Climent-García v. Autoridad De Transporte Marítimo Y Las Islas Municipio

• Decision Date: 16 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–2442.,12–2442.
• Citation: 754 F.3d 17
• Parties: Laura CLIMENT–GARCÍA, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AUTORIDAD DE TRANSPORTE MARÍTIMO Y LAS ISLAS MUNICIPIO, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

754 F.3d 17

Laura CLIMENT–GARCÍA, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.AUTORIDAD DE TRANSPORTE MARÍTIMO Y LAS ISLAS MUNICIPIO, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 12–2442.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

May 16, 2014.

Aníbal J. Núñez–González and Puerto Rico Legal Advocates, PSC, on brief for appellant.

Francisco M. Troncoso, Law Offices of Francisco M. Troncoso, PSC, and Jorge L. Guerrero–Calderón, on brief for appellee.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Laura Climent–García (“Climent”) sued her employer, alleging adverse employment action and a failure to hire on account of sex. A jury found in favor of Climent on both counts. On appeal, the Autoridad de Transporte Marítimo y la Islas Municipio (the Puerto Rican Maritime Transport Authority or “the MTA”) seeks a reversal of the jury verdict, claiming that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury's findings. In the alternative, the MTA requests remittitur on the issue of damages. Because a procedural misstep bars its sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim from review, we do not consider that portion of the MTA's appeal. As to the damages award, after a thorough review of the evidence, we affirm the district court's denial of remittitur.

I. Background

Because the MTA's claims rest on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See Rodríguez v. Señor Frog's de la Isla, Inc., 642 F.3d 28, 30 n. 1 (1st Cir.2011); Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1188 (1st Cir.1995).

A. Climent's Employment

At all times relevant to this case, Climent held the permanent position of Operations Supervisor at the MTA's Fajardo, Puerto Rico, ferry terminal. In this position, her monthly salary was $2,810, and she was eligible for overtime.

In 2006, the Executive Director of the MTA, Juan Cirino–Martínez (“Cirino”), approached Climent about her serving, on an interim basis, as the Assistant Manager of Maritime Transport at the Fajardo ferry terminal. She accepted the position. As Interim Assistant Manager, Climent's responsibilities included overseeing all operational and administrative aspects of ferry operations between Fajardo and the two offshore islands of Culebra and Vieques, Puerto Rico. Many of her duties, such as managing the ticket office, inspecting cargo loads, and ensuring vessel maintenance, required Climent to be present at the Fajardo ferry terminal.

Due to these on-site duties, Climent's male predecessor had worked from an office at the ferry terminal. She, however, was given office space at an MTA-owned location approximately ten minutes away. On several occasions when Climent traveled to the terminal to complete her work, Cirino—either directly or through an intermediary—would forcefully demand that she return to her office. As a result, Climent had less of an operational role than her predecessor, and administrative tasks comprised a relatively larger share of her duties.

Climent also noticed that her predecessor continued to sign certain requisition and disbursement orders. Believing that having multiple signatories on orders for a single ferry would cause confusion, Climent stopped signing orders related to particular vessels. On one occasion, Cirino became angry when he realized Climent had not signed an order, screaming at her and insinuating that she would soon be fired. Climent, upset and in tears, returned to her office and spoke to the MTA's Human Resources Director, Jeanette Santana (“Santana”). She later met with a psychologist to alleviate her distress.

In July 2007, upset with her treatment in Fajardo, Climent resigned from the Interim Assistant Manager position, returned to her permanent job as Operations Supervisor, and began to investigate the possibility of transferring to a different location. Around that same time, an interim position of Maritime Transport Administrator opened up at the AcuaExpresso ferry terminal in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Santana recommended Climent for the job, telling Cirino that she believed Climent was highly qualified. Cirino expressed skepticism, suggesting that Climent's childcare responsibilities would make commuting from Fajardo to San Juan for work inappropriate. Overhearing this conversation, Climent responded that she would happily make appropriate childcare arrangements and that she wished to be considered for the position. Again, Cirino refused, saying that the San Juan ferry terminal was staffed only by males and that he had already selected a different individual, Stanley Mulero (“Mulero”), for the position.

