Clinard v. Lee
| Docket Number | 3:13-cv-01190 |
| Decision Date | 18 September 2023 |
| Parties | JASON CLINARD, Petitioner, v. RANDY LEE, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
On February 27, 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this Court's denial of Petitioner Jason Clinard's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and having found prejudice resulting from Clinard's juvenile court counsel's ineffective assistance, remanded the case for the Court to conduct a de novo hearing on the question of whether Clinard's case should be transferred to adult court. Clinard v. Lee, 722 Fed.Appx. 552 565-66 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 123 (2018). In anticipation of that hearing, Clinard filed a motion to dismiss the transfer petition challenging the constitutionality of the sentence he would face if transferred to adult court and convicted of first-degree murder. (Doc. No. 104). The State opposed Clinard's motion.
Magistrate Judge Joe Brown conducted the de novo transfer hearing in April 2019 and recommended granting the transfer (Doc. No. 88), but Judge Brown did not consider Clinard's motion to dismiss. The Court found that the issues raised in the motion to dismiss and the transfer petition were inextricably intertwined and, on that basis, vacated Judge Brown's report and recommendation and ordered a new hearing at which the parties could offer additional evidence or testimony regarding the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 111). In the interim, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted an application for permission to appeal in State v Booker, in which Tyshon Booker argued that the life sentence he faced as a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree murder under Tennessee law was unconstitutional. Recognizing the importance of that decision to the issues raised in Clinard's motion to dismiss and the transfer petition, the Court stayed these proceedings pending the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision. On November 18, 2022, the Tennessee Supreme Court held as a matter of first impression “that an automatic life sentence when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile's age or other circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tenn. 2022).
The Court reopened this case, and Magistrate Judge Alistair Newbern held the second de novo transfer hearing on April 19, 2023.[1] The parties elected to adopt the testimony given and evidence presented in the April 2019 transfer hearing, and Clinard testified on his own behalf. The parties have filed briefing on the effect of the Booker decision on these proceedings and posthearing briefs addressing the testimony offered and questions raised in the April 19, 2023 hearing. (Doc. Nos. 144, 145, 152). Clinard's motion to dismiss and the transfer petition are now ripe for review.
In March 2005, Jason Clinard was charged with the first-degree murder of Joyce Gregory in the Juvenile Court of Stewart County, Tennessee. Clinard v. Lee, 722 Fed.Appx. 552, 555 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 123 (2018). At the time of the offense, Clinard was 14 years old.
After his arrest, Clinard was placed in the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). Id. The court appointed public defender Jake Lockert-an attorney with substantial experience as a prosecutor and criminal defense lawyer, including in murder trials and juvenilecourt proceedings-to represent Clinard. Id. Because Lockert anticipated that the State would seek to prosecute Clinard as an adult, Lockett and his staff began to prepare for a transfer hearing. Id. Lockert retained Dr. William Bernet, Director of Forensic Psychiatry at Vanderbilt University, to conduct a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Clinard. Id. Lockert also spoke with two doctors treating Clinard at MTMHI as well as administrators from that facility. Lockert believed these individuals would testify that Clinard had “no prior criminal behavior,” “was a model student involved in extracurricular activities,” and “had shown signs of extreme honesty.” Id. (citing Doc. No. 33, Ex. 3 at PageID# 396). Lockert and his staff spent approximately 300 hours working on Clinard's case, and his case file totaled “somewhere between six hundred and a thousand pages.” Id. at 555-56.
As expected, the State moved to transfer Clinard's case to adult court. However, before the transfer hearing took place, Clinard's family retained Worth Lovett as counsel, and Lockert withdrew from representation. Id. at 556. Lovett had considerably less relevant criminal defense experience than Lockert and had not tried any murder cases. Id. Lockert spoke to Lovett about the witnesses Lockert had secured to testify at the transfer hearing and emphasized the importance of having neutral MTHMI doctors testify that Clinard could complete a treatment program by age 19. Id. Lovett did not request Clinard's case file or seek any further assistance from Lockert. Id.
