Cloud v. The Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-CV-1277-S |
| Decision Date | 18 July 2022 |
| Parties | MICHAEL CLOUD v. THE BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
A permanently disabled former National Football League player hired a local lawyer in a small law firm and sued Defendant The Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan (“Defendant” or “Plan”) for disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). After more than two years of high-risk contentious litigation ultimately tried before the Court, the player won handily, defying the odds while facing extraordinary difficulties along the way. David took on Goliath and prevailed.
As set forth in detail in the Court's lengthy Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff Michael Cloud obtained a favorable result on his claims against Defendant. See June 21 2022, Mem. Op. & Order [ECF No. 255]. The Court held that Defendant's Retirement Board (“Board”), the plan administrator, failed to provide a full and fair review of Plaintiffs claim for disability benefits in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2), and abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs application for reclassification to Active Football benefits in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3). See id. at 51-52, 61. The Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him $1,281,120.50 in retroactive benefits as well as prospective Active Football benefits beginning August 1, 2022. See Judgment [ECF No. 259].
The Court also ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff his reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) but reserved its determination of the specific amount of the award until Plaintiffs Opposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Brief in Support (“Motion”) [ECF No. 253] became ripe.[1] See June 21, 2022, Mem. Op. & Order [ECF No. 255] at 84. The Motion is now ripe for adjudication.
The Court has considered the Motion, the accompanying exhibits Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (“Response”) [ECF No. 257], Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Opposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Brief in Support (“Reply”) [ECF No. 260], and the applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
In an ERISA action, “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The Supreme Court has held that attorney's fees under § 1132(g)(1) are not limited to the “prevailing party.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 254 (2010). Rather, the court may award fees if a party has achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Id. at 245. A party satisfies this “success on the merits” requirement “if the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party's success was ‘substantial' or occurred on a ‘central issue.'” Id. at 255.[2] Here, Plaintiff unquestionably succeeded on the merits on all counts. See June 21, 2022, Mem. Op. & Order [ECF No. 255] at 84. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of attorney's fees. See Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255-56 (); see also Ingerson v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18-CV-227-Z-BR, 2020 WL 593 8364 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2,2020) (awarding attorney's fees under ERISA without considering the discretionary five-factor test).
Accordingly, the Court shall determine the amount to be awarded. Courts in the Fifth Circuit use the lodestar method to calculate fee awards. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1459. Under this method, the court determines the reasonable number of hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate, and then multiplies the two figures together to arrive at the “lodestar” amount. Id. A “reasonable hourly rate” is determined by prevailing market rates in the community. McClain v. Lufkin Indus., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011). The party seeking attorney's fees has the burden to show the reasonableness of the hours billed and that it exercised billing judgment. See Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff requests an initial lodestar amount of $1,004,501.25 based on 2,211 hours worked at hourly rates ranging between $300 and $520 for attorneys, and $125 for law clerks and paralegals. See Mot. 8-10. This amount represents the fees incurred through June 3, 2022-the date that the Motion was filed. See id. at 8. Accompanying the Motion is a sworn declaration executed by lead counsel as well as billing records (“Billing Records”). See Declaration of Christian Dennie (“Declaration”) [ECF No. 253-3, Ex. 3]; Billing Records [ECF No. 253-3, Ex. 3 A].
In the Declaration, lead counsel describes (1) the skill and experience of each of the lawyers, law clerks, and paralegals who worked on the case; (2) the number of hours billed and the hourly rate for each; and (3) reductions made to the hours billed for duplicative and clerical work. See Declaration 6-8. The Billing Records detail the tasks, time entries, and hourly rates. See Billing Records [ECF No. 253-3, Ex. 3A]. In addition to the fees incurred through June 3, 2022, Plaintiff seeks $9,900 for an estimated twenty hours required to review Defendant's Response to the Motion and prepare a reply. See Mot. 11. Thus, the final requested lodestar amount by Plaintiff is $1,014,401.25. Defendant does not contest the reasonableness of the hourly rates or the time spent on any particular task. See Resp. 1.
As a billing partner specializing in civil litigation in four established law firms prior to taking the federal bench,[3] this Court has vast personal knowledge of rates charged in the Dallas-Fort Worth legal community for services by individuals with the level of skill, competence and ability of Plaintiffs lawyers and staff. Based on this knowledge, the Court finds that the hourly rates set forth in the Billing Records are reasonable. Indeed, very reasonable, as many law firms bill associates with no courtroom experience at rates higher than that of Plaintiff s lead counsel. See Sortium USA, LLC v. Hunger, No. 3:11-CV-1656-M, 2015 WL 179025, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2015) () (citing Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty., 526 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Defendant argues, however, that the fee award should be reduced by $104,242.50 for time spent on the following:
In support of its argument relating to claims that were unsuccessful or never asserted, Defendant relies on distinguishable cases permitting fees only to a “prevailing party.” But despite Defendant's contention otherwise, a party in an ERISA action may recover fees for work on dismissed claims if that party “achieved ‘some degree of success on the merits' in the overall litigation.” LifeCare, 703 F.3d at 847 (). Moreover, as to claims that were never asserted, “[t]here is nothing patently unreasonable about conducting preliminary research on a case once it is initiated,” Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Disk, 202 F.3d 264, 1999 WL 1131554, at *7 (5th Cir. 1999), and there is nothing to show that these potential claims are “distinct in all respects from [Plaintiffs] successful claims,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
With respect to Plaintiffs “unsuccessful” motion to disqualify defense counsel and motion to strike defense witness's errata sheet, these two motions were neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith. In this case, they were appropriately pursued by counsel who is obliged to zealously represent his client. Indeed, the motion to disqualify brought to the Court's attention the fact that defense counsel advises decision makers at both levels of the Plan's review process despite the inherent conflict of interest presented in acting in such a dual capacity. See June 21, 2022, Mem. Op. & Order [ECF No. 255] at 82. And the motion to strike was understandably pursued to alert the Court that defense counsel filed an errata sheet after the conclusion of the deposition of a Board member significantly altering the substance of his sworn testimony. See ECF No. 102-2.
Defendant also mischaracterizes the Court's ruling on Plaintiff's expert reports. The Court did not “exclude” these reports. Rather, the Court ruled that the reports were admissible to the extent they assisted the Court “in understanding medical terms and procedures at issue.” Feb. 22, 2022, Order [ECF No 151] at 2-3 (citing Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv., 188 F.3d 287, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Gle...
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