Cline v. Tait

Decision Date21 September 1942
Docket Number8281.
PartiesCLINE v. TAIT et al.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Appeal from District Court, Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County; C. F. Holt, Judge.

Action by Othel Cline against Ralph Tait and another for false imprisonment. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Lew L Callaway, M. J. Thomas, and Ralph J. Anderson, all of Helena for appellants.

G. J Jeffries, of Roundup, and E. J. Stromnes, of Great Falls, for respondent.

JOHNSON Chief Justice.

The defendants sheriff and his surety appeal from a judgment against them for $6,000 for false imprisonment. The complaint recited that on the night of April 2, 1936, the sheriff, Tait, "took plaintiff prisoner," imprisoned him in the county jail of Musselshell county until the afternoon of April 3rd, and then without authority removed plaintiff from the said jail, "unlawfully spirited" him from the county, removed him to Great Falls and imprisoned him in the jail of Cascade county "where plaintiff was so confined and imprisoned unlawfully until the 4th day of April, 1936"; that these acts were done by defendant Tait "without complaint being or having been filed against Plaintiff in any Court, without examination or hearing of any kind in any Court, without bringing or having said Plaintiff brought before any Court or Magistrate at any time, and without any warrant, committment or legal process of any kind being or having been issued by any Court."

The answer denied the false arrest and imprisonment and alleged as a further defense that there was no federal jail in Musselshell county; that Cooney and Mellish were United States post office inspectors and had authority to arrest individuals who had committed postal offenses; that on March 2, 1936, a first class mail bag containing $9,200 was stolen from the railroad station at Roundup; that the act constituted a felony under the statutes of the United States and of the State of Montana; that Richardson and Fanning were arrested and stated that the offense was committed by them and a third person whom they described without naming and who the defendants were informed and believed was plaintiff Cline; that knowing these facts and circumstances the two postal inspectors communicated them to defendant Tait, informed him that they had sufficient information and probable cause for plaintiff's arrest, and requested Tait to ask him to come to the county jail for a conference with them; that defendant complied with their request; and that plaintiff had theretofore talked with them about it, expressed a willingness to talk further with them, and went voluntarily; that they then informed him of their information that he was a participant in the crime, and that plaintiff expressed a willingness to go to Great Falls and confront Fanning; that defendant Tait at the inspectors' request, to which plaintiff willingly assented, conveyed them all to Great Falls in his automobile as an accommodation; that on arriving at Great Falls he drove to the vicinity of the county jail, where the postal inspectors and plaintiff alighted, and defendant then drove his car to a garage; that defendant did not arrest plaintiff or deprive him of his liberty; that on April 5, 1936, plaintiff informed the inspectors at Great Falls that he knew where the money was concealed and on the same day went with Palagi, the sheriff of Cascade county, to a place about three miles from Roundup, took the money, amounting to $9,189, from the place of concealment and gave it to Palagi, who delivered it to the postal inspectors; that on April 4, 1936, a complaint was filed with a United States Commissioner at Great Falls charging plaintiff with the mail robbery; that he was held for action by the grand jury, thereafter indicted, tried in federal court and convicted of the crime; that the judgment has not been revoked, annulled or set aside.

The further defense thus contains the affirmative allegation that plaintiff came voluntarily at the request of the inspectors communicated to plaintiff by defendant Tait, and allegations intended to show reasonable cause for the arrest and imprisonment.

Plaintiff made a motion to strike all of those parts of the further defense which related to the postal inspectors and which set forth defendant's version of the transaction in question, including those leading up to the alleged arrest and the subsequent filing of the complaint against plaintiff, and also those relating to his indictment, trial and conviction. The motion was denied.

