Cloyd v. Cnty. of Vermilion

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Citation196 N.E. 802,360 Ill. 610
Docket NumberNo. 22960.,22960.
PartiesCLOYD v. COUNTY OF VERMILION.
Decision Date14 June 1935

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by F. N. Cloyd against the County of Vermilion. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Vermilion County; Casper Platt, judge.

Oliver D. Mann, State's Atty., and O. M. Jones, both of Danville, for appellant.

Acton, Acton & Baldwin, of Danville (W. M. Acton, of Danville, of counsel), for appellee.

FARTHING, Justice.

Appellee, F. N. Cloyd, a physician, sued appellant, the county of Vermilion, for the value of medical and surgical services he had rendered to two persons. The county filed a motion in the nature of a demurrer asking that the complaint be dismissed. The motion was overruled, the county elected to stand by its motion, evidence was heard, and a judgment rendered in favor of appellee for $366. The county appealed directly to this court for the reason that its motion challenged the constitutionality of section 24 of the Pauper Act (Smith-Hurd Ann. St., c. 107, § 25; Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 107, par. 25, p. 2122), upon which the suit was based.

The first of the two counts in the complaint alleged that on May 17, 1932, William Mortenson, a 12 year old boy, was struck and severely injured by an automobile while he was riding a bicycle in the village of Rankin, Butler township, Vermilion county; that the overseer of the poor of that township sent the boy to a hospital in Danville and requested Dr. Cloyd to render the necessary medical and surgical services. This count alleged that the boy and his parents resided in the town of Butler, and that they had not previously been receiving township or county relief, but that they were unable to pay for these services. In the second count it was alleged that Henry Harris broke a leg on October 28, 1933, in the town of Danville, Vermilion county; that he was a nonresident of Vermilion county; that he was a transient; that he was not a person coming within the definition of a pauper; that Dr. Cloyd furnished the necessary surgical and medical services, and that Harris was unable to pay, and that there was no reasonable opportunity to notify the overseer of the poor of Danville township before rendering these services to Harris. Both counts are based expressly on section 24 of the Pauper Act.

The county's motion to dismiss specified only two grounds: First, that the section relied on as a basis for the suit was unconstitutional in that its subject was not within the title of the act, contrary to section 13 of article 4 of the State Constitution; and second, that in both cases the township, and not the county, was liable for the services rendered by Dr. Cloyd.

The statute in question is entitled, ‘An act to revise the law in relation to paupers.’ Section 24 (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 107, § 25) reads: ‘When any non-resident, or any person not coming within the definition of a pauper, of any county or town, shall fall sick or die, not having money or property to pay his board, nursing and medical aid or burial expenses, the overseer or overseers of the poor of the town or precinct in which he may be shall give, or cause to be given to him such assistanceas they may deem necessary and proper, or cause him to be conveyed to his home, and if he shall die, cause him to be decently buried; and the county shall pay the reasonable expense thereof, which expenses of board, nursing, medical aid and burial expenses, may be recovered from the relatives of the said pauper, or from the county of which he is a resident, in an appropriate action.’

The county's contention is that since the title of the act is limited to ‘paupers,’ this section is unconstitutional because it deals with persons who are not paupers, but who are not able to support themselves or pay for board, nursing, medical, and surgical services in case of illness, or for burial if they are overtaken by death.

Section 13 of article 4 of our Constitution was intended to prevent the collation of divergent or unrelated subjects of legislation and to prevent the enactment of what would not have been enactedif it had been put upon its passage separate and apart from the act of which it might be made a part. The section's provisions were not intended to impede legislation, but to protect the people against unwise legislation being passed without notice to the people or to the Legislature itself, and to prevent both the people and Legislature from being deceived by the title of a bill. There is nothing contained in this section which requires the title of an act to give all the details of the proposed law or a table of its contents. If the title informs the members of the General Assembly and the public as to the subject matter, it meets the requirements of this section of the Constitution. Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 124, 188 N.E. 889. This constitutional provision has been liberally construed in favor of the validity of statutes. To render a provision in the body of a statute void for not coming within the title, such provision must be incongruous or have no proper connection with or relation to the title. Swierczek v. Baran, 324 Ill. 530, 155 N. E. 294;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994. The rule is well settled that if the...

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5 cases
  • People ex rel. Nelson v. Trustees Central Mfg. Dist., 31571
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • November 27, 1950
    ...chap. 107, par. 25), has established that two classes of paupers are embraced by the statute. Cloyd v. County of Vermilion, 360 Ill. 610, 196 N.E. 802; People ex rel. Hempen v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 379 Ill. 543, 42 N.E.2d 69. The first class, whose support is an obligation of the ......
  • People ex rel. Hempen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • May 13, 1942
    ...Southwestern Railroad Co., 356 Ill. 272, 190 N.E. 280. It is urged by appellee that the case is controlled by Cloyd v. Vermilion County, 360 Ill. 610, 196 N.E. 802, where we held that under the law then in force (Ill.Rev.Stat.1933, chap. 107, par. 25) the county was liable for the expense o......
  • Sullivant v. Hillside Fluor Spar Mines, 22955.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • June 14, 1935
    ...N. E. 485; and Novarro v. Illinois Steel Co. (Ill.) 196 N. E. 489. Inasmuch as the plaintiff could not maintain his cause of action based [360 Ill. 610]on section 1 of the Occupational Diseases Act for the reason that such section is unconstitutional, the questions as to whether he was enti......
  • People v. Abrams , 22948.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • June 14, 1935
    ...in error was not in the automobile at the time of the accident. In his own behalf the plaintiff in error denied any knowledge of [196 N.E. 802]the stolen car or its being wrecked, gave an account of his reason for being on the street, which was corroborated, and introduced substantial evide......
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