Cline v. Dcfs
| Decision Date | 17 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 20041112-CA.,20041112-CA. |
| Citation | 2005 UT App 498,142 P.3d 127 |
| Parties | Earl L. CLINE II, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES, and/or Child Protective Services; and Judith Ann Forsyth aka Chris Forsyth, as an individual, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Earl L. Cline II, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and J. Clifford Petersen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and McHUGH.
¶ 1 Earl L. Cline II appeals the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of his claims against the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) and DCFS employee Judith Ann Forsyth. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶ 2 Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, ¶ 2, 62 P.3d 440 (quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 3 Early in March 2002, the district court issued an ex parte protective order that required DCFS to investigate allegations that Cline had abused his oldest son, R.C. Several days later, Cline contacted DCFS by phone to inquire about the status of the ordered investigation. During that phone call, Cline informed a DCFS representative that DCFS had been ordered to investigate the abuse allegations and he also alleged that his wife (Wife) had abused their children, including R.C. (the children). Several days after this phone call, DCFS assigned Forsyth to investigate the allegations of abuse made by both Cline and Wife.
¶ 4 During her investigation, Forsyth interviewed Cline, Wife, and the children. Later in March 2002, Forsyth met with Cline and told him that she was not going to substantiate any of the claims of abuse against either Cline or Wife. Based in part upon Forsyth's report to the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), the protective order was dismissed.
¶ 5 Soon after the dismissal of the protective order, a hearing was held in juvenile court concerning R.C. The juvenile court was informed of the previous existence of the protective order, including the allegations that Cline had abused R.C. As a result, the juvenile court ordered that a DCFS representative attend the hearing in order to discuss the abuse allegations. Forsyth attended that hearing, but she did not allege to the court that Cline had abused R.C.
¶ 6 Thereafter, the GAL contacted Forsyth to inquire about Cline's alleged spanking of R.C. As a result of the information she received from the GAL, Forsyth conducted a second investigation of the allegations of abuse against Cline, which included interviewing several of the children a second time. After she completed her second investigation, Forsyth substantiated the allegations of abuse against Cline based, at least in part, upon her assertion that several of the children told her during the second set of interviews that they had been bruised as a result of Cline spanking them.
¶ 7 Cline contends that these allegations were false and were proved to be false in the juvenile court. Cline asserts that Forsyth fabricated the allegations of abuse to help Wife retain custody of the children. Cline maintains that in all the investigations conducted by DCFS and Forsyth, "decisions have been made that g[a]ve greater weight to [Wife's] interest as a woman and mother than [Cline]'s interest as a man and father."
¶ 8 Sometime later in 2002, Cline filed a petition challenging the substantiation of abuse. Cline asserts that Forsyth provided false testimony while under oath during several hearings concerning this petition and during a hearing in which Cline was found to be in contempt of court. Cline maintains that Forsyth's false allegations and testimony, at least in part, caused him to violate several court orders and required him to spend thirty days in jail for being found in contempt of court. Cline also asserts that DCFS and Forsyth failed to maintain the confidentiality of the information concerning the allegations of abuse against him.
¶ 9 In April 2003, pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1997 & Supp.2003),1 Cline sent a notice of claim to DCFS, Forsyth, and the State of Utah. On June 10, 2004, Cline filed a complaint in district court against DCFS and Forsyth, both in her official and individual capacities, alleging causes of action for: (1) deprivation of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003); (2) conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and neglect to prevent that conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1985, 1986 (West 2003);2 (3) breach of confidentiality of records, child abuse, obstruction of justice, and perjury; (4) malicious prosecution; and (5) fraud, libel, and slander. In response, DCFS and Forsyth filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims contained in Cline's complaint, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In an order dated October 6, 2004, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice all of Cline's claims against DCFS and Forsyth. Cline appeals.
¶ 10 Cline argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his claims under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Review of a grant of a motion to dismiss presents questions of law that we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the [trial] court." Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485, ¶ 5, 105 P.3d 963 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 11 Cline claims that DCFS and Forsyth, in both her official and individual capacities, deprived him of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003). It is well settled that a state and its agencies, as well as employees of that state and its agencies acting in their official capacities, do not fit within the meaning of a "person," id., under section 1983. See id. (); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (); Duncan v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Family Servs., 166 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir.1999) (). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Cline's section 1983 claims against DCFS and Forsyth in her official capacity.
¶ 12 With respect to the claims against Forsyth in her individual capacity, Forsyth argues that she is absolutely immune from suit. We disagree. "In general, state government immunity statutes do not apply to suits brought under [section] 1983." Baker ex rel. Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 432 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988)). Instead, "[t]he issue of immunity in a federal civil rights case is a matter of federal law." Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 858 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1993) (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980)).
¶ 13 The federal courts recognize that participants in the judicial process are entitled to immunity under certain circumstances. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The scope of that immunity can be either "qualified" or "absolute." Id. at 268-69, 113 S.Ct. 2606. Under qualified immunity, "government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when `their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Id. at 268, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (citation omitted). In some limited circumstances, however, an official performs functions so essential to the judicial process that she is granted absolute immunity from suits for damages arising out of her actions. See id. at 268-71, 113 S.Ct. 2606. "Absolute immunity is . . . necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). "[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991).
¶ 14 One of the special roles that traditionally has been protected by absolute immunity is that of a prosecutor actually engaged in the judicial process. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (). In considering whether the prosecutor's actions are absolutely privileged, the Supreme Court has adopted a "`functional approach'" that "looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.'" Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (citations omitted). For example, although acts directly related to the judicial...
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