Clinkscale v. St. Therese of New Hope

• Decision Date: 03 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1223.,12–1223.
• Parties: Ruby CLINKSCALE, Plaintiff–Appellant v. ST. THERESE OF NEW HOPE, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

701 F.3d 825

Ruby CLINKSCALE, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.ST. THERESE OF NEW HOPE, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–1223.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 15, 2012.

Filed: Nov. 13, 2012.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 3, 2013.

Mark Alan Greenman, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Sara Gullickson McGrane, Jessica Molyneaux Marsh, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.

Before BYE, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Ruby Clinkscale appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer St. Therese of New Hope on her interference claim brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). We reverse.

I

St. Therese is a long-term care facility located in New Hope, Minnesota. From 2005 to 2010, Clinkscale worked as a nurse in St. Therese's rehabilitation unit. Despite an understanding among employees that St. Therese's nursing staff may be “floated” to different units within the facility, Clinkscale received training only for the rehabilitation unit and worked there exclusively until October 11, 2010, when she was reassigned to St. Therese's long-term care unit.

Clinkscale, who began experiencing symptoms of an undiagnosed anxiety disorder earlier in 2010, expressed apprehension about working in a unit for which she was not trained. Emphasizing that she was not refusing to work, Clinkscale merely reiterated an earlier request for unit-specific training prior to reassignment. Clinkscale's supervisors informed her that she had “no choice. You either work or you don't have a job and that's called patient abandonment and you can lose your license.” Clinkscale immediately went to St. Therese's human resources (HR) office to speak with the HR Director, Rand Brugger. During their conversation, Clinkscale exhibited signs of a panic attack: crying and shaking so severely that, at one point, she requested an ambulance. In light of Clinkscale's obvious distress, Brugger instructed her to go home and said they would work something out the next day.

Once home, Clinkscale made an appointment with her doctor for the following morning, October 12. Her doctor suggested the anxiety attack had been situationally triggered, advised therapy, and prescribed two medications. In a note addressed to St. Therese, Clinkscale's doctor recommended she take the remainder of the week off from work. At 9:30 the same morning, Clinkscale delivered her doctor's note to St. Therese's HR department. In return, the HR department provided Clinkscale with FMLA forms, which she gave to her doctor to complete. Later on October 12, however, a member of St. Therese's HR staff called Clinkscale at home to inform her that she had been terminated the previous day for walking off the job. Clinkscale's doctor returned the FMLA forms two days later, on October 14, 2012, describing Clinkscale as “suffering from anxiety and panic attacks” and requesting she be excused from work for one week due to the severity of her condition. On October 22, 2010, St. Therese registered a complaint regarding Clinkscale with the Minnesota Board of Nursing, alleging that Clinkscale had “refused work assignment & walked out.”

Clinkscale filed suit against St. Therese in the District of Minnesota. Among other claims, she alleged St. Therese impermissibly interfered with her right to take reasonable leave for medical reasons in violation of the FMLA. St. Therese moved for summary judgment, arguing Clinkscale was not entitled to FMLA rights because she had no longer been an employee at the time she asserted them and, in any case, Clinkscale had been terminated for reasons “wholly unrelated to the FMLA.” The district court granted summary judgment in St. Therese's favor on all claims. With respect to Clinkscale's interference claim, the court concluded St. Therese did not have notice of Clinkscale's need for medical leave prior to her termination and, alternatively, Clinkscale had been terminated for patient abandonment and not for asserting her FMLA rights. Clinkscale now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of St. Therese on her FMLA interference claim.

II

This court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.2002). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

The FMLA entitles an employee to twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period if she has a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A “serious health condition” is any “illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). Continuing treatment is defined as “[a] period of incapacity of more than three consecutive, full calendar days and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a). Clinkscale's diagnosed incapacity for one full week, accompanied by two prescriptions for medication and an advised course of ongoing therapy satisfies the FMLA standard for a “serious health condition.” Accordingly, the district court had only to determine whether Clinkscale could establish a prima facie case of interference with her FMLA rights.

To state a claim for interference under the FMLA, Clinkscale must have given notice to St. Therese of her need for FMLA leave. Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir.2008). “Whether an employee gave sufficient information to put his or her employer on notice that an absence may be covered by the FMLA is a question of fact for the jury.” Id. The district court concluded a reasonable jury could find the October 12 doctor's note was sufficient to put St. Therese on notice that Clinkscale may have had a serious health condition. It further concluded, however, the notice had been provided too late, as Clinkscale had already been terminated when it was provided. The FMLA establishes that when leave is needed for an unforeseeable event, notice is required “as soon as practicable.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a). “This ordinarily means at least verbal notification to the employer within one or two business days of when the need for leave becomes known to the employee.” Spangler, 278 F.3d at 852 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(b)) (alterations omitted).

On October 11, Clinkscale exhibited signs of severe...