Cline v. Cline

• Decision Date: 09 November 1887
• Citation: 16 P. 282,191 Or. 687
• Parties: CLINE v. CLINE.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

16 P. 282

191 Or. 687

CLINE v. CLINE.

Supreme Court of Oregon

November 9, 1887

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county; L.B. STEARNS, Judge.

This action was brought by Jacob Cline, plaintiff, against Walley Cline, defendant, claiming a divorce. Decree for defendant granting her a divorce, and one-third of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff appeals.

O.P Mason and R. & E.B. Williams, for appellant.

F.B Jolly and Gearin & Gilbert, for appellee.

THAYER J.

It is an old, familiar case; this makes the third time it has been here in some form, and it always comes from a decree in favor of Walley Cline, granting her a divorce from Jacob Cline, and one-third of his property. The record invariably shows that large sums, by way of allowances, have been granted said Walley to enable her to prosecute and defend the litigation. The first decree was granted by the circuit court upon grounds which the court deemed insufficient, if true, and the evidence of their truth was strongly controverted. The case was remanded to the circuit court, with directions to dismiss the complaint. Both parties then commenced suit against each other. Jacob claimed that Walley had willfully deserted him for the period of three years, and she claimed that he had committed adultery. Both cases were heard in this court. Walley's decree was reversed, and the complaint in the two cases dismissed.

Then the present suit was commenced by Jacob for willful desertion, having, in the mean time, renewed his request to her to live with him. And Walley set up, by way of counter-claim, adultery upon his part. The desertion is claimed to have occurred January, 1881. The marriage of the parties took place in 1878. Walley was then a widow about 32 years of age, and had one child. Jacob was old enough at that time to be a patriarch; was almost 66 years old, had been married a great number of times, and had had several divorce cases. His experience, however, seems not to have added a particle of wisdom to his understanding. He was ready to rush in and become an actor again in the same old farce. He was possessed of some property,--it amounted to $25,000 or $30,000 perhaps,--and that, I apprehend, was the attraction and influence which induced a comparatively young woman to marry him. Such marriages, as a matter of course, were no more in effect than an agreement to cohabit, and their endurance depended entirely upon the disposition of the parties; there was no pride, honor, or self-respect, much less affection, to uphold them, and a divorce suit was pretty certain to follow. It appears in this case that the parties only pretended to live together under the same roof for about three years, and that period in their lives, I imagine, was marked by scenes of almost constant contention. It was, no doubt, an irrepressible conflict between opposing forces, and endured as long as they attempted to stay together. It is claimed by the appellant, and I think the proof in the case shows, that the immediate cause of the separation was Jacob's refusal to make over to Walley a part of his property. She wanted the house and land where they lived put in her name, and, of course, he objected to it. She then left, and they have not lived together since. That was more than six years ago. He is anxious to get a divorce from her in order, probably, to get rid of her. And she wants to get a divorce from him, no doubt, in order to get a third of his property, under the pernicious act of 1865. Jacob wants to be relieved from the constant plundering he has been subjected to during the last four or five years; and she wants to realize the objects and purposes for which she married him. I do not think either has a motive higher than I have indicated. He testifies that she told him, upon an occasion when he proposed that she come back, and go with him to California, that there were two men who were going to find her evidence that he had done enough to entitle her to a divorce if she would give them half of what she got. Whether this is true or not, I am unable to determine; but the evidence in the case certainly tends strongly to prove that she adopted that kind of course.

The main testimony, upon which the decree herein was granted comes from the mouths of two persons who contracted with her to watch the old man, and who swear that they caught him in flagrante delicto; and a shameless female came upon the witness stand, and tacitly admitted that she had had sexual intercourse with him. Such kind of evidence disgraces judicial proceedings. A person who would engage himself for hire to spy out affairs of that kind, and make proof of them, is entitled to no credit whatever; and a woman so devoid of...