Clippard v. Clippard
Citation | 642 S.W.3d 761 |
Decision Date | 25 March 2022 |
Docket Number | SD 37050 |
Parties | Mark Alan CLIPPARD, Respondent, v. Catherine Sue CLIPPARD, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appellant's attorney: Charles B. Cowherd and Derek A. Ankrom, Springfield.
Respondent's attorney: Gail L. Fredrick, Springfield.
Catherine Sue Clippard ("Mother") appeals the circuit court's judgment modifying child support orders that arose out of a decree dissolving her marriage to Mark Alan Clippard ("Father"). Among her contentions, Mother makes two meritorious arguments concerning the circuit court's (1) failure to make a statutorily required finding in determining child support and (2) failure to divide education costs in accordance with the parties’ parenting plan. We reverse the circuit court's judgment in those respects, do not reach the remaining arguments in Mother's points, affirm the judgment in all other respects and remand the case to the circuit court with directions.
The judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage was entered on August 27, 2003 (the "dissolution judgment"). Two children were born of that marriage: Martha ("Daughter"), born on September 10, 1991, and Luke ("Son"), born on December 22, 1997. No party contests the following relevant facts: (1) Daughter is physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting herself, insolvent, and unmarried, see section 452.340.4,1 and is receiving residential care and support from the Nova Center; and (2) Son became emancipated upon turning 21 on December 22, 2018.
The dissolution judgment incorporated an agreed upon parenting plan as part of a marital settlement agreement. In 2009, the amount of child support that Father was required to pay Mother under the parenting plan was modified upward, but provisions of the original parenting plan not addressed by the modification remained in effect. Only two requirements imposed by the parenting plan and its 2009 modification are relevant to this appeal: (1) the requirement that Father pay a total of $2,374 per month in child support with $1,700 going to the Family Support Center as trustee for Mother and the remaining $674 going directly to Mother, provided that Father would receive a dollar-for-dollar credit for Social Security benefits paid to Mother for the support, care, and benefit of Daughter; and (2) the requirement that "Father and Mother shall divide, on a pro-rata basis based on their adjusted gross income shown on their Form 1040, the cost each year for [Son] to attend a post-secondary college, university, or vocational/technical school, state or private," subject to a list of enumerated limitations, none of which are relevant.
In February and March of 2019, the parties, each alleging substantial and continuing changes in circumstances, filed competing motions to modify their child support obligations. After a trial in September 2020, the circuit court entered a judgment of modification. That judgment (1) reduced Father's child support obligation to $300 per month, retroactive to April 1, 2019, for the care and support of Daughter; and (2) required Mother to reimburse Father $5,823.98 for college expenses incurred by Son. A post-judgment motion, filed by Mother and raising all relevant issues, was thereafter denied.
Mother timely appeals, raising two points relied on.
"Our standard of review in a dissolution action is governed, as in any court-tried case, by the standard set forth in Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)." Schollmeyer v. Schollmeyer , 393 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Mo. App. 2013). "We will affirm the decree of dissolution unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." Barth v. Barth , 372 S.W.3d 496, 503 (Mo. App. 2012). All of Mother's points allege that the circuit court "misapplied the law[.]" "If the issue is one of law, this Court reviews de novo to see if the circuit court misapplied the law." JAS Apartments, Inc. v. Naji , 354 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Mo. banc 2011).
In her first point, Mother contends:
The trial court erred in reducing [Father]’s child support obligation to $300.00 per month in the judgment, because the trial court misapplied the law in deviating from the form 14 calculation of presumed correct child support amount, in that, the trial court (1) failed to make the statutorily required finding that the presumed correct child support amount is unjust or inappropriate, and (2) erroneously gave [Father] credit for governmental benefits received by the child[.]
Mother's first argument is correct and, therefore, we need not reach the second.
In determining child support, the circuit court is required to follow a two-step procedure. Sullins v. Sullins , 417 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Mo. App. 2014) ; accord section 452.340.9; Rule 88.01.3 "First, the trial court is required to calculate the child support amount pursuant to Civil Procedure Form 14 (" Form 14"), either by accepting one of the parent's Form 14 calculations or by performing its own Form 14 calculation." Sullins , 417 S.W.3d at 881. "Second, the trial court considers whether the presumed Form 14 amount is ‘unjust or inappropriate ’ after considering all relevant factors." Id. (emphasis added). Regarding the second step, "[a] written finding or specific finding on the record ... that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, after considering all relevant factors ... shall be required and shall be sufficient to rebut the presumption in the case." Section 452.340.9 (emphasis added).
Father suggests that the circuit court satisfied these requirements and, in support of his argument, points to paragraphs 15 through 18 of the circuit court's judgment. Those paragraphs, in toto , state as follows:
Paragraphs 15 through 18 reveal that the circuit court satisfied the first required step—it accepted Mother's Form 14 calculation as the presumed child support amount. The circuit court then rejected this amount, stating that it did not "take into account" Social Security Disability or Medicaid payments to Daughter and the Nova Center. In that rejection, however, the circuit court made no finding addressing the second required step—that the presumed child support amount is "unjust or inappropriate" as is required to rebut the presumption. See Sullins , 417 S.W.3d at 881 ; section 452.340.9; Rule 88.01.
Generally, "[w]here the trial court enters an award of child support which varies from the amount calculated pursuant to Form 14, and fails to make a finding that the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate, such failure is error which requires reversal and remand." Myers-Geiger by Myers v. Geiger , 878 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Mo. App. 1994). Father presents us with no argument directly addressing the circuit court's material omission or any authority suggesting that reversal and remand is not required in this case.
Accordingly, to the extent that Mother's first point claims that the circuit court erred in deviating from the presumed Form 14 amount without first finding that the amount was unjust or inappropriate, it has merit and is granted. As such, having granted point 1, we need not review or address Mother's remaining argument—alleging that the circuit court "erroneously gave [Father] credit for governmental benefits received by the child"—because this argument contains an alternative ground for relief that may become moot following remand. See O'Hare v. Permenter , 113 S.W.3d 287, 289 n.2 (Mo. App. 2003) .
In her second point, Mother contends:
The trial court erred in...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Schuppan v. Ramos
... ... 2005)). "If the issue is one of law, this Court reviews ... de novo to see if the circuit court misapplied the ... law." Clippard v. Clippard, 642 S.W.3d 761, 764 ... (Mo.App. 2022) (quoting JAS Apartments, Inc. v ... Naji, 354 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Mo. banc 2011)) ... ...
-
City of Columbia v. Spectra Commc'ns Grp., LLC
...grounds raised in Point VII, we need not address CenturyLink's alternative theory in Point VIII. See generally Clippard v. Clippard , 642 S.W.3d 761, 765-66 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (citing O'Hare v. Permenter , 113 S.W.3d 287, 289 n.2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) ).5 The Cities filed a motion for atto......