing so, paying her own expenses and giving up a position as a silk weaver.

She arrived in New York November 11, 1946 and was met at the boat by the defendant and his two married sisters who lived in Brooklyn. She was taken to the home of one of the sisters where both parties stayed until November 16 in order to attend the funeral of a relative of the defendant. On November 12 they were given a blood test by a physician and each received a certificate showing a condition satisfactory for marriage. On the same date they also consulted a priest at a Roman Catholic Church in Brooklyn in order to make arrangements for their wedding, the defendant being a member of that faith and the plaintiff being a Protestant. The priest, however, told them in substance that before he could marry them they should furnish an affidavit signed by her mother to the effect that the plaintiff had not been married before. The defendant then suggested to the plaintiff that he would see what could be done in Jamestown about their wedding. While in Brooklyn he purchased a wedding ring from his brother-in-law who was in the jewelry business.

On November 16, 1946 the defendant took the plaintiff to his home in Jamestown where she met his father, his mother, who was elderly and not well, and his brother and others sisters. The next day they consulted the parish priest at the Catholic Church in that town regarding their marriage, and on three occasions, namely, November 18, 20 and 25, the plaintiff received instructions in that faith concerning their wedding. The priest also requested them to produce their baptismal records. The plaintiff did so but the defendant's record had apparently been lost. He had been baptized at a church in Newport and it was necessary to obtain from the priest in charge thereof an affidavit of that fact. Although an affidavit was made out the defendant never obtained it. The plaintiff, however, went to Newport on November 30 and received it, but it was not delivered to the priest in Jamestown.

The plaintiff remained at the defendant's home apparently on goods terms with his family until December 1, 1946. On that date he told her that she would have to leave and that he would take her to his sister in Brooklyn. The only reason he gave was that his mother could stand her no longer. When she asked him about the marriage he said it would have to wait. The defendant and plaintiff remained in Brooklyn until December 6 when he returned to Jamestown alone. He visited her again at his sister's home from January 14 through January 17, 1947, and there was some correspondence between the parties after this occasion. The defendant testified that on this last trip to Brooklyn he told the plaintiff that it was all over and there would be no marriage. The plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that during all this period he merely told her to wait.

On February 4, 1947 she left Brooklyn and went to Pawtucket in this state to visit a woman whose niece she had known in England. She remained with this woman until after the trial of the case in the superior court. On February 6 by agreement the plaintiff met and talked with the defendant in Newport and when she asked him about the marriage he again told her to wait. On March 5, 1947 at the suggestion of her attorney she, accompanied by the woman with whom she was living in Pawtucket, went to Jamestown and called on the defendant in order to get a final answer on the marriage question. At that time he definitely told her that he could not go through with it.

The defendant does not question the fact that he and plaintiff were duly engaged. However, in support of the exceptions relied on he contends; first, that it was a condition of the promise of marriage that the plaintiff would embrace the Catholic faith and that her failure to do so is a defense to this action; and, second, that as the marriage was to have been performed in New York City and the breach of contract occurred there, the breach did not support a right of action in that state where an action of such nature has been abolished by statute, and therefore there was no right of action in this state.

We have examined the evidence in order to determine whether or not the defendant's first contention is correct. In giving his decision the trial justice stated that he was ‘not at all impressed by the story of the defendant.’ After careful consideration we are of the opinion that defendant's contention is not correct and that he did not prove that the promise of marriage was made on the condition above referred to. The defendant testified in substance that in England he and the plaintiff discussed their future and that she then said she would become a Catholic. He did not say when this was to take place and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO v. National Union
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 22, 2002
    ...adopted the Uniform Foreign Law Act in 1939. See O'Neal v. Caffarello, 303 Ill.App. 574, 25 N.E.2d 534 (1940). In Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 375, 60 A.2d 704, 707 (1948), the court stated that it adopted its version of the Uniform Foreign Law Act to provide a simple method of enabling cou......
  • Kingston v. Quimby
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1955
    ...given to the Act in other states where it has been adopted. Fardy v. Mayerstein, 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E.2d 315, 47 N.E.2d 966; Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704; Maccabees v. Lipps, 182 Md. 190, 34 A.2d 424; Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Shumaker, 178 Md. 189, 12 A.2d 618; Smi......
  • Greer v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • December 26, 1967
    ...similar to, or identical with, §§ 541--547, supra (see Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A.2d 241, 12 A.L.R.2d 939; Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704; Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627, 23 A.L.R.2d 1431, and other cases referred to in the footnotes to 29 Am.Jur.2d, 'Eviden......
  • C. I. T. Corp. v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • October 4, 1966
    ...not properly placed in issue and could not be relied on by the plaintiff. See Bailey v. Hagen, 25 Wis.2d 386, 130 N.W.2d 73; Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704. Any other rule would be prejudicial to a party prepared to try his case on the law of the forum and would place an undue bur......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT