Cnty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co.

Decision Date26 March 2018
Docket Number14 C 9548
Citation314 F.Supp.3d 975
Parties COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO & CO., Wells Fargo Financial, Inc., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo "John Doe" Corps. 1–375, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

David J. Worley, James M. Evangelista, Pro Hac Vice, Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Evangelista Worley, LLC, Darren Penn, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffrey Harris, Pro Hac Vice, Harris Penn Lowry LLP, Atlanta, GA, James D. Montgomery, Sr., John K. Kennedy, James D. Montgomery & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Sanford P. Dumain, Pro Hac Vice, J. Birt Reynolds, Pro Hac Vice, F. Jennifer Sarah Czeisler, Melissa Ryan Clark, Pro Hac Vice, Peggy J. Wedgworth, Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Olivia Kelman, Pro Hac Vice, Paul F. Hancock, K & L Gates LLP, Miami, FL, Sheldon Toby Zenner, David C. Bohan, Hannah Olivia Koesterer, Peter Ginewicz Wilson, Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP, Abram Isaac Moore, Nicole Claire Mueller, K & L Gates LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

County of Cook, Illinois, alleges in this suit that Wells Fargo & Co. and related entities (collectively, "Wells Fargo") issued predatory subprime mortgage loans to Cook County residents that over the years went into default and drove the mortgaged properties into foreclosure. According to the County, because the scheme was and remains concentrated in heavily minority neighborhoods, Wells Fargo has violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. , more commonly known as the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The court dismissed the original complaint on the ground that the County, on the facts alleged, did not fall within the FHA's zone of interests and thus was not an "aggrieved person" entitled to sue under the Act. Docs. 59–60 (reported at 115 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D. Ill. 2015) ).

Cook County filed an amended complaint, Doc. 65, and Wells Fargo again moved to dismiss, Doc. 70. While that motion was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co. , 801 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2015), and City of Miami v. Bank of America Corp. , 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), suits very similar to this one. In light of the grant, this court stayed this case pending the Supreme Court's decision. Doc. 96. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the City of Miami's "financial injuries" from the defendant banks' alleged predatory lending practices—practices and injuries closely resembling those alleged here by Cook County"fall within the zone of interests that the FHA protects." Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1296, 1304, 197 L.Ed.2d 678 (2017). The Court nevertheless remanded the case for consideration of whether the City had adequately alleged proximate cause, holding that the "Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that foreseeability is sufficient to establish proximate cause under the FHA." Id. at 1306.

In light of City of Miami —in particular, its discussion of proximate cause—this court offered and the County took the opportunity to file a second amended complaint. Docs. 103–104, 106. Wells Fargo now moves under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss that complaint. Doc. 108. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the operative complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC , 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in Cook County's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts are set forth as favorably to the County as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc. , 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth those facts at the pleading stage, the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A. , 610 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010).

Wells Fargo is a large residential mortgage originator and servicer. Doc. 106 at ¶ 26. Beginning in the late 1990s, in an effort to increase profits, Wells Fargo (and Wachovia, which Wells Fargo acquired in 2008, id. at ¶ 30) developed a practice known as "equity stripping." Id. at ¶¶ 3–7, 77, 92, 105–106, 275. Wells Fargo pooled and securitized the loans it originated while retaining fee-generating mortgage servicing rights, and it maximized its fees by imposing onerous loan terms without regard to borrowers' ability to repay the loans. Id. at ¶¶ 79–80, 89, 97, 103, 105, 109, 111, 274. From 2010 to 2013, for instance, Wells Fargo earned over $2.6 billion in late charges and ancillary fees. Id. at ¶ 121. Wells Fargo's equity-stripping practice continues through the present day in the form of nonprime lending, mortgage servicing, and loan default and foreclosure-related activities. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 120, 272, 276, 292, 385.

