Cline v. City of Mansfield

Decision Date30 September 2010
Docket NumberCase No. 1:07–CV–1070.
Citation745 F.Supp.2d 773
PartiesMelanie CLINE, et al., Plaintiffs,v.CITY OF MANSFIELD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Gerhardstein & Branch, Cincinnati, OH, David B. Malik, Chesterland, OH, Edwin J. Vargas, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs.Colleen M. O'Neil, Maura L. Hughes, Richard P. Goddard, Zoe K. Carlisle, Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Robert F. Cathcart, IV, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Cleveland, OH, George B. Limbert, Mark D. Landes, Steven G. Laforge, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Michael S. Loughry, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Columbus, OH, Nick C. Tomino, Tomino & Latchney, Medina, OH, James A. Climer, John D. Pinzone, Mazanec, Raskin Ryder & Keller, Solon, OH, Richard Lee Shepherd, Poland, Depler & Shepherd, Shelby, OH, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATHLEEN M. O'MALLEY, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of Magistrate Judge Kenneth S. McHargh (“Judge McHargh”). (Doc. 113.) In his R & R, Judge McHargh considers the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 69–72), as well as the Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude the Defendants' Expert Testimony (Doc. 64). He recommends that this Court grant in part and deny in part the Defendants' motions. The Plaintiffs have filed a timely objection to this R & R (Doc. 122), as have the Defendants (Docs. 114–120), and the Court SUSTAINS IN PART AND OVERRULES IN PART those objections (Docs. 114–120, 122).

As explained more fully below, the Motion to Exclude Testimony (Doc. 64) is MOOT, the Motions for Summary Judgment brought by Jeff Alfrey, Jason Bammann, Lance Combs, John Mager, Frank Parella, and Ed Schmidt (Docs. 69, 72, 94) are GRANTED as to those Defendants, the Motions for Summary Judgment brought by the municipal defendants (Docs. 69, 71, 72, 94) are GRANTED as to those Defendants, the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by ASORT as to its capacity for suit (Doc. 70) is DENIED, the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by ASORT as to the substantive claims against it (Doc. 71) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, Riley Snavely's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 94) is DENIED as to him, and the Motions for Summary Judgment brought by all other Defendants (Docs. 71, 72, 94) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to those Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state law. The gravamen of the complaint is straightforward: the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants violated their rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the constitution:

The Defendants have, under color of law, deprived Plaintiffs of clearly established rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution of which a reasonable person would have known. These rights include, but are not limited to, the right to due process of law and the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and excessive force.

(Doc. 40 (“FAC”) at ¶ 70.)

The particulars of this litigation are more complicated. The Plaintiffs' claims have led to hundreds of pages of briefing, thousands of pages of record evidence, and a 73–page R & R. It is, therefore, helpful to provide a broad summary of the facts of the case at the outset, although it is ultimately a full understanding of the details that are necessary to a proper resolution of the pending motions.

This litigation flows from unsuccessful efforts by law enforcement officials to apprehend a man named Joseph Foster, who had entered a home in Ontario, brandished a gun, and stolen certain property from the residents. (Doc. 87 (“Snavely Dep.”) at 5:21–22; see also Doc. 103–6 (Snavely Nar.”).) 1 Among the law enforcement officials searching for Foster was Ontario Police Detective Riley Snavely, who was approached by a previously unknown individual who claimed that Foster was hiding in a house on a particular street in Mansfield—Burns Street. ( See Snavely Dep. at 13:17–18; 8:15–24.)

