Clinch v. MONTANA AFL-CIO, CV-84-262-H.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. CV-84-262-H.,CV-84-262-H.
• Citation: Clinch v. MONTANA AFL-CIO, 633 F.Supp. 872 (D. Mont. 1986)
• Parties: Margi CLINCH, Plaintiff, v. MONTANA AFL-CIO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana

633 F. Supp. 872

Margi CLINCH, Plaintiff, v. MONTANA AFL-CIO, Defendant.

No. CV-84-262-H.

United States District Court, D. Montana, Helena Division.

February 7, 1986.

John W. Larson, Missoula, Mont., for plaintiff.

D. Patrick McKittrick, Great Falls, Mont., for defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

BATTIN, Chief Judge.

Margi Clinch, plaintiff, brought this action in state court seeking damages for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed her by her employer, Montana AFL-CIO, defendant. Asserting that federal law, pursuant to the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b), 173(d), 185, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and the Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., preempt plaintiff's state law claim for relief, defendant removed the action to this court on October 25, 1984. Plaintiff filed a motion for remand to the state court on November 2, 1984. On December 7, 1984, defendant filed a cross-motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This court denies plaintiff's motion for remand and dismisses plaintiff's complaint.

I. Background

Clinch was hired on November 28, 1983, as an administrative assistant for the Rocky Mountain Work Project (the Project), a program established under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 29 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and administered by the Montana AFL-CIO. Clinch worked for the Project until May 11, 1984 when she resigned her position. Plaintiff maintains that defendant coerced her resignation, while defendant maintains that her resignation was voluntary.

At a representation election on May 8, 1984, the employees of the Project voted to be represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW). A letter of recognition of the IAMAW as the collective bargaining representative, signed by Clinch with other employees, was delivered to Montana AFL-CIO on May 10, 1984, the day before Clinch's resignation.¹ Clinch had voted in favor of the IAMAW as the Project's collective bargaining representative. Apparently there was no collective bargaining agreement in force from November 28, 1983 until May 10, 1984. There was no written labor contract between Clinch and her employer; nor was there a printed job description. Clinch maintains she was an "at will" employee.

Franz Ortloff, representative of the IAMAW, on behalf of Clinch and two other past employees of the Project, filed unfair labor practice charges against the Montana AFL-CIO with the National Labor Relations Board on August 17, 1984. On August 22, 1984, Clinch, Ortloff, another past employee, and representatives of Montana AFL-CIO entered into an agreement in settlement of the charges.² Essentially, the agreement precluded Clinch from filing any unfair labor practice charge resulting from her employment and limited her redress to partial grievance procedures for violation of the JTPA. The original unfair labor practice charges were withdrawn. Clinch decided not to pursue the grievance procedure.³

II. Preemption by Federal Laws

The primary issue presented in this case is whether plaintiff's state tort claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is preempted by federal labor laws. The general rule with respect to preemption of state law was recently stated by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) as follows:

Congress' power to pre-empt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution. Congressional power to legislate in the area of labor relations of course, is long established. Congress, however, has never exercised authority to occupy the entire field in the area of labor legislation. Thus, the question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. "`The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.'" Citations and foot-note omitted.

Id. at 1909-10.⁴

This court, in Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 413 F.Supp. 870 (D.Mont. 1976) aff'd. 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1978) held that plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress following his alleged wrongful discharge as a train dispatcher was within the exclusive province of the grievance mechanism of the Railway Labor Act. This case was cited with approval in the recent Ninth Circuit case of Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.1984), where the plaintiff filed suit in state court for wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The court held that the conduct of which Olguin complained was governed by federal law — "the MSHA Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, the federal labor laws, and the collective bargaining agreement — to the exclusion of state law." Id. at 1476.

Plaintiff argues that she was never a member of the Union, was not represented by any bargaining unit and had no labor contract, but was an administrative employee of a project sponsored by the defendant. It is clear from the record, however, that on May 8, 1984, the plaintiff voted in favor of representation by the IAMAW, and on May 9 signed a letter of recognition of the IAMAW as the collective bargaining representative; that this letter was delivered to defendant on May 10, and that plaintiff resigned the following day. The representative of the IAMAW filed an unfair labor practice charge on plaintiff's behalf on August 17, 1984, and on August 22 plaintiff signed an agreement in settlement of the charge.⁵

It is the opinion of this court that these facts created a relationship which was governed by Section 301 of the LMRA. As the Court noted in Allis Chalmers v. Lueck, "Section 301 states: `Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....' 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)." 105 S.Ct. at 1910. The Court held that,

If the policies that animate § 301 are to be given their proper range, ... the preemptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations. These policies require that "the relationships created by a collective-bargaining agreement" be defined by application of "an evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy." Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 224-225, 103 S.Ct. 588, 596, 74 L.Ed.2d 402 (1983).

Id. at 1911.

In holding that the conduct of which plaintiff complained was governed by federal law, the court in Olguin noted that Olguin had not shown that the acts alleged "were not disputes concerning employment or work conditions." 740 F.2d at 1476. The same is true here.

III. Preemption by JTPA

Assuming, arguendo, that the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Fair Labor Standards Act are not applicable under the facts of this case, it is clear that plaintiff's state law claim was preempted by the JTPA. The JTPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1553, ensures reasonable benefits and working conditions for employees of funded projects. Clinch was employed by such a project. Specifically, section 1553(a)(1) and (4) provides the following "labor standards":

conditions of employment and training shall be appropriate and reasonable in light of such factors as the type of work, geographical region, and proficiency of the participant.... All individuals employed in subsidized jobs shall be provided benefits and working conditions at the same level and to the same extent as other employees working a similar length of time and doing the same type of work.

The JTPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1554(a) and (b), then requires all funded employers to "establish and maintain a grievance procedure for grievances or complaints about its programs and activities from participants.... Except for complaints alleging fraud or criminal activity, complaints shall be made within one year of the alleged occurrence.... Each ... employer of participants under this Act shall continue to operate or establish and maintain a grievance procedure relating to the terms and conditions of employment." Congress explicitly provided that the grievance procedure broadly apply to the terms and conditions of employment. The terms and conditions of employment reasonably interpreted include conditions of any resignation or termination. In light of the fact that the Project was funded by the federal government and that Congress enunciated that the grievance procedure apply to the terms and conditions of the employment, the JTPA preempts plaintiff's state law cause of action.

IV. "Well Pleaded Complaint" Rule

This case also presents the issue of whether this court may maintain federal question jurisdiction in light of the "well pleaded complaint rule." To maintain federal question jurisdiction a complaint must plead on the face of the complaint "a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)). Generally, "federal jurisdiction is not created when the plaintiff's cause of action is preempted by federal law, because preemption is a defense only, not an element of the complaint." Id. (emphasis in original); Nalore v. San Diego Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 663 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.1981). At the same time, however, a plaintiff may not "artfully plead" her cause of action to avoid federal question jurisdiction. The courts recharacterize artfully pleaded complaints as arising under federal law, thus resulting in federal question jurisdiction. Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1472; Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369.

Whether a complaint has been artfully pleaded depends upon the nature of the claim. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 n. 5 (9th Cir.1984)...