Cline v. State

Decision Date19 April 2000
Docket NumberNo. 49S00-9810-CR-594.,49S00-9810-CR-594.
Citation726 N.E.2d 1249
PartiesKrista CLINE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Katherine A. Cornelius, Marion County Public Defenders Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Randi E. Froug, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

RUCKER, Justice

Case Summary

Krista Cline was charged with the murder of her two-month-old daughter Alexis. At trial Cline sought to shift responsibility for the crime to her boyfriend Lamar Jenkins. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court sentenced Cline to sixty-five years imprisonment. In this direct appeal Cline raises four issues for our review which we rephrase as: (1) did the trial court err by excluding evidence of Jenkins' gang affiliation and evidence of his propensity for violence, (2) did the trial court err by allowing into evidence Jenkins' pre-trial hearsay statement, (3) did the trial court err by allowing into evidence the testimony of a counselor that statements made by Cline seemed strange and odd, and (4) did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of neglect of a dependent.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts

The record shows that when Cline was sixteen years old she became pregnant. As a result, Alexis was born on March 8, 1997. Cline and Alexis lived with Cline's father and stepmother. While Cline attended school half-days, a neighbor babysat Alexis. Cline would return home around noon, retrieve Alexis and stay with her until Cline went to work at a part-time job. During that time, Cline's father and stepmother usually cared for Alexis. On Friday, May 9, 1997, the neighbor babysat Alexis as usual, and according to the neighbor Alexis seemed healthy that day. Cline, however, had become "frazzled" and was not sure she could cope with raising a child. R. at 483. Although Cline had previously spoken to the neighbor about the possibility of placing Alexis for adoption, Cline became upset when the neighbor suggested that Cline's father and stepmother could obtain custody of Alexis. The following Saturday and Sunday Cline's father and stepmother babysat Alexis. They found her to be healthy and saw nothing unusual about the child.

On Monday, May 12, 1997, Cline decided to stay home from school. She telephoned her boyfriend Lamar Jenkins to let him know that she would be home all day. Jenkins, who is not Alexis' father, came over sometime around 9:30 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. The couple spent the morning smoking marijuana, having sex, and watching television. What happened immediately thereafter is a matter of dispute. Cline testified at trial that while Jenkins was present she took a shower lasting approximately twenty minutes. During that time, according to Cline, Jenkins was alone with Alexis. Cline also testified that when she got out of the shower Alexis was crying loudly and Jenkins then left the house. On the other hand Jenkins acknowledged that the baby was crying just before he left around 2:00 p.m. However he testified that he was in the living room with Cline when that event occurred and the baby was in another room. According to Jenkins, when Cline refused to get the baby, he got her, gave her to Cline, and left shortly thereafter. Jenkins denied that Cline took a shower while he was present. The record shows that Cline's father arrived home around 5:00 p.m. and found Cline lying on the couch with Alexis lying across Cline's chest. According to her father, Cline appeared to have just gotten out of the shower. At her father's suggestion, Cline placed Alexis in her crib. Cline's father then went to the garage. Sometime shortly thereafter Cline saw that Alexis was not breathing, and Cline began screaming. Her father returned from the garage, checked Alexis, and found blood coming from her nose. He called 911. Emergency medical technicians arrived on the scene and transported Alexis to the hospital where she was placed on a life support system. The following day a medical and family decision was made to remove the life support. Alexis died shortly thereafter.

An autopsy revealed that Alexis had suffered numerous injuries all inflicted at approximately the same time. The cause of death was a tear to Alexis' transverse colon due to blunt force impact to the child's abdomen. In addition, there were vaginal and anal injuries that appeared to be caused by a heated object, perhaps a curling iron. Also, there were four areas of blunt force trauma to the child's head.

