Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corporation

• Decision Date: 24 December 1960
• Docket Number: No. 16916.,16916.
• Citation: 1961 AMC 727,285 F.2d 199
• Parties: Richard H. CLINTON, Appellant, v. JOSHUA HENDY CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

1961 AMC 727, 285 F.2d 199 (1960)

Richard H. CLINTON, Appellant, v. JOSHUA HENDY CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 16916.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

December 24, 1960.

Richard H. Clinton, in pro. per.

No appearance for appellee.

Before BARNES, HAMLIN and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.

BARNES, Circuit Judge.

The trial court on its own motion dismissed the complaint herein for lack of asserted admiralty jurisdiction. Defendant Joshua Hendy Corporation was never served, did not appear below, and has therefore filed no brief herein. The sole issue before this court is whether the cause of action alleged by appellant comes within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court.

Appellant in his complaint asserts that the chief mate of appellee's vessel, S.S. Marine Arrow, sent a libelous letter to appellant's union. The letter, allegedly, was written on September 20, 1954, on the decks of the S.S. Marine Arrow, and was published on the same ship to agents of appellant's union. As a result of this publication, appellant was expelled from his union. Appellant asserts that appellee, in publishing the allegedly false letter, violated its statutory duty to make an honest report regarding the character and qualifications of a discharged seaman. 46 U.S.C.A. § 645. Appellant also asserts strongly that, at the time the acts in dispute occurred, a "maritime relationship" existed between appellant and appellee. Appellant maintains, therefore, that appellee is liable to him for interfering with his contractual relations with the union; and he claims that this cause of action comes within the district court's admiralty jurisdiction. Appellant alleges, however, that the tort was consummated on shore in the Dispatch Hall of the International Organization of Masters, Mates, & Pilots.

Appellant devotes a major portion of his brief to the proposition that a tort arising out of a maritime relationship is cognizable in admiralty even though such tort is committed ashore. This court has held in this same case that appellant's charge of interference with his contractual relations with the union is not cognizable in admiralty unless the alleged tort was committed upon navigable waters. Clinton v. International Organization of Masters, Mates, & Pilots of America, Inc., 9 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 370, 372 (see also Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 9 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 329, and Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 9 Cir., 1960, 277 F.2d 450). The principles of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and/or rule of the case foreclose further consideration of this line of argument.

Appellant's second argument merits more careful consideration. Appellant seeks to sustain jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C.A. § 740, which reads, in part, as follows:

"The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land."

The tort here alleged, assertedly was commenced on a vessel lying in navigable waters, and, it is further asserted, the tort occurred in connection with the operation of the vessel. Appellant believes, therefore, that he comes within the jurisdiction provided by § 740. This position would seem to be precluded by the very language of the statute, which refers to damage caused by the vessel. But appellant relies on three decisions which we shall discuss briefly.

Schoeñing v. 102 Jute Bags, D.C.E.D. Pa.1955, 132 F.Supp. 561, does not support appellant's position in any way. The court there does not cite or discuss § 740; and, as a matter of fact, the decision refuses to accept admiralty jurisdiction because the tort alleged did not occur on navigable waters.

Kamara v. S. Livanos & Co., D.C.S.D. N.Y.1951, 97 F.Supp. 435, also does not deal with § 740. There the court held that defendant's alleged "blacklisting" of certain sailors dealt with their employment as seaman and hence came within the cognizance of admiralty jurisdiction. But this conclusion is relevant only to appellant's contention that a tort, though committed ashore, is cognizable in admiralty if it arises out of a...