Clinton v. Brown
| Decision Date | 19 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. 3:15-cv-0048-FDW-DSC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | WILLIAM K. CLINTON, Plaintiff, v. FRANK M. BROWN, M.D., individually and/or as employee and/or agent of the Veteran's Administration Medical Center of Asheville, Defendant. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in the alternative Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 26, 2015. (Doc No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED as moot.
Plaintiff is a veteran of the United States military. He received an honorable discharge and is entitled to Veteran's Administration ("VA") health benefits through VA medical centers. Plaintiff became baptized into the Jehovah's Witness faith in 2005 and does not take blood products during surgical procedures.
Defendant is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon working at the Veteran's Administration Medical Center in Asheville, North Carolina ("A-VAMC"). Plaintiff alleges Defendant was a federal employee of the A-VAMC, an agency of the United States of America, and was acting inthe scope of his employment at the Department of Veterans' Affairs.
In 2009, Plaintiff had a total right knee replacement without receiving blood products. After continuing to suffer pain in his right knee, Plaintiff sought treatment at the A-VAMC in 2012. On June 14, 2012, Plaintiff informed several members of the A-VAMC that he was a Jehovah's Witness and would not take blood products during surgical procedures. He noted this on his official consent form dated June 14, 2012, and specified he would not take blood products even if they were necessary to save his life.
Defendant scheduled a pre-operation appointment with Plaintiff on June 19, 2012. Plaintiff brought his son, William Eric Clinton, and his cousin, William Ballard, to the appointment. At the appointment, Defendant spent forty-five minutes informing Plaintiff of the risks and nature of a bloodless procedure, including complications. Plaintiff and Defendant also discussed an alternative procedure to using blood product during surgery - "cell saver." (Doc. No. 10). Defendant explained that cell saver, used for re-infusing a patient's own blood back into patient's body during surgery, was only possible if there was no infection in Plaintiff's knee. At the time of the pre-operation appointment, Defendant argues that he could not be sure of the presence of an infection until tissue samples were taken during surgery. (Doc. No. 10). Defendant states that Plaintiff was resistant to his efforts to explain the surgical risks and did not accept that cell saver was only an option in non-infected cases. Plaintiff again stated that he would not take blood products under any circumstances after discussing the possible risks with Defendant. Plaintiff also discussed increasing pain in his hip.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant pressed him to consent to the use of blood products in a life-threatening situation and proceeded to ask Plaintiff's son if he wanted his father to die on theoperating table. Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant shared Plaintiff's history of illegal drug use with his son, asking why his father would use illegal drugs but would not take blood if necessary. (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant then pressed his son to convince Plaintiff to "change his religion so Defendant could perform the operation with blood." (Doc. No. 1). Defendant argues that he challenged Plaintiff's religious beliefs, stating that many prior patients of the Jehovah's Witness faith consented to the use of blood products in life or death surgical situations after being informed of the risks. Defendant states that he always has this conversation with Jehovah's Witness patients to ensure all risks and alternatives are addressed. (Doc. No. 10).
Defendant states that he advised Plaintiff of the risks and requested he receive an MRI of his painful hip at Salisbury VA Medical Center and return two months later. Defendant states in his declaration that Plaintiff left the appointment and did not return for follow-up treatment. (Doc. No. 10). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to perform the surgery, alleging that there might be an infection in the knee. In July 2014, Plaintiff sought treatment at the VA medical center in Durham, North Carolina, and is now advised he needs a replacement for his painful hip. (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intentionally mistreated him in June 2012. Plaintiff contends that as a result, he endured additional pain and suffering in his knee and seeks punitive damages. Plaintiff also alleges that he now needs a hip replacement and seeks damages. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that the claim of a constitutional tort is proper because there is no other avenue for which Plaintiff can recover relief in this matter. (Doc. No. 1). Although Defendant moves fordismissal under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and summary judgment in the alternative, the core of Defendant's argument states that dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) shall be granted when a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts have jurisdiction in "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §1331. The burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction rests on the Plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). The moving party should prevail on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to a lack of federal jurisdiction if material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. U.S., 945 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987)).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint allege sufficient facts to ascertain that a "claim is plausible rather than merely conceivable." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Plaintiffs must "state a claim that is plausible on its face," which would allow a court to draw a "reasonable inference" that a defendant could be liable for the conduct alleged in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Ultimately, the court "...need not accept as true unwarranted inferences,unreasonable conclusions, or arguments" laid out in the complaint. Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2009). Rather, a court must simply accept as true factual matter alleged in the complaint for purposes of stating the elements of his or her claim. Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 343 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
For a court to grant summary judgment, the moving party must show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is only appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and cannot weigh evidence or determine credibility. Jacobs v. N.C. Admin Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569-69 (4th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom and seeks monetary damages for pain and suffering and increased pain in his hip. Plaintiff asks this Court to fashion a monetary remedy against a federal employee, as the Supreme Court first created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations do not support his claim. Defendant contends Plaintiff's claims do no state a Bivens claim as recognized by the Court. Defendant further contends that even if a Bivens claim were allowed based on Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's suit, asserting that he has absolute immunity under the VAImmunity Statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7316, and in the alternative, Defendant argues he is immune from a Bivens remedy under the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
A Bivens action is a suit for damages against a federal employee acting under the color of law for violations of a Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As such, the core purpose of a Bivens action is "deterring individual officers from engaging in constitutional wrongdoing." Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). However, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States stated that a Bivens remedy does not lie where: (1) "Congress provided an equally effective alternative remedy and declared it to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, special factors counsel hesitation." These two situations preclude a Bivens remedy if there is either a statutory scheme of recovery established by Congress, or if there are special factors that preclude a Bivens remedy.
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