For reasons not clear from the record, Detective Snavely and his supervisor, then-Acting Chief Dale Myers, decided to apprehend Foster with the help of the Allied Special Operations Response Team (“ASORT”), an organization that provides local municipalities with SWAT teams for assistance with high-risk search warrants.2 (Doc. 85 (“Myers Dep.”) at 9:24–10:5.) The team sent by ASORT to execute the warrant on Burns Street was led by Shelby Police Sergeant David Mack. ( See Doc. 82 (“Mack Dep.”) at 19:2–19:22)

After beginning surveillance on Burns Street, the confidential informant reported that Foster had moved to a different location, South Main Street. ( See Snavely Dep. at 14:5–11.) Detective Snavely then drove past the South Main location with the informant, another individual who was familiar with Foster, and Mansfield Detective Ed Schmidt. ( See Snavely Dep. at 11:4–14.) The informant apparently reported seeing Foster standing on the front porch, although no law enforcement official corroborated that sighting, nor did the search warrant application include any reference to this sighting. ( See id.; see generally Doc. 103–3 (“Search Warrant”).)

Detective Snavely then appeared before a Magistrate, who signed a “knock-and- announce” search warrant listing South Main Street as the place to be searched, but containing facts relating only to Burns Street. ( See Search Warrant at 2,5–6.) This discrepancy would have been apparent to anyone who glanced at page five of the document because the warrant prepared by Detective Snavely listed the factual basis for his belief that Foster was located on Burns Street on the same page that began to describe Foster's physical characteristics. ( See id.)

After the warrant issued, ASORT arrived at South Main Street to search for Foster. (R & R at 2–3.) As ASORT approached the house, ASORT Team Member and Ontario Patrolman John Mager prepared to throw a flash grenade inside the house, consistent with the operational plan. (Doc. 83 (“Mager Dep.”) at 15:15–16.) For some reason, the flash grenade detonated outside of the house moments after ASORT team members had begun to call out “police.” ( See R & R at 3.) ASORT then entered the house.

The Plaintiffs allege that, while in the house, ASORT members used force on them in a variety of ways. Plaintiff Thomas Willis reports that he was thrown to the floor during ASORT's entry, causing him to sprain his ankle. (R & R at 4.) Plaintiff Earl Fuller reports that he was placed in handcuffs, and that one of the law enforcement officials then put a foot on Fuller's back and a gun to Fuller's neck. ( Id. at 5.) He further testifies that, although cuffed and suspected of no crime, he was kicked by Chief Myers after the conclusion of the search. ( See Fuller Dep. at 37:11–21.) Plaintiff Kiana Smith reports that an officer held her at gun point, made her lift up her shirt and turn around to ensure that she didn't have any weapons, told Smith to get face down on the floor, and then kicked Smith once she was on the floor. ( See Doc. 86 (“Smith Dep.”) at 35:3–41:20.) Plaintiff Melanie Cline alleges that she was awakened by an “excruciating[ly] sharp pain running up [her] back and heavy pressure on top of [her] and [the feeling of] the barrel of a gun in the back of [her neck].” (R & R at 6.) She states that she was then placed in handcuffs and kept naked from the waist up while ASORT members searched her room. (R & R at 6.) There are also allegations concerning the use of force on two minor children, which the Court will discuss below.

Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that they were restrained for 25–30 minutes after the conclusion of the search, well past the point where the Defendants had determined that Foster was not present at their residence. ( See Doc. 86 (Smith Dep.) at 50:6–19; R & R at 4–5.) This description of the timeline is consistent with testimony from one of the Defendants ( see Doc. 98 (“Parella Dep.”) at 8:8–11), but disputed vigorously by others. ( See, e.g., Myers Dep. at 24:1–23.)

Based on the above events, the Plaintiffs have asserted four discrete constitutional claims against the Defendants. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants: (1) obtained and executed an invalid warrant; (2) failed to “knock-and-announce” prior to commencing their search; (3) employed excessive force when executing the search; and (4) detained the Plaintiffs for a constitutionally unreasonable length of time after realizing that the Plaintiffs had not committed any crime. ( See Doc. 122 (“Plaintiffs' Obj.”) at 1–2.) The Plaintiffs also assert a number of claims arising under state law, which are discussed in more detail below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEWA. Summary Judgment

Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In reviewing summary judgment motions, this Court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 412 (6th Cir.2008). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir.2008). Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Thus, in most civil cases, the Court will decide “whether reasonable jurors could find by a...

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    • February 11, 2011
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