Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 05-CV-9907 (CS),05-CV-9907 (CS)
• Parties: EILEEN A. CLINTON, on behalf of herself and as Administratrix of the Estate of WILLIAM A. CHAMPAGNE, JR., Plaintiff, v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON HOLDINGS, INC., as successor by merger to AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, and PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

EILEEN A. CLINTON, on behalf of herself and as Administratrix of the Estate of WILLIAM A. CHAMPAGNE, JR., Plaintiff, v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON HOLDINGS, INC. as successor by merger to AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, and PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., Defendants.

No. 05-CV-9907 (CS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: June 20, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

Appearances:

Jerome H. Block

Amber Long

Levy Phillips & Konigsberg, LLP

New York, New York

Counsel for Plaintiff

Harold K. Gordon

Robert Iscaro

Jones Day

New York, New York

Stephen J. Kaczynski

Jacqueline M. Pasek

Jones Day

Cleveland, Ohio

Kimberly A. Jolson

Jones Day

Columbus, Ohio

Counsel for Defendant Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., as successor by merger to The

American Tobacco Company

Seibel, J.

Before the Court are Defendant The American Tobacco Company's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, (Doc. 393), and Plaintiff Eileen A. Clinton's Motion to Modify Judgment to Include Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest and for a New Trial on Certain Elements of Damages pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, (Doc. 391). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Rule 50 Motion is DENIED; Defendant's Rule 59 Motion is DENIED; and Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

The parties are presumed to be familiar with the background facts of this case, which are recounted in other opinions. See Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Between November 15, 2012 and December 12, 2012, a jury trial was held in part on Plaintiff Eileen A. Clinton's negligent failure to warn and fraudulent concealment claims against Defendant The American Tobacco Company ("ATC"). The jury found for ATC on the fraud claim but returned a verdict for Plaintiff on the negligent failure to warn claim, awarding $1,300,000 for decedent William A. Champagne, Jr.'s wrongful death, $25,000 for Champagne's pain and suffering, and $20,000 for Plaintiff's loss of consortium. (Doc. 389.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50

ATC renews its previously-filed motion for judgment as a matter of law, (Doc. 379), pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment - or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged - the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;

(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

In considering a Rule 50 motion, the Court must "consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence that the jury might have drawn in that party's favor." Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Sikorski, 303 F. App'x 938, 940 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Sharpley v. Metro North Commuter R.R., No. 06-CV-7884, 2009 WL 855790, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009). The Court may not, in assessing the evidence, "'make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. . . . [T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" EEOC v. Everdry Mktg. & Mgmt., Inc., No. 06-CV-5430, 2009 WL 3287570, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 2009) (summary order) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000)). "The court is not permitted to find as a fact a proposition that is contrary to a finding made by the jury." Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court may not disturb a jury verdict unless "there is 'such a completeabsence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture,'" Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 364 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Harris v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 F.3d 592, 597 (2d Cir. 2001)), or "such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men [sic] could not arrive at a verdict against the moving party," Okemo Mountain, 303 F. App'x at 940 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Sharpley, 2009 WL 855790, at *2.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59

Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). A motion for a new trial "may invoke the discretion of the court in so far as it is bottomed on the claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving; and may raise questions of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection of evidence or instructions to the jury." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940).

Whether to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) is in the district court's sound discretion. Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1998). It is well-settled that a new trial may be ordered even if there is "substantial evidence" supporting the jury's verdict. DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998). The court, however, should only grant a new trial where it finds the jury's verdict to be "egregious." Id. (citation omitted). In other words, a Rule 59(a) motion "ordinarily should not be granted unless the trialcourt is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Kosmynka v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 462 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Nimely v. City of N.Y., 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 2005) (district court must determine, "in its independent judgment, [that] the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or [its] verdict is a miscarriage of justice") (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); DeWitt v. N.Y. State Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 97-CV-4651, 1999 WL 672560, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1999) ("In evaluating a Rule 59 motion, the trial judge's duty is essentially to see that there is no miscarriage of justice.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

In considering whether a jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence such that a new trial is warranted, the district judge is "free to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses and need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner." Scherer v. Kane, 284 F. App'x 850, 854 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "it is still improper for the Court to grant a new trial when resolution of the issues depended on assessment of the credibility of the witnesses." Ellis v. La Vecchia, 567 F. Supp. 2d 601, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134 ("[A] court should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility.").

III. Discussion

ATC asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively a new trial, because the Court admitted irrelevant and time-barred evidence and erred in aspects of its jury instructions; Plaintiff did not satisfy her evidentiary burden on two elements of her negligent failure to warn claim; and New York law does not recognize a claim for loss of consortiumwhere the tortious conduct occurred prior to marriage. (D's 50/59 Mem. 1-2.)¹ Plaintiff responds that there were no errors in the Court's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions; she presented substantial evidence in support of all elements of her negligent failure to warn claim; and the loss of consortium claim was properly submitted to the jury. (P's 50/59 Opp. 1.)²

Plaintiff moves for the judgment to be amended to include pre-and post-judgment interest and seeks a new trial on the damages awards of $25,000 for Champagne's pain and suffering, $20,000 for Plaintiff's loss of consortium, and zero for the losses of Champagne's children, Jennifer and William, Jr. (to whom I will refer as Billy). (P's 59 Mem. 1.)³ ATC opposes a new trial on damages, arguing that the jury's assessment of the credibility of the trial witnesses should not be disturbed, and that the issues of liability and damages are inextricably linked and cannot be severed. (D's 59 Opp. 1.)⁴

A. Evidentiary Rulings

1. Conduct Occurring After September 11, 1968

ATC argues that because Plaintiff voluntarily limited the two claims against ATC to the period before September 11, 1968, the same temporal limitation should have applied to the evidence admitted at trial. (D's 50/59 Mem. 11.) Specifically, ATC identifies six exhibits post-dating 1968 that it alleges inflamed and confused the jury by making it seem as if ATC could be liable for post-1968 conduct. (Id. at 13-14.)

ATC's Motion in Limine No. 6, (Doc. 114), and October 22, 2012 letter, (Doc. 384 Ex. A), sought to exclude all evidence of post-1968...