Clifton v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 24 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–5402.,13–5402. |
| Citation | 775 F.3d 760 |
| Parties | Terry CLIFTON, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Wayne CARPENTER, Warden, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Unconstitutional as Applied
West's T.C.A. § 41–21–812ARGUED:D. Bruce La Pierre, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellant. John H. Bledsoe, Office of the Tennessee Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:D. Bruce La Pierre, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri, Brian C. Walsh, Bryan Cave LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellant. John H. Bledsoe, Office of the Tennessee Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: ROGERS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge.*
Terry Clifton's habeas corpus petition was denied because he failed to file his appeal in the Davidson County Chancery Court within the sixty-day period allowed for filing such appeals. Clifton attempted to file during that timeframe, but the clerk returned it unfiled because of unpaid court costs from a previous matter. Tennessee Code § 41–21–812 prohibits court clerks from filing claims while inmates have court costs and fees outstanding. Consequently, the district court dismissed Clifton's habeas corpus claim on the basis that Clifton had procedurally defaulted.
Clifton now appeals this finding, arguing that he was deprived of a state-authorized parole revocation appeal due to his indigence and inability to pay court costs. The question before us is whether Tennessee may constitutionally require that “prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses [be] paid in full” before permitting a prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition challenging the constitutionality of his probation revocation proceedings. Tenn.Code Ann. § 41–21–812. Because the answer to this question is no, the case will be REMANDED for further proceedings.
In 1983, Terry Clifton was convicted of grand larceny, found to be a habitual criminal, and sentenced to life in prison. Twenty-seven years later, in March of 2010, Clifton was paroled. After Clifton had been released, Tennessee's Appellate Court Cost center sent Clifton an invoice for $124.10 in outstanding court costs. Clifton attempted to make a payment on this debt and contacted the Center to establish a payment plan.
Clifton's parole was short-lived. Only a few months later, on July 23, 2010, the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole issued an arrest warrant based on allegations that Clifton had violated his conditions of parole by engaging in “intimidating and threatening behavior.” After holding a hearing, the parole board recommended that Clifton's parole be revoked. Clifton appealed the decision to the Parole Hearings Director but his appeal was denied.
In compliance with Tennessee Code §§ 27–9–101 and 102, Clifton next filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 1 in the Davidson County Chancery Court. Although the petition was timely filed, the court clerk refused to file it because Clifton had unpaid court costs. Clifton attempted to appeal this decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, but his notice of appeal was also returned unfiled by the chancery court for the same reason. In a letter to Clifton, the clerk explained that the clerk could not file Clifton's petition because of outstanding and unpaid court costs totaling $1,449.15.
The clerk's decision to return Clifton's petition and notice of appeal unfiled was in compliance with a Standing Order of the chancery court, a copy of which was enclosed with the letter, that directed the clerk “not to file another claim received by this office from an inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses assessed to the inmate are paid in full.” [R.1, ChanceryCourt Standing Order, Page ID # 49.] Included in the Standing Order was the full text of the Tennessee statute:
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b), on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.
(b) A court may allow an inmate who has not paid any costs or expenses assessed against the inmate to file a claim for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin an act or failure to act that creates a substantial threat of irreparable injury or serious physical harm to the inmate.
On October 28, 2011, Clifton filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated during his parole revocation proceeding.2 Clifton also filed a motion seeking to be excused from filing his petition for a writ of certiorari in the chancery court. The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee acknowledged Clifton's contention that he was unfairly prevented from filing his appeal to the Davidson County Chancery Court because of his failure to pay outstanding fees, but concluded that the claims were procedurally defaulted as Clifton had failed to file his appeal in the Chancery Court within the sixty-day period for filing such appeals. The court also concluded that Clifton had not established “cause” and “prejudice” to overcome the procedural default.
“Due to longstanding policies of comity and respect between state and federal courts, a habeas petitioner must give state courts the first opportunity to consider and rule upon the federal claims the prisoner wishes to use to attack his state court conviction.” Pudelski v. Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 605 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). Consistent with these principles, a federal court will not consider a petition for habeas unless the petitioner has sufficiently exhausted his state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012). Normally, when a petitioner fails “to fairly present federal claims to the state courts, and a state procedural rule ... prohibits the state court from considering them, the claims are considered procedurally defaulted.” Pudelski, 576 F.3d at 605 (citing Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir.2002)).3
This Court undertakes a four-part inquiry to determine whether a habeas petitioner procedurally defaulted on a claim. Such default occurs when:
(1) the petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule; (2) the state courts enforce the rule; (3) the state procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim; and (4) the petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice excusing the default.
Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir.2010) (citations omitted). This case hinges on the question of whether the Id. at 290.
The district court's procedural default finding rested on the fact that Clifton “did not follow the [state] court rules in filing his appeal with the Davidson County Chancery Court.” [R. 38, Dismissal Order, PageID # 1704.] Based on this finding, the court concluded that he had not exhausted his remedies in the Tennessee state courts. In its procedural default analysis, despite noting the applicable standard, the district court did not actually consider whether the Tennessee statute was an “independent and adequate” state ground. Rather, the district court concluded that “[w]hether the state court properly refused his appeal for nonpayment of court costs constitute[d] a state law issue” and that such “[e]rror in the application of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.” [R. 38, Dismissal Order, PageID # 1705 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)).] After concluding that Clifton had procedurally defaulted his claim, the district court further found that Clifton had not shown “cause” and “actual prejudice” or “a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” and thereby concluded that he could not overcome the procedural default. [R. 38, Dismissal Order, PageID # 1704.]
First, Tennessee contends that Clifton may not challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code § 41–21–812 in a habeas corpus action. This misstates the inquiry. Clifton's habeas action challenges the constitutionality of the parole board's decision. The Tennessee statute is only implicated insofar as it was used to prevent him from filing his appeal which, ultimately, served as the basis for his procedural default. The question of whether Tennessee Code § 41–21–812 is adequate is a question to be answered by the federal courts. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465–66, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (“We have recognized that the adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions ... is not within the State's prerogative finally to decide; rather, adequacy is itself a federal question.”); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 736, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965).
Whether a state procedural rule is “adequate and independent” generally requires “an examination of the legitimate state interests behind the procedural rule in light of the federal interest in considering federal claims.” Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986) (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446–48, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965)). A state law cannot, however, serve as an “adequate basis for the state court's...
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