Clinton v. Perez
| Decision Date | 09 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-cv-02010 (VAB),3:19-cv-02010 (VAB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | JAMES CLINTON, Plaintiff, v. MARCO PEREZ, JOHN ALDI, DANIEL PAPOOSHA, DOMENICK PISANO, MERIDITH MINNOCCI, AND ANTONIO SANTIAGO, Defendants. |
James Clinton ("Plaintiff") has sued employees of the Connecticut Department of Correction: Marco Perez, John Aldi, Daniel Papoosha, Domenick Pisano, Meridith Minnocci, and Antonio Santiago (collectively, "Defendants") for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Connecticut. Compl., ECF No. 1 (Dec. 26, 2019); Am. Compl., ECF No. 7 (July 13, 2020).
Defendants have filed a motion a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17 (Sept. 4, 2020) ( ).
For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
All claims are dismissed with prejudice.
On or around February 19, 2019, "[a]n interview was schedule[d] by the Department of Correction Security Division . . . pertaining to [Mr. Clinton's] off[-]duty conduct." Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Mr. Clinton allegedly began recording the interview, id. ¶ 14, and allegedly Mr. Perez told him that "only [the] security division was allowed" to make recordings, id. ¶ 15. Mr. Perez allegedly also told Mr. Clinton "[he] would receive a copy of the interview at a later time." Id. When Mr. Clinton did not stop recording, "[t]he Department of Correction[] [H]ead of Security Division, Antonio Santiago[,] was [allegedly] summon[ed] to the office" where the interview was taking place. Id. ¶ 16.
Mr. Clinton allegedly "stated that he would cease from such activities . . . if [they] . . . were unlawful, illegal or against administrative policies." Id. ¶ 17. Defendants allegedly "fail[ed] to prove or provide" Mr. Clinton with evidence that any such laws or policies existed. Id. ¶ 18. Mr. Clinton allegedly asked if the Constitution applied and Mr. Santiago allegedly told Mr. Perez that it did not. Id. ¶ 19. Mr. Clinton allegedly would not "cooperate . . . [and] was escorted out of the office to the lobby of the building." Id. ¶ 20.
He allegedly learned that he would be "placed on administrative leave [until] further notice." Id. ¶ 21. Consequently, Mr. Clinton allegedly had to participate in the interview and "give statements pertaining to the investigation." Id. ¶ 22.
On December 26, 2019, Mr. Clinton filed his initial Complaint against Defendants. Compl.
On July 13, 2020, Mr. Clinton filed an Amended Complaint. Am. Compl.
On September 4, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Clinton's Amended Complaint. Defs.' Mot; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17-1 (Sept. 4, 2020) (" ").
On September 18, 2020, Mr. Clinton filed a motion to strike Defendants' motion to dismiss. Pl. Mot. to Obj. & Strike Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 21 (Sept. 18, 2020).
On September 24, 2020, Defendants filed an opposition to Mr. Clinton's motion to strike the motion to dismiss, Defs.' Opp'n Mem. to Pl.'s Mot. to Strike Their Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 26 (Sept. 24, 2020), and a reply in support of their motion to dismiss, Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 27 (Sept. 24, 2020).
On June 19, 2021, this Court issued an Order denying Mr. Clinton's motion to strike Defendants' motion to dismiss. Ruling and Order on Mot. to St[r]ike, Mot. to Submit Evid., and Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 29 (June 19, 2021) ("June Order").
On July 7, 2021, the Court held a hearing regarding the pending motion to dismiss. Min. Entry, ECF No. 31 (July 7, 2021).
"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See id.
"When considering a motion to dismiss [under] Rule 12(b)(1), the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff." Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sweet, 235 F.3d at 83). The court, however, may also resolve disputed jurisdictional issues "by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings, such asaffidavits, and if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing." Karlen ex rel. J.K. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 638 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000)).
"When the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the complaint . . ., the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden." Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). "[A] defendant is [also] permitted to make a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion, proffering evidence beyond the [p]leading." Id. "In opposition to such a motion, the plaintiffs will need to come forward with evidence of their own to controvert that presented by the defendant 'if the affidavits submitted on a 12(b)(1) motion . . . reveal the existence of factual problems' in the assertion of jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Exch. Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)).
A complaint must contain a " short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Any claim that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" will be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a "plausibility standard" guided by "two working principles." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
First, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) . Second, "only acomplaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the complaint must contain "factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible." Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).
When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court also views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) ().
A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review "to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken" and "documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, however, "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F. 3d 471, 474 (2dCir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) ().
Mr. Clinton has sued Defendants alleging violations of his rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and Connecticut General Statutes Section 31- 51q. Am. Compl. ¶ 2.
The Court will address each of Mr. Clinton's claims in turn.2
The Eleventh Amendment, which protects the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects state officials sued for damages in their official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (). Mr. Clinton has sued Mr. Perez, Mr. Aldi, Mr. Papoosha, and Ms. Minnocci "only in [their] official capacit[ies]." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6, 8-9. Mr. Clinton further has sued Mr. Pisano "only in his official capacity." Id. ¶ 7. Given the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition against damage claims against state officials in their official capacities, all claims brought against all of the defendants in their official...
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