Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye

• Decision Date: 02 May 1889
• Citation: 6 So. 192,87 Ala. 468
• Parties: CLIFTON IRON CO. v. DYE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

6 So. 192

87 Ala. 468

CLIFTON IRON CO. v. DYE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 2, 1889

Appeal from chancery court, Talladega county; S. K. MCSPADDEN Chancellor.

The bill in this case prayed an injunction against the Clifton Iron Company from corrupting a stream flowing through the land of James T. Dye, the complainant, by means of muddy water, clay, and other extraneous matter in the washing of iron ores, which flowed from machines known as "washers," operated by defendant. A perpetual injunction was granted by the chancellor, and from such decree defendant appeals.

Knox & Bowie, for appellant.

Bishop & Whitson, for appellee.

STONE C.J.

We do not deem it necessary to decide whether the flowing of the dirt and other material from the washers of the appellant upon the land of the appellee entitles the latter to recover therefor. If it be conceded that it does, the question presented is whether the injuries complained of, and damages inflicted and to accrue hereafter, are such as should call forth the extraordinary restraining powers of a court of equity. It is shown that the Clifton Iron Company owns a valuable body of iron ore land at Ironaton, and for the purpose of converting this iron ore into pig-iron the company has erected a smelting furnace and other improvements at a very large cost. It is further shown that the washing of these ores, substantially in the manner detailed, is necessary for their use; and, as an incident of such washing, the particles of earth and other materials are carried down into the creek or stream which crosses appellee's land, thereby polluting the stream, and causing a deposit of the sediment on appellee's land. It is neither averred nor proved that there is any other available outlet for the impurities complained of. There is some conflict in the testimony as to the nature and extent of the alleged injury. It is affirmatively shown that this stream or creek is not the only source of water supply which appellee has; for the undisputed evidence shows that he has a spring and branch on his land quite as conveniently located as the creek is, and which affords an ample and certain supply of water for his uses. The only asserted use made of the waters of the creek by appellee prior to the erection of the washers was for fishing, bathing, and watering a few horses, cattle, and hogs. The first washer was erected in 1882 or 1883, the second in 1884, and the third or last in 1885-86. It is not shown that since these washers were erected appellee has suffered any material injury, nor been deprived the means of giving water to his horses, cattle, and hogs. Under these circumstances, should a court of equity enjoin the operations of the company, or leave complainant to his remedy at law for such injury as he has sustained, or is likely to sustain in the future?

Counsel have pressed the proposition that mere convenience in the use of its property by the company does not entitle it to pour down upon the appellee's land, and into the stream on his land, the débris from the washers erected by it, and we think the contention is reasonable. But it is not every case of nuisance or continuing trespass which a court of equity will restrain by injunction. In determining this question, the court should weigh...