Cmty. Antenna Serv. Inc. Below v. Charter Communications Vi

• Decision Date: 23 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 35703.,35703.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMUNITY ANTENNA SERVICE, INC. Plaintiff Below, Appelleev.CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS VI, LLC Defendant Below, Appellant.

227 W.Va. 595

712 S.E.2d 504

COMMUNITY ANTENNA SERVICE, INC. Plaintiff Below, Appellee

v.CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS VI, LLC Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 35703.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 27, 2011.Decided June 23, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict the court should: (1) consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of the prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the facts proved.” Syllabus Point 5, Orr v. Crowder, 173 W.Va. 335, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983).

2. “The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syllabus Point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

3. “A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).

4. “Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.” Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

5. “A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith.” Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).

6. “Statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly.” Syllabus Point 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975).

7. Under the Cable Television Systems Act, W.Va.Code, 24D–1–22(c) and –23(e) [1999], any person, firm or corporation damaged by a violation of the Act by any cable operator may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for which such cable operator may be liable.

8. “A prima facie case is not overcome by evidence which merely affords a bare conjecture to the contrary.” Syllabus, Scioto Livestock Sales Co. v. Crockett, 116 W.Va. 27, 178 S.E. 427 (1935).

9. A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to establish the cause of a harm is not required to eliminate all other possible causes of the harm. A plaintiff is only required to submit evidence from which the jury can conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's conduct caused the harm. The fact that there may be other causes of the harm does not preclude liability.

10. “Because the verdict below is entitled to considerable deference, an appellate court should decline to disturb a trial court's award of damages on appeal as long as that award is supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all essential elements of the award.” Syllabus Point 4, in part, Reed v. Wimmer, 195 W.Va. 199, 465 S.E.2d 199 (1995).

11. “Our punitive damage jurisprudence includes a two-step paradigm: first, a determination of whether the conduct of an actor toward another person entitles that person to a punitive damage award under Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W.Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895); second, if a punitive damage award is justified, then a review is mandated to determine if the punitive damage award is excessive under Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991).” Syllabus Point 7, Alkire v. First Nat. Bank of Parsons, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996).

12. “Upon petition, this Court will review all punitive damages awards. In our review of the petition, we will consider the same factors that we require the jury and trial judge to consider, and all petitions must address each and every factor set forth in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of this case with particularity, summarizing the evidence presented to the jury on the subject or to the trial court at the post-judgment review stage. Assignments of error related to a factor not specifically addressed in the petition will be deemed waived as a matter of state law.” Syllabus Point 5, Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991).

Robert W. Full, Esq., Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP, Parkersburg, WV, for Community Antenna.Bryant J. Spann, Esq., Allen Guthrie & Thomas, PLLC, Charleston, WV, Robert G. Scott, Jr., Esq., Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, for Charter Communications.

KETCHUM, Justice:

This case has a simple central issue: did one television cable company offer discounted rates to some (but not all) of its customers in violation of a state law that prohibits “unduly discriminatory rates”?

The parties—two cable companies—have litigated this issue for over a decade. After a trial, a jury concluded that one cable company's reduced rates for only a few of its customers violated state law, and were designed to unfairly drive the smaller and economically weaker cable company out of business. The jury awarded the smaller cable company compensatory and punitive damages.

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County—the third time these parties have appeared before this Court—we find there is a private cause of action under the West Virginia Cable Television Systems Act against cable operators that illegally offer “unduly discriminatory” cable rates. We further find that the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages was supported by the evidence.

I.Facts and Background

Appellant Charter Communications VI, PLLC (“Charter”), acquired an existing television cable company in 1999, and began providing cable services to citizens in the more “urban” incorporated areas of Wood County, largely centered in Parkersburg, West Virginia. Appellee Community Antenna Service, Inc. (“Community Antenna”), is a much smaller company that provided cable services in rural, unincorporated areas of Wood County. In 1999, Community Antenna received a franchise agreement with the City of Parkersburg, and began extending its service into areas already served by the Charter system.

This appeal has its genesis in a lawsuit filed in the circuit court in October 2000. Appellant Charter brought a lawsuit alleging that Community Antenna had unlawfully entered into agreements with certain apartment building owners, whereby Community Antenna would be the exclusive cable provider for tenants in those buildings. Upon a certified question from the circuit court, we concluded that state law does not allow the kinds of exclusive contracts that Community Antenna made with apartment owners.¹

At issue in this appeal is a counterclaim filed by Community Antenna in the underlying lawsuit. Community Antenna alleged that Charter was using an unlawful pricing scheme called “CAS buy-back plans” to unfairly drive Community Antenna out of business. A buy-back pricing plan was only offered by Charter to (1) Community Antenna customers, and (2) Charter customers who indicated an intent to leave Charter to subscribe to Community Antenna. The buy-back pricing plan was only offered in service areas where Charter and Community Antenna competed. No other Charter customer was eligible.

Under the buy-back pricing plans, Charter essentially offered some of its customers rates that would “meet or beat” Community Antenna's rates, and which were lower than Charter's rates for its customers who were not offered the buy-back pricing. If a Charter customer qualified for and received services under the plan—and about 800 did—the customer got some variation of cash rebates, credits, and/or reduced rates while simultaneously receiving added cable services. Charter customers usually received the benefit of the plan for a twelve-month period; however, some were allowed to extend their service under the plan, at reduced rates, indefinitely. The large number of Charter customers who were not in the service areas where Charter competed with Community Antenna were not offered the buy-back pricing plan.

During the pendency of the circuit court action, Community Antenna filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission. Community Antenna asked the Commission to find that Charter's buy-back pricing plans were “unduly discriminatory” in violation of the Cable Television Systems Act, W.Va.Code, 24D–1–13(b) [1999]. In 2002, an administrative law judge determined that Charter's buy-back plans “unduly discriminate in favor of certain customers [since] [o]nly customers who have [Community Antenna] service available and either leave Charter or threaten to leave Charter for [Community Antenna] are offered the plans.” However, the Public Service Commission rejected the administrative law judge's recommended decision, and in 2004 decided that the buy-back pricing plans were “reasonable and not discriminatory.”

Community Antenna appealed the Commission's decision to this Court. In 2006, in a careful and extended discussion by Justice Benjamin of federal and state laws pertaining to the regulation of the cable...