Clinton Mining Co. v. Loveless

• Decision Date: 15 January 1920
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 830
• Citation: 204 Ala. 77,85 So. 289
• Parties: CLINTON MINING CO. v. LOVELESS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

85 So. 289

204 Ala. 77

CLINTON MINING CO. v. LOVELESS.

6 Div. 830

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 15, 1920

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; John C. Pugh, Judge.

Action by Grace M. Loveless, as administratrix of the estate of W.R Loveless, against the Clinton Mining Company, for damages for the death of her intestate while in its employ. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Stokely Scrivner & Dominick, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Harsh Harsh & Harsh and Erle Pettus, all of Birmingham, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

A condensed paraphrase of the several counts of the complaint, showing their essential features, may be stated as follows: (1) It was defendant's duty to furnish ladders, or similar appliances, for the use and safety of its workmen while pulling down or removing loose dock (which needed to be so treated) from the roof of its mine; (2) defendant negligently failed to furnish such ladders or appliances; and (3) as a proximate result of that failure a large rock fell from the roof of the mine upon plaintiff's intestate, while he was doing the work he was employed to do, viz. propping or preparing to prop said rock.

Several grounds of demurrer aptly challenge the sufficiency of the several counts, in that, on the facts alleged, they show no proximate causal connection between defendant's negligent omission to furnish a ladder for the safe removal of the rock, and the falling of the rock on intestate while he was engaged in propping it up.

Complaints charging negligence must allege facts showing a proximate causal connection between the negligence charged and the injury complained of, or, if no such facts are shown, or they are equivocal as to the inference of causation, they must expressly charge the causation. Such a charge, though made as the mere conclusion of the pleader, is held to be sufficient. Merriweather v. Sayre M. & M. Co., 161 Ala. 441, 49 So. 916.

But, where facts are shown which contradict the averment of proximate causation, the latter, being a mere conclusion, will be disregarded on apt demurrer; that is to say, when the facts and circumstances alleged generate a prima facie presumption that there was no proximate causal connection between the injury suffered and the negligent act or omission charged, the mere averment of such connection as a conclusion of the pleader is not sufficient as against demurrer.

See Southern Ry. Co. v. Shook, 150 Ala. 361, 43 So. 579; Thomas, Admr. v. S.-S.S. & I. Co., 144 Ala. 188, 39 So. 715; Ritch v. Kilby, etc., Co., 164 Ala. 131, 51 So. 377.

Prima facie, the complaint here exhibited shows that intestate was injured in a way and under circumstances that are wholly foreign to defendant's alleged...