Equity stripping begins with the origination of "high cost," "subprime," or other "nonprime" mortgages, which permits Wells Fargo to charge substantially higher origination fees and then substantially higher service fees over the life of the loan. Id. at ¶¶ 86, 92, 102, 104. Those mortgages often allow the borrower to pay only the monthly interest accruing on the loan or to make only minimum payments. Id. at ¶ 126. Equity stripping continues through loan servicing, as Wells Fargo receives income from both prepayment fees and late payment fees. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 91–92, 102. Equity stripping culminates in default and foreclosure, as borrowers pay additional fees and ultimately see their equity eliminated. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9, 91–92, 102.

Wells Fargo's equity-stripping practice targeted minority borrowers in Cook County. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6, 54, 80–81, 166, 187–188, 229, 293–300, 311. Publicly available loan origination data indicates that the percentage of high-cost and other nonprime loans issued by Wells Fargo in Cook County to minority borrowers well exceeded the County's percentage of minority home owners—typically by a factor of two to three. Id. at ¶¶ 297–309. Because minority borrowers "provided the quickest and easiest path ... for [Wells Fargo] to originate as many loans as possible as rapidly as possible to borrowers most likely to accept ... less favorable terms," id. at ¶ 164, Wells Fargo subjected minority borrowers to equity stripping to a greater extent than it did nonminority borrowers with similar credit histories, id. at ¶¶ 80, 154. Minority borrowers were particularly susceptible to Wells Fargo's predatory practices because they were more likely than nonminority borrowers to lack access to low-cost credit, relationships with banks and other traditional depository institutions, and adequate comparative financial information. Id. at ¶ 162.

As part of its equity-stripping practice, Wells Fargo granted employees discretion to steer prime-eligible minority borrowers into nonprime loans. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 81, 150, 183–186, 197–199, 212, 227, 229, 231, 243–244, 435. Wells Fargo employees encouraged minority borrowers otherwise eligible for prime loans to limit the documentation they provided concerning their income and assets, to take out larger loans than they needed, and to avoid making down payments. Id. at ¶¶ 246–248. This resulted in minority borrowers paying "materially higher costs, discretionary fees, [and] materially higher monthly mortgage payments ... than similarly situated non-minority borrowers." Id. at ¶ 266. Wells Fargo employees also failed to advise prime-eligible minority borrowers of their prime-eligible status. Id. at ¶ 246.

Wells Fargo compensated employees with bonuses and commissions for offering minority borrowers higher than published loan rates and for approving them for loans for which they were not qualified based on their employment, income, or credit history. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 150, 183, 197–199, 205, 227, 229, 243–244. Wells Fargo reserved the right to discipline employees who failed to issue a certain quantity of nonprime loans. Id. at ¶ 184. In addition, Wells Fargo incorporated unfavorable terms, excessive fees, and prepayment penalties into mortgage loans to minority borrowers; based loans to minority borrowers on inflated or fraudulent appraisals; encouraged minority borrowers to inflate their stated income; fraudulently entered income data into the company's underwriting software; repeatedly refinanced loans to minority borrowers; and included loan terms and conditions that made it difficult for minority borrowers to reduce their debt. Id. at ¶¶ 152, 255–256, 259–260.

To further its equity-stripping practice, Wells Fargo maintained a "Diverse Segments" unit, whose responsibility was to increase the number of loans made to minority borrowers. Id. at ¶¶ 167–182. The unit had access to a wealth of relevant demographic data and typically worked closely with realtors and community organizations to target potential customers. Id. at ¶¶ 162–182, 187. The data enabled Wells Fargo to customize its marketing materials to African–Americans. Id. at ¶ 188. Wells Fargo paid bonuses to employees in the Diverse Segments unit based on the number of loans they made to minority borrowers. Id. at ¶ 183.

Discrimination in administering Wells Fargo's equity-stripping practice continued into the loan-servicing process, including its evaluation and processing of loan modification requests and its handling of defaulted loans through default work-outs and foreclosure proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 272–273, 295. Wells Fargo retained the discretion to modify loans in default and to foreclose on properties with defaulted mortgages and, pursuant...

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