Plaintiff then filed a reply admitting that Cooney and Mellish were postal inspectors and had authority "to arrest individuals who had committed federal crimes," admitting the arrest of Richardson and Fanning, and the arrest, indictment and conviction of plaintiff, but alleging that any information implicating plaintiff was obtained from Fanning and Richardson by coercion under arrest and by conspiracy between Tait, Mellish and Cooney for the purposes of justifying a prior arrest of plaintiff by Tait in the preceding month and establishing his defense to a prior action by plaintiff for "false arrest and unlawful imprisonment" in connection therewith, and to enable Tait to profit from the reward offered for the recovery of the money. The reply further alleged that no charge was filed against plaintiff until after Tait had arrested him and removed him to Cascade county and that there was no probable cause for the arrest; denied that Fanning and Richardson had involved plaintiff in the crime or that he consented to go voluntarily to the jail at Roundup or at Great Falls. It further alleged that by a promise of reward he was tricked by defendant and the inspectors into learning from Fanning where the money was secreted; that he was then taken by the sheriff of Cascade county to the vicinity of Roundup where he found and delivered up the money; that he was thereupon charged with complicity in the crime, was held in excessive bail at the instance of the inspectors; that the case was not presented to the grand jury for many months after his imprisonment, and was not promptly tried; that Richardson and Fanning pleaded guilty to the charges; that defendant and inspectors conspired to obstruct justice by inducing Fanning and Richardson by promises of immunity and parole to testify falsely against plaintiff and by attempting to cause a witness "to modify, alter and color his testimony against" plaintiff; that a representative of the insurance company, by which the mail bag was insured, attempted to obstruct justice by preventing the giving of testimony in plaintiff's behalf; that defendant and the inspectors were directly interested in the outcome of the criminal prosecution "in that plaintiff *** had filed against Tait a civil action for false arrest and unlawful imprisonment in connection with said offense," and "well knew a conviction of plaintiff, however obtained, could be urged as a defense in said civil action, and that Tait and said postal inspectors conspired to unlawfully bring about plaintiff's conviction" for that purpose "well knowing plaintiff was innocent of the crime charged against him"; that the latter facts were denied admission as evidence at the criminal trial and that the jury had no information of the real interest affecting "the testimony of said persons; that the day following an adverse disposition of said civil action for false imprisonment, and within the week following plaintiff's conviction in Federal Court, Tait represented he had positive information Cline had nothing whatever to do with the robbery in question; ***."

Defendants moved to strike many of the allegations of the reply, including those attempting to impeach the federal court judgment of conviction and to charge defendant, the inspectors and others with conspiracy and attempts to obstruct justice; but the motion was denied in full.

The prayer of the complaint was for $10,000 damages for the resulting "great physical inconvenience and discomfort loss of time, mental suffering, humiliation, shame, public ridicule and public disgrace," but at the trial plaintiff waived any damages in excess of the $6,000 covered by the sheriff's bond. He also stipulated at the trial that "At this time, to the end there may be no confusion as to the issue involved, the record may show there are no claims asserted so far as the alleged unlawful arrest and apprehension of the plaintiff by the defendant was effected on the seventh of March, 1936 or upon the second arrest on the night of the second of April." Thus the unlawfulness of the arrest itself was eliminated from the case. The issue was further narrowed by several instructions given without objection that "when a person is imprisoned, without a warrant, by a peace officer, the person so imprisoned must, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which such person is imprisoned, and a complaint, stating the charge against such imprisoned person, must be made before such magistrate"; (a paraphrase of section 11766, Rev.Codes); that "if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the plaintiff Cline was imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the defendant Tait, then you are further instructed, as a matter of law, that there is no evidence in this case that the defendant Tait did at any time bring, or attempt to bring, the plaintiff before a Justice of the Peace or a Committing Magistrate or a United States Commissioner in Musselshell County, and by virtue of failing so to do, you are instructed you must return your verdict in this case for the plaintiff unless you should further find from a preponderance of the...

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2 cases
  • Cline v. Tait
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • February 9, 1945
    ...The former opinion herein narrowed the issues and established the law of the case. At page 485 of the reported decision in 113 Mont., at page 94 of 129 P.2d, it was held: effect to the preponderance of the evidence, the custody of Tait ceased some time between 11:30 a. m. and 1:00 p. m., wh......
  • State v. Johnston, 10335
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1962
    ...his defense on the merits at the trial. If the defendant has a remedy at all it must be found in a civil action. See Cline v. Tait, 113 Mont. 475, 129 P.2d 89. The rule is stated in 15 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 317, as 'As a general rule, the mere fact that the arrest of an accused person......

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