Clifton v. Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana

• Decision Date: 03 March 1941
• Docket Number: 36100.
• Citation: 197 La. 222,1 So.2d 84
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: CLIFTON et al. v. TRI-STATE TRANSIT CO. OF LOUISIANA, Inc., et al.

1 So.2d 84

197 La. 222

CLIFTON et al. v. TRI-STATE TRANSIT CO. OF LOUISIANA, Inc., et al.

No. 36100.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

March 3, 1941

Hudson, Potts, Bernstein & Snellings, of Monroe for petitioners.

Thompson & Thompson, of Monroe, for respondents.

PONDER Justice.

A motor vehicle collision occurred on U.S. Highway No. 80 in Richland Parish, on December 17, 1939, wherein a Chevrolet car, owned and operated by Daniel E. Jones, collided with a passenger motor bus owned by the Tri-State Transit Company of Louisiana, Inc., operated by its employee. At the time of the collision, the bus was carrying some thirty-five passengers among whom were Miss Mattie Tyson, Mrs. Howard Clifton, and Mrs. Eva Newberry. Mrs. Clifton and her husband, Howard Clifton, instituted suit on September 9, 1940, in the Fifth Judicial Court for the Parish of Richland against the Tri-State Transit Company of Louisiana, Inc., and the American Fidelity and Casualty Company, its insurance carrier, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by her in the collision in the amount of $35,500. Miss Mattie Tyson brought suit on November 30, 1940, against the same defendants in the same court to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by her in the accident in the sum of $57,509.37 and for $50 per month for life. Mrs. Newberry and Charles F. Newberry, her husband, also brought suit in the same court against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in the accident in the sum of $21,500. On December 14, 1940, Daniel E. Jones brought suit against the defendants to recover damages sustained by him in the accident in the sum of $877.52. The defendants, the bus company and its insurer, filed answers in all the suits. On January 15, 1941, the defendants filed a motion in the lower court to consolidate the suits aforementioned for the purpose of trial, and on that date the clerk of court, at the request of the defendants notified the attorneys representing the plaintiffs that the motion would be taken up for hearing on January 27, 1941. The case of Mrs. Clifton and her husband was fixed for trial for January 29, 1941, by a previous order of court. The motion to consolidate the cases came up for hearing on January 27, 1941, and it was denied by the lower court. The defendants applied to this court for the writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition which were granted and the rule nisi issued. The matter is now submitted for determination.

The relators contend that they are entitled to have the cases consolidated for trial on the merits with the understanding that separate judgments are to be rendered. The relators take the position that the case of Riggin et al. v. Watson-Aven Ice Cream Co., Inc., et al., 192 La. 469, 188 So. 144, is compelling and direct authority for granting the relief sought.

From the record it appears that the defendants are represented by the same attorneys in all the suits. The plaintiffs are represented by the same attorneys in all the suits except the Newberry case. No objection was made to the consolidation on behalf of the Newberry suit. Counsel for the plaintiffs, except in the Newberry suit, announced in the lower court that the plaintiffs did not oppose the consolidation of the Newberry, Clifton, and Tyson suits, but consented to their consolidation. The plaintiffs in all the suits, with the exception of the Newberry suit, oppose consolidating the cases with the suit of Daniel E. Jones. Such being the case, it appears that the dispute is whether or not the suit of Daniel E. Jones should be consolidated with the other cases. The respondents contend that the Jones case presents different issues.

All of the suits are for damages for alleged injuries received in the accident. They arise from the same accident. They involve the issues of negligence and causation. They would necessarily depend to a large extent on the same evidence. The consolidation does not tend to give an advantage to any of the parties or prejudice their substantial rights. All of the suits are against the same defendants. There appears to be no apparent conflict of interest among the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs with the exception of Jones were passengers on the bus and Jones was the driver of the other car. All of the plaintiffs are relying on the alleged negligence or fault of the bus company and seek to hold it responsible for the accident. The plaintiffs opposing the consolidation are represented by the same counsel. Two of the suits, the Jones suit and...