After giving several statements to the police, Cline was ultimately arrested and charged with murder. While in custody awaiting trial, Cline was held in the Marion County Jail. Two inmates who were also in custody at the jail testified at trial that they overheard a conversation between Cline and her cellmate. According to the inmate witnesses, Cline stated that after Jenkins left the house, she became "stressed out" because she could not get Alexis to stop crying. R. at 782, 804. As a result, she punched Alexis in the stomach. One of the witnesses later spoke with Cline and asked about a report that Alexis had shown signs of injury to her head. According to the witness, Cline demonstrated how that happened indicating that she applied force to Alexis' head using the heel of her hand. A pathologist testified at trial that the blunt force injuries to Alexis' head were consistent with someone using the heel of a hand.

Cline was convicted of murder. This appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.

Discussion
I. Gang Affiliation and Prior Bad Acts

Cline's theory of defense at trial was that her boyfriend Jenkins caused Alexis' death. According to Cline, Jenkins inflicted injuries on Alexis during his morning visit when he was alone with the child while Cline took a shower. In an attempt to bolster this theory, Cline sought to introduce evidence that Jenkins was a member of a street gang, and that he had been involved in two physical altercations with other juveniles in the week before Alexis was killed. In response to the State's relevancy objection, the trial court precluded Cline from cross-examining Jenkins on this point and would not allow Cline to introduce a police arrest report concerning Jenkins.

Cline contends the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection because the evidence was relevant for a number of reasons: (a) to show that Cline was afraid of Jenkins thus explaining why when first questioned by police Cline did not inform them that Jenkins had been present at her home the day Alexis was injured, (b) to show that Jenkins was intelligent enough to commit a violent act thus addressing evidence that Jenkins suffered from a learning disability, (c) to complete the story surrounding the circumstances of the crime, and (d) to show that Jenkins was Alexis' attacker.

Although the trial court did not allow Cline to introduce the proffered evidence based on the State's relevancy objection, there is a more fundamental reason supporting the trial court's decision. Under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Spencer v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ind.1999). In this appeal, Cline advances the above-mentioned reasons to support her claim that evidence of Jenkins' gang membership and violent conduct were admissible. Regardless of the propriety of these claims, at trial Cline's argument in support of admitting the evidence was that "[Jenkins] was in the proximity of the alleged victim, Alexis Cline, on May 12, 1997, the day she allegedly received her fatal injuries ... He had the opportunity and the ability to perform the alleged violent act, to-wit: blunt force trauma, which resulted in her death. Additionally, he had demonstrated the propensity to commit such a violent act." R. at 299-300. Essentially, Cline sought to introduce evidence of Jenkins' prior acts for the sole purpose of demonstrating that because Jenkins had acted violently in the past, he likely acted in conformity with those acts and harmed Alexis. This is the forbidden inference that Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) specifically proscribes. Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind. 1999) ("[R]ule [404(b) ] is designed to prevent the jury from making the `forbidden inference' that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt."). The trial court properly excluded evidence of Jenkins' gang affiliation and prior violent conduct. There is no error on this issue.

II. Evidence of Prior Consistent Statement

Cline contends the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify concerning the contents of Jenkins' out of court statement. The facts surrounding this contention follow. The State called Jenkins to testify concerning the events of May 12, 1997. Among other things Jenkins testified that on the morning in question he arrived at Cline's house around 9:30 a.m. or 10:00 a.m., he and Cline had sex and smoked marijuana, and he left the house as school was letting out, around 2:00 p.m. R. at 424-50. Jenkins also testified that for most of the time he was in the home the baby was asleep; however just before he left, the baby started crying, and he picked her up and handed her to Cline. R. at 450. Jenkins also testified that Cline did not take a shower while he was present in the home. R. at 553. On cross-examination, Cline challenged Jenkins' veracity and his ability to correctly remember the events of the day in question. In rebuttal, the State called to the stand Officer Larry Smith who had taken Jenkins' statement on July 15, 1997. Through Officer Smith, the State sought to offer the statement as evidence of a prior consistent statement. Over Cline's hearsay objection, Officer Smith testified that Jenkins told him Cline...

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