Cline v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 25 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-6399,94-6399
• Citation: 87 F.3d 176
• Parties: Jackie Ray CLINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George W. ROGERS, individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of McMinn County and McMinn County, Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 176

87 F.3d 176

Jackie Ray CLINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George W. ROGERS, individually and in his capacity as

Sheriff of McMinn County and McMinn County,

Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-6399.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 5, 1995.

Decided June 25, 1996.

Judy P. McCarthy (argued), Dennis M. McCarthy (briefed), Law Office of Judy Pinkston McCarthy, Knoxville, TN, for plaintiff-appellant.

John W. Baker, Jr. (briefed), Baker, McReynolds, Byrne, Brackett, O'Kane & Shea, Knoxville, TN, Peter D. Van de Vate (briefed), Knoxville, TN, for George W. Rogers.

John W. Baker, Jr., Gerald L. Gulley, Jr. (argued), Baker, McReynolds, Byrne, Brackett, O'Kane & Shea, Knoxville, TN, for McMinn County.

Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge; DOWD, District Judge. ^*

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing with prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all his claims against both defendants in this case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The plaintiff-appellant, Jackie Ray Cline ("Cline"), alleges that in 1992, a private citizen contacted the Sheriff's Department of McMinn County, Tennessee ("the County"), and asked Sheriff George Rogers to check Cline's arrest record. According to Cline, Rogers searched state and local records and requested a computer search of National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Cline alleges that Rogers disclosed to the private citizen the information Rogers obtained regarding Cline's criminal history, in violation of both Tennessee and federal law.

Cline filed this lawsuit against Rogers, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff. Cline also named the County as a defendant, alleging that improper searches of criminal records is "a routine and customary practice in McMinn County," that the County "lacks adequate controls to ensure that access to criminal records is for authorized purposes only," that the County did not have in place an adequate system to detect misuse of criminal records, that the County had provided inadequate training to prevent such abuse, and that the County had "been indifferent to the civil rights of private citizens by allowing such abuses to continue."

Cline's complaint sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his federal civil rights. The complaint also asserted an implied private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 3789g. Finally, the complaint alleged "violations of State and federal common law rights to privacy." Rather than answering the complaint, the defendant County filed its motion "to dismiss the Complaint against it on the ground that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against this Defendant in that 42 U.S.C. § 3789(g) [sic ] does not, as a matter of law, provide a private right of action to [Cline] to be maintained under 43 [sic ] U.S.C. § 1983."

The defendant Rogers answered the complaint. Rogers apparently did not file a separate motion to dismiss. After Cline's counsel sought and received an extension of time to respond to the County's motion to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff filed a response. Following motions by Cline's counsel for a continuance, the district court ruled on the County's motion to dismiss the complaint. In its memorandum of opinion, the court explained that all of Cline's claims against both Sheriff Rogers and the County were dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), because Cline "undoubtedly cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations which would entitle him to relief, i.e., the plaintiff is not entitled to relief despite the facts as pleaded." Further, the court held that sua sponte dismissal with respect to defendant Rogers was appropriate pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and this Court's precedent, citing Morrison v. Tomano, 755 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.1985). This timely appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 296 (6th Cir.1993). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993).

A. The Federal Constitutional Claim

There is no violation of the United States Constitution in this case because there is no constitutional right to privacy in one's criminal record. Nondisclosure of one's criminal record is not one of those personal rights that is "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). In Whalen, the Supreme Court distinguished fundamental privacy interests in "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education" and "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," see id. at 599, 97 S.Ct. at 876, finding no general constitutional right to nondisclosure of private data, see id. at 608-09, 97 S.Ct. at 881 (Stewart, J., concurring).

Moreover, one's criminal history is arguably not a private "personal matter" at all, since arrest and conviction information are matters of public record. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (rejecting a similar claim based on facts more egregious than those alleged here); see also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir.1981) (interpreting Paul in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases (Whalen and Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977)) and holding that there is no general right to a constitutional balancing of government action against individual privacy absent personal rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"). Although there may be a dispute among the circuit courts regarding the existence and extent of an individual privacy right to nondisclosure of "personal matters," see Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631 (10th Cir.1984); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (both opining that Paul has been at least partially overruled by the Supreme Court's decisions in Whalen and Nixon ), this circuit does not recognize a constitutional privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of, e.g., one's criminal record. See DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1090 (regarding disclosure of juvenile delinquents' "social histories"); see also Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733 (6th Cir.1994) (disclosure of inmate's HIV infection did not violate constitutional right of privacy).

Because there is no privacy interest in one's criminal record that is protected by the United States Constitution, Cline could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief; therefore, the district court correctly dismissed this claim.

B. State Constitutional Claim

The plaintiff can state no claim of a state constitutional violation in this case because Tennessee does not recognize a private cause of action for violations of the Tennessee Constitution. See Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn.Ct.App.), appeal denied, (Tenn.1992). There, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, searching for authority to support or refute the plaintiff's claim of an implied cause of action for violations by a local police officer of her civil rights under the Tennessee Constitution, stated:

We have held ... that we know of no authority for the recovery of damages for a violation of the Tennessee Constitution by a state officer. See Bennett v. Horne, 1989 WL 86555 (No. 89-31-II, Tenn.Ct.App. ... August 2, 1989). So far as we are able to determine, the Tennessee courts have not extended the rationale of Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ] to give a state cause of action against a police officer for violating a person's civil rights.

Lee, 834 S.W.2d at 325. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this claim.

C. Direct Claim for Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3789g

1.

The plaintiff claims that the defendants violated enforceable privacy rights created in him by Congress under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3797 ("the Act"). Specifically, Cline claims that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 3789g, which provides for confidentiality of information under the Act. That section has four subsections: § 3789g(a) prohibits the unauthorized dissemination of research or statistical information; ¹ § 3789g(b) requires the Office of Justice Programs to safeguard the accuracy and security of criminal history information; ² § 3789g(c) requires that criminal intelligence information be handled in conformity with policy standards prescribed by the Office of Justice Programs; ³ § 3789g(d) states that "[a]ny person violating the provisions of this section, or of any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, shall be fined not to exceed $10,000, in addition to any other penalty imposed by law."

The district court correctly found that the only subsection of § 3789g even arguably applicable in this case is § 3789g(b), which addresses the confidentiality of criminal history information. Subsection 3789g(a) is inapplicable because that section deals with "research or statistical information." That term is not defined in the statute; however, the Department of Justice regulations define the term to mean "any information which is collected during the conduct of a research or statistical project and which is intended to be utilized for research or statistical purposes." 28 C.F.R. § 22.2(d). "Research or statistical project" is defined as "any program, project, or component thereof which is supported in whole...