While Maritime Transport Administrator, Mulero received a monthly salary of $4,342 and was not eligible for overtime. Having not been selected for the position, Climent continued to work as Operations Supervisor in Fajardo, where she remained employed throughout this litigation.

B. The Trial

Climent brought claims pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and analogous Puerto Rico law, Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended,P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq.(“Law 100”). Trial began on September 19, 2012. During the jury trial, the MTA twice moved for judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, first, at the conclusion of Climent's case-in-chief and, second, after the close of all evidence. The magistrate judge presiding over the trial declined to grant either motion.

After deliberations, on September 27, 2012, the jury returned a verdict for Climent on both counts. For her adverse employment action claim, which was related to her time as Interim Assistant Manager in Fajardo, the jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages. For her failure to hire claim, which was related to the Maritime Transportation Administrator position in San Juan, the jury awarded $95,750 in back pay. Pursuant to Law 100, the magistrate judge doubled this total award, entering judgment against the MTA in the amount of $291,500. The MTA filed a post-verdict motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), seeking a reduction of the damages award. It did not renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The magistrate judge declined to reconsider damages, and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The MTA seeks a reversal of the jury verdict, arguing that no reasonable jury presented with the evidence at trial could have found either an adverse employment action or a failure to hire. The tide runs strongly against a litigant seeking to overturn a jury verdict. See, e.g., Bisbal–Ramos v. City of Mayagüez, 467 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.2006) (“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found in favor of the party that prevailed.”); Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir.2002) (“Our review ... ‘is weighted toward preservation of the jury verdict,’ for ‘we must affirm unless the evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the verdicts that no reasonable jury could have returned them.’ ” (quoting Rodowicz v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 36, 41–42 (1st Cir.2002))).

In order to engender appellate review on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, however, “a party must first have presented the claim to the district court, either by moving for judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury and renewing that motion after the verdict or by moving for a new trial.” Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., 82 F.3d 1166, 1171 (1st Cir.1996) (emphasis added and internal citation omitted). Despite having twice filed for judgment as a matter of law during trial, the MTA failed to renew this motion post-verdict. That failure leaves the MTA's claim dead in the water, for an appellate court “ ‘cannot review the denial of a Rule 50(a) motion based on the sufficiency of the evidence when the party appealing the verdict failed to renew its sufficiency challenge in the district court pursuant to Rule 50(b).’ ” Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Vázquez–Valentín v. Santiago–Díaz, 459 F.3d 144, 148 (1st Cir.2006)); see also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407, 126 S.Ct. 980, 163 L.Ed.2d 974 (2006) (“[S]ince respondent failed to renew its preverdict motion as specified in Rule 50(b), there was no basis for review of respondent's sufficiency of the evidence challenge in the Court of Appeals.”).

Although the MTA did file a post-verdict motion to amend or alter the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), that is of no help to their claim. We have previously explained that when a party files a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) for a new trial on evidentiary grounds, it may be the benefactor of a “limited review of the sufficiency claim,” insofar as that review is required to assess the merits of its new trial request. Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 986, 991 (1st Cir.1989). We have made clear, however, that a post-verdict Rule 59 motion seeking other relief—including the reduction of damages—cannot preserve a party's sufficiency claim for appellate review. Id. at 992 (“Although [appellant] filed a posttrial motion under Rule 59(e), that motion did not challenge the adequacy of the evidence generally, but dealt solely with the matter of double damages.... [A]ppellants neglected seasonably to invoke either Rule 50 or Rule 59(a) on sufficiency grounds.”). Here, the MTA did not argue in its postverdict motion that there was insufficient evidence of liability on either the adverse employment action or the failure to hire claim.

In light of its failure to file a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion, we do not consider the MTA's unpreserved challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. That ship has sailed.

B. Damages Amount

The MTA also appeals from the district court's denial of its Rule 59(e) motion for remittitur. It is...