Clodfelter v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 20-cv-22413-GAYLES |
| Citation | 574 F.Supp.3d 1183 |
| Parties | Madeline CLODFELTER, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Mark J. Beutler, Law Offices of Mark J. Beutler, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Leona Nicole McFarlane, Miami-Dade County Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). [ECF No. 15]. The Court has reviewed the Motion and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
Plaintiff began working for Defendant on July 21, 1986. From 2014-2018, she served as Fire and Rescue Division Manager (the "Division Manager")1 for Defendant's Fire Rescue Department ("MDFR"). During that time, Scott Mendelsberg ("Mendelsberg") was Plaintiff's direct supervisor and David Downey ("Chief Downey") was the MDFR chief. Chief Downey had the authority to hire and fire employees.
On March 25, 2018, Plaintiff sent an email to MDFR Personnel Staff stating:
I have decided to retire effective end of business day on April 6th. Meanwhile, I'll be using my leave. I would like to thank you for your service. I will be dropping by on April 6th to complete the paperwork. See you then.
[ECF No. 14-2 at 53]. The same day, Plaintiff drafted and signed a memorandum addressed to Chief Downey, copying Mendelsberg, and stating in pertinent part:
[E]ffective end of business day, April 6, 2018, I will like to inform you that I am retiring from county service. I plan to use my leave until then. On April 6th, I will come in to complete all required paperwork.
[ECF No. 14-2 at 56]. Plaintiff left the March 25, 2018 memorandum underneath the door of Chief Downey's office, where he found it the next morning. Chief Downey was "completely blindsided" by Plaintiff's decision to retire. [ECF No. 14 ¶ 16].
On March 26, 2018, the day after Plaintiff submitted her resignation letter, she signed and notarized a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP)2 and Resignation of Employment (the "Notice of Election"). [ECF No. 14-1 at 130]. Pursuant to the Notice of Election, Plaintiff's DROP would begin March 1, 2018, and her DROP termination and resignation date would be February 28, 2023.
The next day, Plaintiff drafted and signed a second memorandum to Chief Downey stating:
This is to inform you that based on conversations that I have had in the last couple of days with several other executive level County personnel, and also a conversation that Scott and David had yesterday, I have decided to DROP, effective March 30, 2018 and take leave while I look for another position in Miami-Dade County, instead of abruptly retiring. Meanwhile, I have been and will continue assisting Maria Jose as needed and will be available to testify, as required, in any pending cases that I have been working on with the County Attorney's Office. When working, I will contact payroll via email so they can change the PAR to report my hours worked.
In response, on March 29, 2018, Chief Downey emailed Plaintiff a letter stating in pertinent part:
[ECF No. 14-2 at 63]. In an emailed response, Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter and indicated that she would be making an appointment to see her doctor to complete the required Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") paperwork. She did not directly respond to Chief Downey's stated assumption that she no longer wished to serve as the Division Manager.
Plaintiff suffers from migraines. On April 12, 2018, Plaintiff's physician certified that Plaintiff had a chronic medical condition that commenced in 2002 and that Plaintiff's symptoms were intermittent and could periodically prevent her from performating her job functions. On April 30, 2018, Chief Downey approved Plaintiff's request for FMLA leave. On May 7, 2018, Plaintiff was notified that her request for an intermittent leave of absence under the FMLA had been approved for the time period April 9, 2018, to June 29, 2018.
On June 14, 2018, Maria Jose, the then Acting Administrative Services Manager, emailed Plaintiff regarding her "PAR" hours for approval.4 That same day, in a brief emailed response, Plaintiff confirmed that her hours "look[ed] good" and added: "FYI: Returning to work Monday, July 2nd." [ECF No. 14-2 at 54]. Chief Downey was copied on Plaintiff's emailed response.
On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff met with Chief Downey, Mendelsberg, and Maria Jose and was told that she was being removed from her position as Division Manager for the good of MDFR. Chief Downey also provided Plaintiff with a letter which stated that she was being removed "from her current exempt position as Fire and Rescue Division Manager ... effective Friday, July 6, 2018." [ECF No. 14-1 at 139]. The letter noted that (1) Plaintiff had classified service rights to exercise to another county position, (2) she would receive written notification of her new assignment from Human Resources, and (3) in the interim she would be granted administrative leave until July 6, 2018. The letter did not provide a reason for Plaintiff's removal.5 At his deposition, Chief Downey testified that he made the decision to remove Plaintiff from the Department because she expressed the intent to no longer work in MDFR. At the meeting, Plaintiff did not tell Chief Downey that she wanted to remain in her position.
Upon completing her FMLA leave, Defendant placed Plaintiff in a new position as a Special Project Administrator 1 in the Department of Transportation and Public Works. The new position paid less and entailed less responsibility.
During the time Chief Downey led MDFR, other employees were granted FMLA leave. There is no evidence in the record that Chief Downey retaliated against any other employees for taking FMLA leave. At his deposition, Chief Downey testified that he believes Plaintiff had the right to apply for FMLA leave and that his decision to remove her from MDFR had nothing to do with her FMLA leave. Plaintiff testified that during her tenure with MDFR, Chief Downey demonstrated an antipathy towards FMLA leave, in particular FMLA leave for fathers of newborn children.
On June 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant alleging it violated the FMLA by retaliating against her for exercising her right to take FMLA leave (Count I) and interfering with her FMLA rights (Count II). [ECF No. 1]. Defendant has now moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light of his burden of proof. Harrison v. Culliver , 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is "material" if, "under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co. , 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. SEC v....
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