Clifton v. Chater, 95-3128
Decision Date | 26 March 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-3128,95-3128 |
Citation | 79 F.3d 1007 |
Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15156B Danny CLIFTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, * Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 94-CV-4168); Dale E. Saffels, Judge.
Cynthia J. Patton of Patton & Patton, P.A., Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, Jackie A. Rapstine, Assistant United States Attorney (Frank V. Smith III, Chief Counsel, Region VII, Kristi A. Schmidt, Assistant Regional Counsel, Kansas City, Missouri, of Counsel), Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before PORFILIO, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Danny Clifton filed an application for Social Security benefits, alleging a disability beginning on June 30, 1991, due to a back injury. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded at step five of the five-part sequential evaluation process, see 20 C.F.R. 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.1988), that appellant could still perform limited sedentary work and, therefore, was not disabled. Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ's decision became the Secretary's final decision. Appellant appeals from the district court's order affirming the Secretary's decision to deny him disability benefits. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. 1291. We reverse. 1
Appellant argues on appeal that the district court erred in affirming the Secretary's determinations that: (1) appellant's impairments did not meet or equal Listed Impairment 1.05(C) (vertebrogenic disorders), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; and (2) appellant retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a limited range of sedentary, unskilled work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairment "is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges as so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 (quotation omitted). In this case, the ALJ did not discuss the evidence or his reasons for determining that appellant was not disabled at step three, or even identify the relevant Listing or Listings; he merely stated a summary conclusion that appellant's impairments did not meet or equal any Listed Impairment. Appellant's App. at 18-19. Such a bare conclusion is beyond meaningful judicial review. Under the Social Security Act,
[t]he Commissioner of Social Security is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for a payment under this subchapter. Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner's determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is based.
42 U.S.C. 405(b)(1). Under this statute, the ALJ was required to discuss the evidence and explain why he found that appellant was not disabled at step three. Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (4th Cir.1986); see also Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 703, 708 (D.C.Cir.1986) ( ).
This statutory requirement fits hand in glove with our standard of review. By congressional design, as well as by administrative due process standards, this court should not properly engage in the task of weighing evidence in cases before the Social Security Administration. 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (); Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir.1981) ( ); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) ( ). Rather, we review the Secretary's decision only to determine whether her factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether she applied the correct legal standards. 42 U.S.C. 405(g); see also Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (10th Cir.1984).
Substantial evidence " 'means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). In the absence of ALJ findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence, we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the ALJ's conclusion that appellant's impairments did not meet or equal any Listed Impairment, and whether he applied the correct legal standards...
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DC Register Vol 70, No 43 October 27, 2023 Pages 014136 to 014429
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DC Register Vol 69, No 23 June 10, 2022 Pages 006579 to 007033
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