Stewart County Juvenile Court Judge Andrew Brigham conducted Clinard's transfer hearing on August 2, 2005. Id. at 553, 555-56. The parties stipulated to the admission of a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation of Clinard prepared by MTMHI psychologist Dr. M. Duncan Currey. Id. at 556. Clinard then called Dr. Bernet to testify out of order. After two witnesses for the state testified, Lovett requested an in-chambers conference. Id. at 556-57. In that conference, Lovett recommended to Clinard that he agree to the transfer. Id. at 557. Clinard followed Lovett's advice and consented to be tried in adult court. The parties drafted an agreed order stating that the elements of the transfer statute had been satisfied. Judge Brigham entered the parties' order, thus transferring Clinard to the jurisdiction of the Stewart County Circuit Court. Id.
After trial in the Circuit Court, a jury convicted Clinard of first-degree premeditated murder. State v. Clinard, No. M2007-00406-CCA-R3CD, 2008 WL 4170272, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2008). Because the State did not seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Clinard “received the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment.” Id. at *2. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Clinard's conviction and sentence. Id. at *2-7. Clinard did not seek further review of that decision. Id. at *1.
On January 29, 2009, Clinard filed a state post-conviction petition on his own behalf. Clinard v. State, No. M2011-1927-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 6570893, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2012). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Judge Brigham testified that he was surprised by Clinard's decision to agree to the transfer “because the state had not rested,” and “[t]he defense hadn't started yet other than that out-of-order witness [Dr. Bernet].” Clinard v. Lee, 722 Fed.Appx. 552, 557 (quoting Postconviction Hr'g, R. 33-3, PID# 438-39). “The only explanation Judge Brigham could recall for the decision was that ‘the defense was concerned that the record was developing against their client,' and that the record of the transfer hearing might be used against Clinard at trial or by the corrections department.” Id. (quoting Postconviction Hr'g, R. 33-3, PID# 439, 459). Judge Brigham testified that he “was going to consider possible rehabilitation programs available to [Clinard] in juvenile court, [Clinard's] amenability to rehabilitation, and evidence showing the existence of premeditation.” Id. at *3. The postconviction court found that, although Lovett's performance was deficient for failing to present available testimony regarding Clinard's mental health and potential for rehabilitation, Clinard was not prejudiced by the deficient representation because “there was no reasonable probability that [Clinard] would not have been transferred to adult court had all of the evidence been presented to the juvenile court.” Id. at *4. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, finding that Clinard had “failed to establish that but for counsel's deficient performance, his case would not have been transferred from juvenile to adult court.” Id. at *9.[2]
On October 28, 2013, Clinard filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. (Doc. No. 1). The Court appointed counsel (Doc. No. 16), and counsel filed an amended petition on May 2, 2016. (Doc. No. 30). The Court denied relief, finding that, while it was not unreasonable for the state courts to have find that Lovett performed deficiently at the transfer hearing, Clinard had not established prejudice. (Id.) The Court granted a Certificate of Appealability on Clinard's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Doc. No. 46).
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding “no reasonable argument that Clinard was not prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance.” Clinard, 722 Fed.Appx. at 565. The court held that, “[b]ecause there is a reasonable probability that Clinard would not have been transferred to adult court absent his counsel's ineffective assistance,” Clinard was “entitled to a new transfer hearing.” Id. at 566.
The Sixth Circuit instructed that the appropriate redress for the ineffective representation Clinard received at his August 2005 transfer hearing is to afford Clinard a “new” transfer hearing in this Court. Clinard v. Lee, 722 Fed.Appx. 552, 566 (6th Cir. 2018). The Court previously determined that, to provide this relief, it “must operate under the legal fiction that no previous proceedings have occurred-neither the 2005 juvenile transfer hearing nor [Clinard's]...
To continue reading
Request your trial